Three Essay in Corporate Finance by Volkova, Ekaterina
  
 
  THREE ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Dissertation 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by Ekaterina Volkova 
May 2017
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2017 Ekaterina Volkova 
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 
  
THREE ESSAYS IN CORPORATE FINANCE 
 
Ekaterina Volkova, Ph. D.  
Cornell University 2017 
 
This dissertation explores three different aspects in corporate finance. My first 
essay explores governance from the side of blockholders. My second essay explores 
governance from the side of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). And my 
third essay overview and summarizes recent literature in the IPO field. 
 In Chapter 1, “Blockholder Diversity: Effect of Polyphony on the Power of 
Monitoring”, I investigate how the differences in skill, incentives and preferences 
between large shareholders in the company affect the power of their monitoring. My 
findings suggest that diversity between blockholder creates disagreement that have 
strong negative influence of the power of their governance. Such adverse influence is 
also reflected in the future dynamics of company value and performance. 
 In Chapter 2 (joint with Michelle Lowry and Roni Michaely) “Information 
Revelation Through Regulatory Process: Interactions Between the SEC and 
Companies Ahead of the IPO”, we explore the main determinants of extensiveness and 
focus of SEC review of companies before they go public. In the second part of this 
chapter we explore what investors could learn from the information disclosed during 
this review process. 
 In Chapter 3 (joint with Michelle Lowry and Roni Michaely) “Initial Public 
Offerings: a Synthesis of the Literature and Direction for Future Research” we provide 
a literature review of recent papers in the IPO field. In addition, we also explore how 
the main stylized facts behave of the large sample of IPOs between 1972 and 2015. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BLOCKHOLDER DIVERSITY:  
EFFECT OF POLYPHONY ON THE POWER OF MONITORING 
Abstract 
According to my new and extensive data on all US public companies, the majority 
of them have multiple blockholders. These blockholders could differ along several 
characteristics even within one company. Diversity between blockholders within one 
firm could have a positive and synergistic impact on its value. Alternatively, 
conflicting objectives and interests may cause diversity to adversely impact company 
operations. To investigate the resulting impact of blockholders diversity on the 
company value, I construct diversity measures reflecting their heterogeneity in 
identity, portfolio size an investment horizon. Using shocks from blockholder 
acquisitions of financial firms and unexpected increases in payouts they receive from 
other positions to identify the causality channel, I find that block diversity has a strong 
negative influence on company value and operations. This result is robust to a variety 
of specification and to exclusion of different groups of blockholders. Additionally, I 
use simulated placebo tests to reject alternative explanations of the results with other 
observed and unobserved characteristics of block ownership. 
Introduction 
“Perhaps the most important evidence about blockholders is their wide 
prevalence” (Edmans and Holderness (2016), p. 42). Indeed, according to a new and 
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extensive dataset, a typical US public company has four blocks on average.1 These 
blocks are held by different types of owners. Block owners may differ in whether they 
are the agent or the owner, and they may also vary in the size of their portfolio and 
investment horizon. The theoretical and empirical literature covers the impact of the 
level of block ownership on company characteristics.2 And while some evidence 
suggests variation in the influence between certain groups of blockholders, there is no 
research on how the simultaneous presence of different blockholders affects company 
value.3 This paper investigates the causal effect of blockholders’ diversity on company 
value and performance. 
This work has four main contributions to the literature. First, I show that diversity 
among blockholders has a negative impact on form value and investigate potential 
mechanism behind it. Second, the paper constructs a comprehensive and unique 
dataset that covers every block position in all US public companies between 1998 and 
2013. Block ownership information is extracted with a sequence of custom parser 
scripts from the disclosures under Section 13 of The Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (“SEA”). In total, the constructed dataset contains details of 179,120 block 
                                               
1 Throughout the paper, I use the term “blockholder” to refer to an entity that owns more than 5% of 
firm’s shares outstanding, and thus files Schedule 13D or Schedule 13G forms. Share ownership is 
defined in Rule 13d-3(a) (§ 240.13d-3(a)) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
2 Kahn and Winton (1998), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994) 
theoretically explore the ability of a single large blockholders to influence the company. Laeven and 
Levine (2008), Konijn, Kraussl, and Lucas (2011), Maury and Pajuste (2005) empirically investigate 
how block ownership and block concentration are relate to company value. 
3 Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) detect a significant heterogeneity in between the impact of 
blockholders on company value. Brav et al. (2008) explore the special role of hedge funds in 
monitoring, Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011) show how influence of a blockholder depends on his 
level of diversification, Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015) suggest that a blockholder's incentives to 
monitor a company is determined by the relative weight of the company in his portfolio. 
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positions and 35,024 blockholders in 15,157 companies. Third, I build three measures 
of block diversity that capture differences in preferences between company 
blockholders. Lastly, this paper constructs two instrumental variables for the level of 
block ownership and block diversity. One instrumental variable exploits time variation 
in the payouts that blockholders receive on their other block positions. The second 
instrument captures the creation of new blocks and the increase in existing block 
positions from the acquisition of financial firms. Both instruments are valid for a set of 
block ownership characteristics and could be used in other studies. 
Diversity between blockholders could have a two-sided effect on company 
governance and value. On the one hand, interactions between blockholders that 
possess different information and skills might have a synergistic effect. Having variety 
in their expertise might help them detect and implement policies that would maximize 
company value. For instance, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) show that passive 
institutional ownership increases the chances of activists gaining board representation. 
Also, the presence of one type of blockholder could discipline the behavior of other 
types of blockholders. For example, the model in Dhillon and Rossetto (2015) 
suggests that entrance of a diversified blockholder could offset the value-destructive 
influence of a non-diversified blockholder. 
Alternatively, diversity among a company's blockholders could adversely impact 
their influence on company value. While all shareholders prefer higher returns on their 
investment, differences in their beliefs, horizons, and risk attitudes could create 
discrepancies in their views on the desired policies. For instance, long-term investors 
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favor investment in R&D, while investors with short horizons prefer acquisition from 
external sources (Hoskisson et al. (2002)). Blockholders with higher heterogeneity in 
characteristics are more likely to vary in their objectives, and consequently prefer 
different corporate policies. Disparity and potential contradictions in blockholders' 
agendas may lower each blockholder's chances to achieve their desired changes. 
Building on the previous literature, I measure diversity across three components: 
blockholder type, portfolio size, and investment horizon. 
The first measure, diversity in identity, divides blockholders into four groups: 
financial institutions, individuals, activists investors, and other corporations. This 
division of blockholders originates in the work of Barclay and Holderness (1989). 
Blockholders in these groups differ in their regulatory constraints, fiduciary 
responsibilities and agency problems (Diamond (1984)). And according to Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach (2009) these groups have a pronounced difference in their impact on 
the corporate policies. More than two-thirds of US companies have blockholders from 
two of the groups described above, and around one-fifth of companies have 
blockholders from three groups. 
The second diversity component accounts for differences in portfolio size among 
company blockholders. The size of a blockholder’s portfolio influences his 
preferences over the desired level of company diversification (Faccio, Marchica, and 
Mura (2011)), and affects the intensity and power of his monitoring. Blockholders 
with larger portfolios could be less involved in the monitoring of a particular company 
because their portfolio returns are less sensitive to the performance of any particular 
5 
company (Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015)) or because they shift attention to other 
stocks in his portfolio (Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2016)). The power of monitoring, 
on the other hand, might increase with the number of blocks in the portfolio (Edmans, 
Levit, and Reilly (2016)). Thus, blockholders with different portfolio sizes vary in 
both whether they prefer a company to take additional risk and in their monitoring 
approach. 
The third measure of diversity divides blockholders into groups by their 
investment horizon. Investors with different horizons vary in their preferences over 
investment and payout policies (Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013)), opinions 
about company acquisition (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005)) and monitoring styles 
(Gallagher and Gardner (2013) and Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)). To capture 
described heterogeneity in preferences, I separate blockholders into four groups based 
on their investment horizons, and measure the diversity among these groups. 
Each diversity component represents the variation in skills and preferences 
between investors. Described heterogeneity between blockholders could either 
enhance or impair impact of their monitoring. In the initial predictions, I am agnostic 
about the resulting effect of diversity. For each source of diversity, I construct a 
variable that captures differences in the control rights between blockholders of various 
types. 
I establish the causal effect of diversity with the use of instrumental variables. 
Ideal instruments should provide identification for two variables: level of block 
ownership and diversity between blocks. These two variables change when either a 
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new block enters a company or some of the existing blocks change in size. I capture 
the described changes with two instruments that are built on the payouts blockholders 
receive from cross-held companies and their acquisitions of financial firms. 
The first instrument captures exogenous variation from payouts blockholders 
receive on their positions in other companies. Received payouts would predict changes 
in block positions under the following two conditions: 1) at least a part of a payout is 
allocated back into the blockholder’s portfolio, and 2) larger payouts result in more 
reinvestment. Reinvestment of payouts could result either in the creation of new 
blocks in different companies or in a change of the size of existing blocks. And both of 
these changes would affect the level of block ownership and diversity between blocks. 
The construction of the instrument relies only on payouts from other companies 
and does not include payouts from the company itself; thus, the instrument is unlikely 
to be affected by any characteristics of the company of interest. To further ensure that 
the exclusion restriction holds and that the instrument is not related to unobserved 
characteristics of blockholders, I measure the instrument based only on payouts 
received by blockholders whot are less prone to affect corporate policies. 
The idea for the second instrumental variable originates from the work of Hong 
and Kacperczyk (2010). This instrument indicates whether one of the company's 
blockholders acquired a financial firm during the previous year. After the acquisition, 
the portfolio of the target company would be combined with the portfolio of the 
acquirer. If a target firm has any holdings in the companies where the acquirer had a 
block, then the size of his block position would increase. Additionally, combining both 
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portfolios might result in new blocks. My analysis shows that company block 
ownership increases by almost 3% when one of its blockholders acquires a financial 
firm. An increase in the position of one of the company's blockholders would impact 
measures of block diversity. Statistical tests also support the intuition for the relevance 
condition for both instruments. 
Acquisition is a long, complex, and costly process, and it is implausible that a 
blockholder would initiate it mainly to increase one of his portfolio positions. 
Therefore, this instrument is unlikely to be correlated with any characteristics of the 
company. I limit the instrument construction to a subset of blockholders that are less 
prone to have a distinctive impact on corporate policies. The independence of the 
instrument from both companies’ and blockholders’ characteristics suggests that the 
exclusion restriction should hold. 
My analysis finds that diversity among company blockholders negatively affects 
its value. This effect has a strong statistical significance across all diversity measures. 
Economic magnitude of the predicted causal impact is similar for all three measures: 
one-standard-deviation increment in diversity lowers company value by 0.27 standard 
deviations. The difference between observed partial correlation and estimated causal 
effect of diversity on company value indicates a presence of strong selection bias in 
blockholder’s decision to enter the company. My paper predicts that blockholder 
would decide to enter a company where other large shareholder differ from him in 
preferences only when he has expectations that the company value would increase in 
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the future. Also I find a similar negative effect of blockholder diversity on return on 
assets and free cash flow of the company. 
In addition to establishing of the aggregate effect of block ownership on the 
company value and performance I investigate a potential mechanism behind this 
effect. My results suggest propose that the negative influence of diversity comes from 
the difference in views between blockholders. First, I show that the level of 
disagreement between blockholders rises after the increase of diversity. Also, I 
document that increase in diversity leads to more shareholder proposals in a company, 
but each of this proposals receive lower support. These findings suggest that 
heterogenous group of shareholders tend to pull company in different directions, but 
each direction receives lower support. My results also indicate that such disintegration 
in monitoring lowers level of company investment. 
To ensure that the results are not driven by the presence of one particular type of 
blockholder, I repeat the entire analysis excluding certain groups of blocks. The first 
test estimates diversity measures, block ownership, and instrumental variables for a 
subsample of non-institutional blockholders only, and repeats my paper’s analysis for 
this new set of variables. This test detects that even diversity between non-institutional 
blockholders lowers the value of the company. The second test investigates the impact 
of diversity when blockholders from the top quantile (by the size of their portfolio) are 
excluded. And the third test omits blockholders in the top quantile of their investment 
horizon from the analysis. Furthermore, the second and third tests also show that 
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diversity between selected subsamples of blocks has a negative impact on company 
value. 
Additionally, I verify that my results are not driven by other components of block 
ownership, such as block concentration or unobserved characteristics of the blocks. To 
reject this set of alternative explanations, I use 100,000 simulations of placebo 
diversity; in each simulation, I randomly divide company blocks into four groups and 
calculate the placebo diversity measure based on these groups. For every generated 
placebo diversity I estimate its influences on company value. Comparing the main 
results of my paper with the results of simulations, I find that the effects of three “real” 
diversity variables are stronger than 98% of simulations. These simulations address 
concerns that my results could be explained by omitted variables that are related to 
company block ownership. 
Another contribution of my paper is a collection of detailed information about 
block ownership in every US public company between 1998 and 2013. To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study of block ownership that includes all publicly 
listed US companies. To construct this dataset, I download and process 579,249 forms 
filed under Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of SEA using a set of custom parser scripts. My 
dataset extends the conclusions in Holderness (2009): not only are blocks present in 
the majority US companies, but more than 80% of companies have multiple blocks. 
And both the average number of blocks and the level of block ownership in US 
companies has risen over time. Surprisingly, blocks are more common in medium-size 
companies than in small or large companies. And only half of all blocks belongs to 
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institutional investors. Compared to the European data on block ownership, US blocks 
are relatively small in size and rarely held by both inside and outside individuals. 
Hypotheses 
Blockholders can influence the value of the company and affect its policies. They 
can exert the governance through intervention (Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and 
Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994)) and discipline the management with the 
threat of exit (Admati and Pfleiderer (2009); Edmans (2009); Bharath, Jayaraman, and 
Nagar (2013)). Several models suggest that the power of a single large shareholder to 
improve the value of the company rises with the size of his stake (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986); and Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner (1994); and Kahn and Winton (1998)). 
But cases of sole large blockholders are relatively rare: less than 10% of US 
companies in the recent years have just one block.4 The majority of US companies 
have several blockholders, and interactions between them could also affect the ability 
of this group to control the management (Crane, Koch, and Michenaud (2015)). 
A number of previous studies have documented a correlation between the value of 
the company and the characteristics of its block ownership in multiple countries. The 
value of the company is positively related to block ownership concentration in US 
companies (Konijn, Kraussl, and Lucas (2011)), the presence of the second large 
blockholder in European companies (Laeven and Levine (2008)) and a more equal 
distribution of cash flow rights between two largest block sizes in Finnish companies 
                                               
4 This estimate is based on the data in my sample; see Figure 1.1. 
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(Maury and Pajuste (2005)). In addition to company value, the presence of the 
multiple blockholders has been linked to changes in dividend payouts (Faccio, Lang, 
and Young (2001)), an increase in corporate risk taking (Mishra (2011)) and a higher 
level of shareholders protection (Barroso Casado et al. (2015)). Bharath, Jayaraman, 
and Nagar (2013) show that the power of the “threat of exit” monitoring increases 
with the number of blocks. 
The previously cited papers have mostly focused their analysis on the 
characteristics of the block position, and rarely account for the characteristics of the 
block owner. However, large investors vary in the their beliefs, expertise, preferences, 
and also in the way they influence the company. This is supported by Cronqvist and 
Fahlenbrach (2009), who discovered that there is significant heterogeneity in the 
investment and governance styles between different types of blockholders. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first paper that estimates the effect of block diversity on 
the value of the company. 
The idea that shareholders are heterogeneous is not new to the finance literature. 
For instance, shareholders vary in their valuation of a company (Bagwell (1992)) and 
in their reaction to corporate news (Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003)). This idea also 
finds reflection in other business disciplines. Paper in the strategy literature indicate 
the variety of the effects different investors have on the innovations (Hoskisson et al. 
(2002)), international diversification (Tihanyi et al. (2003)), and firm strategy 
(Connelly et al. (2010)). 
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What should the direction of diversity impact on the outcome? Review paper by 
Williams and O’Reilly (1998) suggests that diversity in a group could have a dual 
impact on the outcome: it can either improve it through the synergy between the group 
members, or worsen it because of communication difficulties. Similar predictions hold 
in the application of diversity influence to a group of blockholders. On the one hand, a 
more diverse group of stakeholders posses a wider set of potentially relevant 
information, and they could employ multiple methods to influence the company. On 
the other hand, a diverse group of blockholders could have the opposite views on the 
company’s optimal growth and development strategy. Additionally, the more diverse 
the group is, the higher are the coordination difficulties between agents. And, 
consequently, the aggregate power of governance could be lower with a diverse group 
of blockholders. 
Hypothesis I (Benefits of Diversity) 
Diversity between blockholders could have a synergistic impact on their 
effectiveness. Studies in the organization behavior find that more heterogeneous 
groups of agents have an advantage in problem solving. The studies originated from 
Hoffman and Maier (1961) experiment, in which a more heterogeneous group of 
agents outperformed a homogenous group. Theoretical model by Hong and Page 
(2004) shows that a heterogeneous group of agents even outperforms a homogeneous 
group of agents that have better problem-solving abilities. This conclusion suggests 
that diversity in a group of blockholders could enhance their abilities to resolve 
potential problems in the company, such as extraction of private benefits by 
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management. Heterogeneous blockholders could also cross-monitor each other’s 
actions and diminish potential negative influence (Dhillon and Rossetto (2015)). 
Additionally, blockholders in a more heterogeneous groups tend to have greater 
variance in their levels of expertise. For instance, passive mutual funds could impact 
the management through private communication, and an individual blockholder could 
expert in the gathering of information about the company. As a result, a group of 
diverse blockholders in the company could possess more information and have more 
potential expertise in monitoring the management, which could enhance the power of 
their governance. For instance, Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016) find that the 
presence of passive investors increases the chances of activist investors to improve 
governance of the company. 
Lastly, heterogeneous blockholders could also vary in their valuation of the 
company. Miller (1977) model states that higher heterogeneity of in the beliefs about 
the company value makes short positions more expensive, and thus increases the price 
of the stock. Studies by Chen, Hong, and Stein (2002) and Diether, Malloy, and 
Scherbina (2002) find empirical support for this model the based on breadth of mutual 
fund positions in the company and analysts disagreements. 
Hypothesis I. Higher heterogeneity among large investors has a positive impact 
on the value of the company 
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Hypothesis II (Costs of Diversity) 
Alternatively, diversity between blockholders could adversely impact value of the 
company. An adverse effect of heterogeneity could come through two main channels: 
conflict of interests between blockholders and coordination/communication difficulties 
between them. 
Diversity between large shareholders signals that they are heterogeneous in their 
beliefs, skills, and preferences. Their views on whether a company should take a 
project or adopt a new policy could vary as well. For instance, Hoskisson et al. (2002) 
find that in respect to innovation policies, public pension funds favor investments in 
R&D, while professional investment fund managers support the acquisition of 
innovations from external sources. Such a range of opinions creates a conflict of 
interests between the blockholders, and could decrease their governance. 
Coordination difficulties between the different type of blockholders could also 
potentially decrease their ability to monitor the company. Laeven and Levine (2008) 
study suggests that large shareholders are less likely to cooperate when they vary in 
type. Crane, Koch, and Michenaud (2015) find that closely connected groups of 
investors have greater chances of improving the governance of the company. 
Coordination problems could appear even within the same class of investors: Huang 
(2016) finds that institutional investors' monitoring power increases as communication 
between them becomes easier. Communications difficulties for blockholders could 
play an even larger role because these agents do not have special meetings or other 
discussion platforms. 
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The homogeneity of blockholders' preferences could also lead to a more uniform 
exit decision. This similarity in the exit decisions could also improve the “threat of 
exit” governance of the group (Edmans and Manso (2011)). 
This hypothesis is also consistent with the findings of Kandel, Massa, and 
Simonov (2011). They find that Swedish companies whose small investors are more 
similar in terms of age, wealth, and location have higher profitability and returns. 
Hypothesis II. Heterogeneity between the blocks in the company lowers its value 
 
Data 
My sample is pulled from CRSP-Compustat Merged database over the period 
from 1998 through 2013. The start of the sample coincides with the earliest 
availability of reliable information about block purchases. The blockholders' 
information was collected using the Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and 
Retrieval system (EDGAR) of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
Institutional and insider ownership is obtained from Thompson Reuters database. 
Information about M&A deals is taken from SDC Platinum database. 
I collect block ownership information from the disclosures under Sections 13(d) 
and 13(g) of SEA. These sections obligate shareholders to file a Schedule 13 when 
their position in a public company rises above 5%. In case of material changes, they 
have also to file amendements to the schedules. There are two types of Schedule 13 
filings: the more extensive Schedule 13D and the short-form Schedule 13G. The type 
of form and reporting rules depend on multiple factors, such as identity of investor, 
16 
size of his stake, and the intentions of his purchase. Despite the variation in the 
disclosure rules, all forms include detailed information about the investor, block size, 
date of the event, name, and CUSIP code of the company. Amendments to both types 
of forms have to be filed at least once a year if substantial changes occur. 
I download all Schedules 13 and their amendments filed between 1995 and 2014 
from the EDGAR system and remove duplicated filings and filings triggered by stock 
buybacks.5 The described parameters limit the dataset of raw filings to 579,249 forms. 
All filings follow SEC guidance and have a similar structure; however, the exact 
wording of the form may vary across blockholders. I develop a set of custom parser 
scripts that accounts for the variation in the form templates. My scripts are adjusted for 
more than 200 different templates in the Schedule 13 filings. With the use of these 
parser scripts, I extract details about the company, blockholder, and size of the block 
position. On the next step, I construct a dataset that indicates the position of every 
blockholder at the end of each calendar year.6 
In total, the extracted data includes information about 35,024 blockholders in 
15,157 different companies. Most of these blocks have medium size: 96% of 
blockholders hold less than 20% of shares outstanding. 
                                               
5 Most of the filings appear in the EDGAR server at least twice: in the directory of the investor and the 
directory of the company. 
6 A more detailed description of the data collection and git hub directory with the code is available on 
my website www.evolkova.info 
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I append block ownership information to the dataset pulled from CRSP-
Compustat Merged Database between 1998 and 2013. I use the following criteria to 
construct my sample: 
1. Shares of the company are traded on NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX 
exchanges. 
2. I use following variables in my analysis: price and number of shares at the 
year end, sales, total assets, fixed assets, capital expenditures, Tobin's Q, 
ROA and FCF. I exclude observations in which this information is 
missing. 
3. Every company in my sample should disclose their information with the 
SEC. I exclude companies that do not have annual reports in their SEC 
directory. 
4. I exclude companies in the finance (SIC between 6000 and 6999) and 
utilities (SIC between 4900 and 4999) industries. 
My sample contains 51,708 observations between 1998 and 2013 for 6,316 unique 
firms. Figure 1.1 provides the distribution of the number of the blocks per company by 
year. Panel (A) suggests that the average number of blocks in US public companies 
increases over the years. The portion of companies without a block drops from 14% in 
1998 to 5% in 2013. At the start of my sample less than one third of companies had 
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four or more blocks, and this number rises to 59% by the sample's end.7 Panel (B) 
shows similar dynamics in the constant sample of 1,865 companies. 
 
Figure 1.1 Block Distribution. 
 
                                               
7 This result is similar to Holderness (2009) who explored the proxy statements of 376 US public 
companies and documented that 96% of them have at least one blockholder. Potential disparity with 
regarding the portion of companies without any blocks could be related to the matching SEC and 
Compustat information for these companies. As for the companies with at least one block I use CUSIP 
information from Schedule 13, but for the companies with 0 blocks I rely on the WRDS link database 
between Compustat and SEC EDGAR. 
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According to Panel (A) of Figure 1.2, the average number of blocks in a US 
public company rises from 2.9 in 1998 to 4.1 in 2013. Institutional investors hold 
around half of the blocks on average. Panel (B) shows that the average block 
ownership increases from 24% in 1998 to 31% in 2013. Institutional block ownership 
increases form 10% to 17% and non-institutional block ownership varies between 12% 
and 14% during the sample years. 
 
Figure 1.2 Institutional and non-Institutional Block Ownership.  
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Figure 1.3 presents the average number of blocks and the level of block ownership 
for twenty size quantiles of 4,090 companies in the last year of my sample. Median-
size companies have the highest number of blocks and the highest level of block 
ownership on average. Both of the characteristics follow an inverse U-shape pattern 
along the size quantiles. 
 
Figure 1.3 Block Ownership and Company Size.   
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Dimensions of Diversity 
To test my hypothesis, I derive three measures of blockholder diversity. The first 
measure focuses on the heterogeneity in blockholders' identities, the second measure 
captures differences in their portfolio sizes, and the last measure examines variation in 
the blockholders' horizons. Heterogeneity across these dimensions represent the 
potential differences in skills and preferences between blockholders in a company. 
In the first dimension, I divide blockholders into four groups based on their 
identity: individual investors, financial institutions, activists, and all other 
blockholders. Blockholders in these groups differ in the type of their ownership type, 
regulations, fiduciary responsibilities, and potential agency problems. Study by 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) finds that investors in these groups differ 
significantly in the impact they have on the company policies. 
The first group, individual blockholders, hold the position for their own account. 
Unlike institutions, individuals are not concerned with the potential fund outflow, and 
they face fewer agency problems (Diamond (1984)). Also, individual blockholders 
face less regulation constraints and are not subject to fiduciary responsibilities. Study 
by Becker, Cronqvist, and Fahlenbrach (2011) finds that individual blockholders 
significantly impact a range of company characteristics, including payouts, 
investments, return on assets, and leverage. 
The second group of blockholders includes institutional investors, defined as 
financial intermediaries that are regulated under Section 13(f) of SEA. A body of 
academic literature stresses the involvement of institutions in monitoring and their 
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influence on a company. Institutional investors have an advantage in information 
gathering (Michaely and Shaw (1994)) and are viewed as better monitors (Grinstein 
and Michaely (2005)). The presence of institutional investors has an impact on the 
different aspects of company governance (shareholders proposals Gillan and Starks 
(2000), executive compensation Hartzell and Starks (2003), board independence 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2014), private communications with the management 
McCahery, Sautner, and Starks (2016)), and corporate policies (R&D Bushee (1998), 
payouts Grinstein and Michaely (2005), and leverage Michaely, Vincent, and Popadak 
(2015)). 
Third group of investors include active shareholders. Unlike blockholder from 
other identity groups activists could impose governance through direct interventions (“
voice”). I define activists as blockholders who file Schedule 13D that gives them on 
option to oppose the management. My definition of activists investor is broader than 
Brav et al. (2008) who focus only on activists hedge funds, but even this conservative 
estimate suggests that active blockholders constitute only a small portion of all 
blockholders (Panel (A) Figure 1.4). 
The fourth group includes all other blockholders. This group did not receive any 
focused attention in the academic literature, and we do not have any knowledge about 
its influence on the company policies. 
These four groups differ in their incentives and preferences. They also vary in 
their investment and governance styles (Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009)). Panel (A) 
of Figure 1.4 show the dynamics of the average holdings of each group over the years. 
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In the first diversity measure, I capture the difference in the control rights between the 
described identity groups. 
 
Figure 1.4 Block ownership and Investor Type.  
 
In the second diversity measure, blockholders are divided into groups based on 
the size of their portfolio. The size of their portfolio reflects blockholders’ preferences 
regarding company’s risk taking behavior and their involvement in monitoring. I 
proxy the size of a blockholder’s portfolio with the number of blocks that he holds. 
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The number of blocks in a portfolio is a crude proxy for the level of a 
blockholder's diversification. Faccio, Marchica, and Mura (2011) show that the 
diversification of large shareholders influences company’s risk taking. They find that 
companies with more diversified blockholders undertake riskier investments than 
companies with less diversified blockholders. 
The number of blocks contained in his portfolio influences the monitoring 
approach of a blockholder. Edmans, Levit, and Reilly (2016) model suggests that 
governance impact increases with the number of blocks in a portfolio. They show that 
decision to sell one particular block sends a signal to the market about the future 
performance of a company. The more blocks an investor holds, the less likely it is for 
him to exit the position due to a liquidity shock. On the other hand, investors with 
fewer blocks have more incentives to monitor, because they can focus their attention 
(Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt (2016)), and the overall performance of their portfolio is 
more sensitive to the returns of each stock (Fich, Harford, and Tran (2015)). Kang, 
Luo, and Na (2017) find that large number of blocks held within one industry gives 
blockholder an informational advantage and improve efficiency of their governance. 
I divide blockholders into four quantiles based on the number of blocks in their 
portfolio. The first group includes investors that have a single block, the second those 
that have 2-20 blocks, the third those that have 21-220 blocks, and the last group those 
that have more than 220 blocks. Panel (B) of Figure 1.4 presents the dynamics of the 
average ownership by each group over the years. I use these four groups to construct 
the second diversity measure. 
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The third measure of diversity divides blockholders into groups based on their 
investment horizon. The finance literature suggests that short-term and long-term 
investors vary in their preferences regarding company payouts and monitoring styles. 
In terms of corporate policies, long-term blockholders prefer higher investments 
and lower payouts (Derrien, Kecskes, and Thesmar (2013)), while short-term 
blockholders favor company acquisitions, even when the premium is lower (Gaspar, 
Massa, and Matos (2005)). Short-term blockholders tend to discipline management 
through trading (Gallagher and Gardner (2013)), while long-term blockholders are 
more involved in monitoring (Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)). 
I use portfolio turnover as a proxy for a blockholder's investment horizon. 
Portfolio turnover is defined as a weighted average of absolute changes in all 
blockholders' positions. 
 
Where  is a turnover measure of blockholder  in the year , that holds 
 blocks,  is a market capitalization of company  in the year  and  
represents the percent of shares outstanding controlled by blockholder  in the 
company  at the end of the year . Variable  is set to zero in the years before the 
enter or after the exit. Thus, when a blockholder enter or exit one of the companies, 
turnover of his portfolio increases. 
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I divide blockholders into four groups based on the quantiles of the portfolio 
turnover. Panel (C) of Figure 1.5 shows the dynamics of the average ownership of 
each group over the years. I estimate the third measure of diversity based on these 
groups. 
 
Figure 1.5 Block Ownership and Investor Turnover.  
This paper explores the effect of diversity between blockholders. However, any 
definition of diversity is reasonable only for companies with at least two blocks. Thus, 
I limit my dataset to the companies with multiple blocks. This restriction decreases my 
sample from 51,708 to 40,935 company-year observations. For each observation, I 
construct three measures of diversity based on the described groups using the formula: 
 
Where  is one of three diversity measures (  {identity, size, 
horizon}),  is the number of groups in the component ,  is a percent of shares 
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outstanding controlled by the group , and  is a percent of shares outstanding 
controlled by all blockholders in a company. 
Diversity variables are based on Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) between 
diversity groups. HHI is taken with a negative sign in the formula for a more intuitive 
interpretation of the measures: the higher value of the diversity variable corresponds to 
higher heterogeneity between blocks. If all blocks in a company are homogeneous, 
then the diversity variable equals zero. Diversity in the company is the highest when 
all the groups have the same size. 
Figure 1.6 illustrates the construction of diversity in identity for a company with 
four blocks. When a company has three blockholders – individual, institution, activist 
and corporation – and each of them holds a block of 6%, diversity in identity equals to 
0.75 (Panel (A)). Diversity measure is affected by the changes in the types of its 
blockholders and by the changes in the sizes of their positions. For instance, if two 
blockholders with the stake of 6% each would be individual and two other 
blockholders with 6% each would be activists investors then diversity would 0.5, 
lower than in a previous case (Panel (B)). Diversity measure would also change after 
changes in the block sizes. If instead of having three different blocks of 6% (as in 
Panel (A)), a company would has three blocks with sizes of 5%, 5%, 15%, and 15% 
(Panel (C)), diversity in identity would decrease from 0.75 to 0.6875. 
I calculate three diversity variables: , , and 
 using the same principal. FigureMatrix presents a histogram for 
all constructed variables.  
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Figure 1.6 Construction of Diversity Variable.  
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Figure 1.7 Correlation between Diversity Measures.  
Each of the three diversity dimensions captures a different aspect of heterogeneity 
between blockholders. Figure 1.7 shows correlations and heat map of the distributions 
of the three diversity variables. Correlation of  variable with 
 and  is 0.23 and 0.20 respectively. Correlation 
between  and  is 0.49. Relatively low level of 
correlation between the variables suggests that these variables captures different 
characteristics of the block diversity. Additionally, I construct an aggregate diversity 
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index, using these three variables. This index is constructed as a first principal 
component of three previously defined variables.8  
 
The resulting variable of the principal component analysis explains the highest 
portion of variance of three diversity variables and allows me to control for variation 
in all three measures at once. 
Results 
Starting in this section, I focus on the analysis of diversity between blockholders. 
Diversity between blocks can only be measured in the companies where there are two 
or more blockholders. Therefore, I exclude companies without a block or with only 
one block from my analysis. This restriction cuts my sample to 40,935 company-year 
observations. Panel (A) of Table 1.1 provides summary statistics of all companies in 
my initial sample and Panel (B) describes the summary information after the exclusion 
companies with less than two blocks. All variables in my sample are winsorized at the 
1% level from the top and the bottom. 
  
                                               
8 I select the direction of the main principal component such, that it has a positive correlation with at 
least two diversity measures. If correlation is positive with less than two measures, diversity index is 
multiplied by -1. 
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Table 1.1. Summary Statistics.  
This table reports summary statistics for number of firm-specific characteristics from 1998 through 
2013. Sample in Panel (A) consists of firm-year observations for all US public firms between 1998 and 
2013 after exclusion of 1) firms in financial and utilities industries, 2) firms without annual reports in 
SEC EDGAR, 3) observations with negative or zero value of market capitalization and total assets or 
missing value of any the listed variables. Panel (B) restricts the sample to firms with at least two 
blockholders. Accounting information is obtained from CRSP-Compustat Merged database, 
institutional ownership is obtained from Thompson Reuters, and blockholders data is collected from 
Schedule 13D and Schedule 13G filings obtained from SEC EDGAR.  
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Table 1.2. Firm Value and Diversity of Block Ownership. Partial Correlations.  
This table reports non-causal relations between company value and diversity among company block- 
holders. The dependent variable in all models is Tobin’s Q. The sample consists of firm-year 
observations for all U. S. public firms with at least two blocks after exclusion of 1) firms in financial 
and utilities industries, 2) firms without annual reports in SEC EDGAR, 3) observations with negative 
or zero value of market capitalization and total assets or missing value of any other listed the variables. 
The vector of firm controls includes institutional holdings, sales growth, firm size, fixed assets, capital 
expenditures, leverage, Amihud illiquidity measure, firm fixed effects, and industry-year fixed effects. 
Standard errors are robust and double-clustered on firm and year level.  
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As a first step, I estimate a non-causal relationship between company value and 
block diversity. In this step, I use a multivariable regression defined by the following 
equation: 
 
Where  is a Tobin's Q of firm  in a year ,  corresponds to 
one out of four diversity measures described in the previous section (three dimensions 
and the aggregate index) and  is the percent of shares outstanding 
controlled by all blockholders.  is a set of firm specific controls, and variables  
and  corresponds to firm and industry-year fixed effects. I control for the 
aggregate level of institutional ownership to separate its influence from effect of block 
ownership. Other firm specific controls include growth, size, fixed assets, capital 
expenditures, leverage and Amihud illiquidity measure. The Appendix provides 
detailed definitions of the variables. All errors in all regressions are robust and double 
clustered on the company and year level. 
Model (1) of Table 1.2 shows the relationship between firm value and the level of 
block ownership. This model does not control for any measures of diversity. The 
results of this model do not detect any significance of correlation between the overall 
level of block ownership and firm value. This lack or relation is consistent with 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Mehran (1995) findings. 
Model (2) shows the results of the regression of firm value on the level of block 
ownership and diversity in the blockholders identity. In this specification, measure of 
diversity in identity does not have a significant predictive power toward the value of 
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the company. Model (3) and Model (4) show a significant negative link between the 
value of the company and diversity in the size of the blockholder's portfolio and in his 
investment horizon. Model (5) consistently suggests a negative relationship between 
firm value and aggregate diversity index. Overall, partial correlations suggest a weak 
negative link between block diversity and company value. 
The results of multivariate regressions detect a negative relationship between 
some measures of block ownership diversity and the value of the company. In this 
section I explore a causal relationship between these variables using identification 
with instrumental variables. My goal is to instrument two endogenous variables: level 
of block ownership and diversity between holders of these blocks. I identify 
exogenous variation in these variables with two instruments: payouts from cross-held 
companies and acquisitions of financial firms. 
The first stage regressions are described by the following system of equations: 
 
Where is the percent of shares outstanding controlled by all 
blockholders in the company, and  corresponds to one out of four 
diversity measures described in the previous section. Variables  and 
 are the constructed instruments. Variables represent company specific 
controls, and variables and corresponds to firm and industry-year fixed effects. 
The first instrument reflects how much blockholders receive in payouts from their 
positions in other companies. To construct this instrument, I obtain the list of all 
blockholders in a company. I estimate how much each blockholder receive in payouts 
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from all other companies in his portfolio. After I normalize this amount to the number 
of stocks in blockholder’s portfolio and the market capitalization of the company and 
sum all this amount across all blockholders. Formally, the first instrument is defined 
with the following formula: 
 
Where  is the market capitalization of the company  which has  
blockholders in a year . Blockholder  has blocks in  companies,  is a size of 
his position in the company ;  and  is the dollar amount of dividends 
and repurchases paid by the company . 
To verify the use of this instrumental variable I have to show that it satisfies the 
relevance condition and the exclusion restriction. The first condition requires the 
payout instrument to have a predictive power toward the level of block ownership and 
diversity measures. 
The payout instrument would predict the level of block ownership if two 
conditions are satisfied: 1) a blockholder reinvests at least part of the payouts back 
into the companies in his portfolio, and 2) reinvestment into each company is 
monotonic in the amount of payouts. Consistent with the described assumptions, the 
results of the first stage regression in the Model (1) of Table 1.3 show that the payouts 
variable has a strong positive correlation with the level of block ownership in the 
company. T-statistics of the instrument coefficient is 16.0, and this value is significant 
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at the 1% level. One standard deviation increase in the level of payouts corresponds to 
approximately 3% of an increase in the level of company block ownership. 
The size of the blocks tend to increase if a blockholder receives more payouts 
during the year. I find, that the marginal propensity to increase a block position 
decreases with the size of a block. A blockholder is more likely to increase a 8% size 
block by 10% (i.e. increase it to 8.8%), than increase a 10% size block by 10% (i.e. 
increase it to 11%). Due to such properties of a blockholder’s preferences, a payout 
instrument could also identify exogenous variation in the level of block diversity. 
Indeed, if the relative size of a diversity group changes, the level of diversity 
would change as well. For instance, block diversity would increase, if the relative size 
of the smallest diversity group rises. Empirically I find, that the smallest block in a 
company tend to belong to a smaller diversity group. This fact, in conjunction with the 
decreasing marginal propensity to reinvest into a block, predicts a positive correlation 
between block diversity and payout instrument. Decreasing marginal propensity to 
reinvest leads to higher relative increase in smaller blocks in response to payouts. And 
if smaller blocks tend to be in smaller diversity groups, then smaller diversity group 
would increase relatively more after payouts. Thus, diversity measure would rise. First 
stage analysis shows high correlation between diversity measures and the instrument. 
T-statistics of the instrument coefficient in the first stage varies between 8.0 and 11.8 
and is significant at 1% level. 
The exclusion restriction requires the instrument to influence the dependent 
variable of the analysis only through the level of block ownership or block diversity, 
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conditional on the controlled variables. This condition could not be tested statistically, 
and I can only argue that the instrumental variable is unlikely to influence the value of 
the company through other channels. 
The payout instrument is constructed based on the actions of other companies. 
Thus, it is less likely to be affected by any anticipated changes in the company of 
interest. Controlling for firm level fixed effects in the regression analysis additionally 
accounts for impact of initial characteristics of the company. In sum, the constructed 
instrument is unlikely to be correlated with any company-specific omitted variables. 
All 2SLS regressions also control for the industry-year fixed effects, and thus account 
for the potential dependence of company value and payout instrument on the market 
conditions. 
Another concern is that the payout instrument could be affected by unobserved 
characteristics of blockholders. For instance, a blockholder who is a strong monitor 
could be more successful in the demand for dividends in one company and 
improvement of the value of another company at the same time. To address this issue I 
scale received payouts by the number of blocks in the portfolio, and thus penalize 
more companies with large portfolio. Also, according to Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt 
(2016) findings shareholders have a limited attention in monitoring, and thus it is less 
likely that one blockholder would be highly involved into the monitoring of several 
companies at the same time. 
The second instrument is constructed based on the acquisition of financial firms 
by blockholders. The initial idea of this instrument comes from Hong and Kacperczyk 
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(2010), who used the mergers of brokerage houses as a shock to the competition 
between stock analysts. I adopt their design, and construct an instrument that indicates 
whether one of the blockholders in a company acquired a financial firm during the 
previous year. 
Information about mergers and acquisitions (M&A) is taken from the SDC 
Platinum database. I download all M&A deals between 1996 and 2013 where the 
target company is in the finance industry (meaning that two digit SIC code is 60, 61, 
62, 63, 64 or 67) and the value of the deal is above $1 million. There are 6,655 deals 
completed by 3,313 different acquirers that satisfy the described conditions. I 
manually match SDC acquirers with blockholders in my sample and check that the 
matched investor is a blockholder in my sample the year after the deal. These two 
conditions restrict the selection to 550 acquisitions. Similar to the previous instrument, 
I omit the events where a blockholder-acquirer controls more than 100 blocks in a 
year. 
For the next step, I construct a variable that equals to one when one blockholder in 
a company was involved in the selected acquisitions and zero otherwise. In total, this 
instrument equals to one in 1472 company-year observations.9 
Why acquisition of financial firms would be relevant for the level of block 
ownership or block diversity? First, in case of acquisition, assets of acquired firm 
would be added to blockholder's portfolio. And if the firm had any positions in the 
                                               
9 As an alternative investment, I use a target size instead of a dummy variable. This selection does not 
change my results. 
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company where acquirer has a block, then the size of this block will increase. Also, 
combined position of the blockholder and the target firm could result in new blocks in 
other companies. Table 1.3 indicates that the level of block ownership rises by 2.9% 
on average in the response to described acquisitions. 
The constructed instrument affects the diversity measure through the relative 
change in the size of one group of blocks in the company. Empirically, I detect that 
smaller blocks tend to have a higher relative increase than larger blocks in response to 
acquisitions. Because smaller blocks tend to be in the smaller diversity groups, smaller 
diversity groups would increase more in response to acquisitions. And a relative 
increase in a smaller diversity group leads to an increase in the level of diversity. 
Therefore, diversity in a company, on average, would increase after an acquisition. 
Results in the Table 1.3 support the proposed relation between the instrument and 
diversity measures. 
Relevancy of the instrument could also be established using the statistical tests in 
the first stage regressions. Table 1.3 presents the results of the first stage regressions. 
Model (1) shows a strong positive correlation of the level of block ownership in the 
company with both payout and acquisition instruments. Both of the instruments are 
significant at the one percent level, with t-statistics of 16.0 for payout instrument and 
5.0 for acquisitions instrument. Both of these statistics indicate the presence of a 
strong link between the block ownership variable and two instruments. The value of F-
test for the joint significance of two instruments is 262.8, which also supports the 
relevancy of the instruments for the level of block ownership. 
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Table 1.3. Validity of Instruments. First-stage Regression.  
This table reports results from a linear regression of the level of block ownership and four measures of 
diversity among firm blockholders on instrumental variables. The first instrumental variable, payouts, 
estimates the total value of payouts received by firm blockholders from their positions in other 
companies relative to firm market capitalization. The second instrument is a dummy variable that equals 
to one when one of firm blockholders acquires a financial firm. The sample consists of firm-year 
observations for all U. S. public firms with at least two blocks after exclusion of 1) firms in financial 
and utilities industries, 2) firms without annual reports in SEC EDGAR, 3) observations with negative 
or zero value of market capitalization and total assets or missing value of any other listed the variables.  
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Models (2) - (5) in the Table 1.3 also suggest relevancy of the constructed 
instruments in the explanations of the diversity measures. T-statistics of the instrument 
for first stage regressions of diversity measures range between 4.5 and 8.5, and are 
significant at the 1% level for all measures. 
The value of F-test for the joint significance of the instruments for diversity 
measures varies between 66.2 and 146.7 and also suggests a high correlation between 
the instruments and diversity measures. 
Acquisition of a financial firm is a long, regulated and complex process. If a 
shareholder wants to increase one of his block positions or obtain a new block, then 
direct purchase of the shares would be an easier option than a firm acquisition. 
Therefore, acquisition variable should be independent from the blockholder’s 
expectations of the future performance of the company. 
As in the previous instrument, I exclude the acquisition activity of investors with 
more than 100 blocks for the instrument. Large blockholders are more prone to 
acquire financial firms,  also might have a stronger impact on a company. To avoid the 
effect of these blockholders on my instrumental variables, I omit their activity in the 
construction of the instrument. 
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Table 1.4: Firm Value and Diversity of Block Ownership. 2SLS Analysis.  
This table explores the influence of diversity among blockholders on company value using two stage 
analysis. Block ownership and diversity measures are instrumented with payouts from other companies 
and acquisition of financial firms.  
 
43 
I estimate the causal effects of block diversity on company value with the 
following equation: 
 
Where  is a Tobin's Q of firm i in a year t,  corresponds to 
one out of four diversity measures (instrumented on the first stage), and  
is the portion of shares outstanding controlled by all blockholders (instrumented on the 
first stage).  is a set of firm specific controls, and variables  and  
corresponds to firm and industry-year fixed effects. I control for the aggregate level of 
institutional ownership to separate its influence from effect of block ownership. Other 
firm specific controls include growth, size, fixed assets, capital expenditures, leverage 
and Amihud illiquidity measure. All errors in all regressions are robust and double 
clustered on the company and year level. 
The level of block ownership and block diversity are treated as endogenous and 
instrumented with payouts and acquisitions variables constructed in the previous 
section. Model (1) of Table 1.4 shows that diversity in the identity of block owners 
lowers the value of the company. The coefficient of the variable equals to -4.630 and 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. According to the results, one-standard-
deviation increase in the level of this diversity measure leads to a 0.64 standard 
deviation drop in the value of the company . The 
magnitude of the effect of the block diversity is large in comparison to the standard 
deviation. However, the second stage coefficients reflect predicted causal effect of the 
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diversity. The difference between two-stage and one-stage coefficients suggest a 
strong sample selection bias in block ownership and block diversity. Indeed, the 
estimated value of the selection bias is 4.60.10 Large positive value of the selection 
bias suggests that a new blockholder would enter a company with blockholders who 
different from him mostly in the cases when he believes that the company is 
overvalued or would outperform in the future. 
Model (2) shows the relationship between heterogeneity in the size of 
blockholders’ portfolios and company value. The coefficient of this diversity 
dimension is -5.714 and it is significant at the 1% level. The economic effect of 
diversity in size is very similar to the effect of the diversity in identity: one-standard-
deviation increase in the size diversity corresponds to a drop of 0.73 standard 
deviations in the value of the company . Model (3) 
presents a negative relation between the diversity of blockholders in investment 
horizon and value of the company. This relation is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and the economic magnitude of the effect is very similar to estimates from the 
previous models: one-standard-deviation rise in the diversity in investment horizon 
corresponds to a 0.73  standard deviation drop in the 
value of the company. While economic magnitude seems to be very high it does not 
mean that every increase in diversity would result in a dramatic drop in company 
value. 
                                               
10 4.60 is a difference between -0.02 (the coefficient on Diversity in identity in Model (1), Table 1.2) 
and -4.62 (the coefficient on Diversity in identity in Model (1) Table 1.4). 
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Table 1.5: Return on Assets and Diversity of Block Ownership. 2SLS Analysis.  
 
This table explores the influence of diversity among blockholders on company ROA using two stage 
analysis. Block ownership and diversity measures are instrumented with payouts from other companies 
and acquisition of financial firms.  
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Table 1.6: Free Cash Flow and Diversity of Block Ownership. 2SLS Analysis.  
This table explores the influence of diversity among blockholders on free cash flows of the 
company using two stage analysis. Block ownership and diversity measures are instrumented with 
payouts from other companies and acquisition of financial firms.  
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Model (4) suggests that the aggregate level of diversity also has a negative impact 
on the value of the company. The described effects is statistically significant at the 1% 
level and is economically meaningful: one standard deviation increase in the diversity 
index leads to 0.51  drop in company value. The value of 
the economic effect of the aggregate index is lower than the value of the effect of three 
previous measures of diversity, suggesting that diversity within the group has stronger 
impact on company value than diversity between the groups. Similar to the Table 1.2, 
Table 1.4 suggests that the level of block ownership does not have a statistically 
significant predictive power towards the future value of the company. 
Table 1.5 explores the relationship between block ownership diversity and return 
on company assets. Model (1) of Table 1.5 shows that diversity in the identity 
dimension leads to lower returns on company assets. One-standard-deviation decrease 
in this component of diversity leads to 0.55  of a 
standard deviation drop in the ROA of the company. This effect is statistically 
significant at 10% level. Model (2) and Model (3) detect the similar impact of 
diversity in the size of a blockholder’s portfolio and his investment horizons and 
ROA. Consistently, Model (4) suggests a negative impact of the aggregate diversity 
index and ROA. In the last three models diversity variables is statistically significant 
at 5% level. The level of block ownership, on other hand, has a strong positive effect 
on company value. One standard deviation increase in the level of block ownership 
leads to 0.60 to 0.44 standard deviation rise in the ROA of the company. Similarly, to 
the previous analysis, large magnitude of the economic significance suggests a high 
positive value of the sample selection bias between the first stage and second stage. 
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Table 1.6 shows the impact of block ownership and diversity between blocks on 
free cash flows of the company. Model (1) suggests that block ownership in the 
company has a positive impact on company performance. One-standard-deviation 
increase in block ownership leads to a 0.72 standard deviation rise in the company free 
cash flows. Diversity in identity, on the other hand, lower free cash flows: one 
standard deviation increase in this diversity measure lowers company free cash flows 
by 0.64 of a standard deviation. The scale of the economic impact of diversity on 
company performance is almost identical to estimates of its effects on ROA of the 
company. Model (2) - Model (4) similarly present a negative impact of other diversity 
estimate on free cash flows. 
In the previous sections, I’ve explored how diversity affects company value and 
performance. In this part of the paper, I investigate one potential channel through 
which diversity between blockholders affects the company. As mentioned in the 
hypotheses section, higher diversity between blockholders could lead to a 
disagreement among them on the optimal policies which the company should take. 
Although, it is hard to measure a disagreement on each policy decision, I can measure 
a general level of disagreement between company blockholders about its future 
performance. As one measure of disagreement, I use a dummy variable which 
indicates whether blockholders trade in the opposite direction in the following year. 
Panel (A) in Table 1.7 shows how diversity between blockholders impacts a future 
level of disagreement among them. This table indicates, that blockholders tend to trade 
in different directions after diversity between blocks increases. One-standard-deviation 
rise in diversity increases the chances of blockholders of making opposite trades by 
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6.0%-8.6%. Panel (B) of Table 1.7 explores how an increase in diversity influences 
the level of disagreement among all shareholders in the company. I proxy the 
aggregate level of disagreement using the stock volatility in the following year. 
Model(1) to Model (3) of Panel (B) shows that one standard deviation rise in the level 
of block diversity increases stock volatility by 0.34-0.44 of standard deviations. 
Table 1.7. Blockholder’s Disagreement and Block Diversity  
This table explores the influence of diversity on the disagreement between blockholders in the next 
year. Panel (A) shows the likelihood that blockholders will trade in different directions next year. Panel 
(B) shows the influence of diversity on stock volatility in the next year. Block ownership and diversity 
measures are instrumented with payouts from other companies and acquisition of financial firms.  
 
In the Table 1.8 I explore how increase in the blockholder diversity is related to 
the number and support for shareholder proposals. Model (1) suggest that shareholders 
are more likely to file an additional proposals after an increase in blockholder 
diversity. Model (2) additionally suggests that support for each proposal is lower when 
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diversity increases. These results indicates that a company with more diversity set of 
blockholders receives more suggestions about the potential change in strategy, but 
each of the proposals receives less support. 
Table 1.8. Shareholders Proposals and Block Diversity  
This table explores the influence on diversity between blockholders on shareholder’s voting. 
Model (1) explores the relation between the number of shareholder proposals each year and blockholder 
characteristics, Model (2) shows the link between the support for each proposal and blockholder 
diversity. Block ownership and diversity measures are instrumented with payouts from other companies 
and acquisition of financial firms.  
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Table 1.9: Investment Policies and Block Diversity  
This table explores the influence of diversity on investment policies in the company in the next 
year. Panel (A) shows the influence of the diversity on the level of investment. Panel (B) shows the 
influence of diversity on the number of acquisitions next year. Panel (C) shows the influence of 
diversity on the number of diversified acquisitions next year.  
 
Lastly, I check how diversity between blocks influences investment policies in the 
company. I investigate how increase in diversity impacts capital expenditures and 
acquisition activity of the company in the future. Heterogeneity could have a two-
sided effect of the level of innovations. For instance, Bernile, Bhagwat, and Yonker 
(2017) find that increase in diversity in the board of directors leads to higher level of 
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R&D. Garlappi, Giammarino, and Lazrak (2017), on other hard, predict that higher 
disparity in beliefs between decision-makers would lower investment in innovations. 
According to the results in the Table 1.9, an increase in diversity has a weak 
negative influence on the capital expenditures and a strong negative influence on the 
number of all acquisitions and the number of diversified acquisitions. 
Robustness Checks 
In this section, I want to ensure that the results of the analysis reflect the influence 
of block diversity and are not driven by the presence of one particular type of 
blockholders. Indeed, if one group of blockholders would have a pronounced positive 
or negative impact, then diversity measures would capture it, and the results could be 
significant merely due to the impact of one group alone. 
To account for this concern, I repeat my analysis excluding several groups of 
blocks. First, I exclude all institutional blockholders from my analysis. I reestimate the 
level of block ownership, four diversity measures, and two instrumental variables for 
all non-institutional blockholders and repeat the analysis from Table 1.4. Panel (A) of 
Table 1.10 investigates how diversity between non-institutional blockholders is related 
to company value. Consistently, I find that diversity across all measures has a negative 
effect on the company value.  
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Table 1.10. Firm Value and Diversity of Block Ownership. Exclusion of Specific 
Groups of Blocks.  
This table explores the influence of diversity in the subgroups of blockholders on company value using 
two stage analysis. Panel (A) shows the influence of the diversity among non-institutional blockholders 
on company value. Panel (B) presents the impact of the diversity among blockholders that hold less 
than 220 blocks in a year on company value. Panel (C) estimates changes in company value caused by 
diversity in the subsample of blocks that excludes blockholders in the top quarter by investment 
horizon. All panels control for the aggregate ownership of a subgroup of blockholders.  
 
Model (1) on Panel (A) investigates the impact of diversity between individual 
and non-institutional corporate blocks. According to the results, diversity between 
these two groups has a statistically significant negative impact on company value. 
Model (2) measures diversity in portfolio size between non-institutional blocks. I 
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divide blockholders into size groups using the same threshold as in original analysis. 
Model (2) shows that diversity in portfolio size between non-institutional blocks 
negatively affects company value and this effect is significant at the 1% level. For 
analysis in Model (3), I divide non-institutional blockholders into groups by their 
portfolio turnover. According to Model (3), diversity in investment horizon negatively 
impacts company value. Lastly, I construct a new diversity index as a first principal 
component of three redefined diversity variables. Model (4) suggests that the new 
aggregate diversity index also negatively impact company value. While all new 
diversity variables have a strong statistical significance on company value, but their 
economic impact is lower: one-standard-deviation increase in these variables leads to a 
0.07 to 0.15 standard deviation drop in company value. 
In the second robustness check, I perform the same analysis excluding 
blockholders in the largest group by portfolio size (this group includes blockholders 
with more than 220 blocks per year). Similarly, I reestimate the level of block 
ownership, three diversity measures and aggregate diversity index without the 
excluded investors. I did not use any of these large blockholders in the construction of 
instrumental variables, and thus they are not affected. Panel (B) of Table 1.10 presents 
the effect of diversity between selected blockholders on company value. According to 
the panel, all diversity variables in the subgroup of blockholders have a negative 
impact of company value and this effect is at least 5% significant. One-standard-
deviation increase in reconstructed diversity variables leads to a 0.1-0.15 standard 
deviation drop in company value. 
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Lastly, I repeat the analysis excluding long-term blockholders. In this test, I 
estimate block ownership, diversity variables and instrumental variables without 
blockholders in the lowest turnover quantile. Panel (C) suggests that all reconstructed 
diversity variables have a negative impact on the company value. Diversity in the size 
of blockholders' portfolios is significant at 10% level and other diversity measures 
have statistical significance of 5%. One-standard-deviation increase in diversity 
variables leads to a 0.13 - 0.17 standard deviation drop in company value. Thus, the 
analysis in the Table 1.10 suggests that diversity in at all levels lowers the value of the 
company. 
I check the robustness of the results using a placebo test. Preferably, the placebo 
diversity measure should not be related to heterogeneity between blockholders. I 
create placebo diversity measure between blockholders based on their position in the 
alphabetically ordered list. This construction relies on the assumption that any 
potential source of heterogeneity between blockholders is not correlated with the 
position of their name in the list. In the placebo diversity measure, blockholders with 
names in the first quarter of the alphabetically ordered list are assigned to placebo 
group 1. Blockholders in the second, third, and fourth quarter of the list are assigned to 
groups 2, 3 and 4 respectively. Similar to the previous cases, placebo diversity is 
constructed using Equation 2. Table 1.11 compares the effect of diversity in the size 
of the portfolio between investors and the constructed placebo measure on company 
value, return on assets and free cash flows. I use two stage analysis in all models to 
establish the causal references. According to the Table 1.11, instrumental variables 
have strong predictive power towards generated placebo diversity. First-stage t-
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statistics of the payouts instrument and acquisitions instrument equals to 3.92 and 3.46 
respectively, and are significant at 1% level. F-statistics value of 23.76 also suggests 
relevancy of the instrument for placebo diversity. 
Table 1.11: Placebo Test of Block Diversity Impact on Company Value and 
Performance.  
This table explores the impact of diversity on company value and performance with a placebo test. We 
create a placebo diversity measure based dividing investors into diversity groups based on an alphabetic 
order of their names. Lower significance of falsified block diversity in conjunction with a negative 
value of R-squared suggests absence of its impact on the company. 
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Model (1) and Model (2) shows the impact of diversity in size and placebo 
diversity on company value. As discussed previously, diversity in size has a strong 
negative impact on company value. The value of R-squared in Model (1) suggests, that 
diversity in size, together with other variables, can explain 49.5% of variation in 
company value. However, the negative values of R-squared in the Model (2) implies 
that a combination of placebo diversity and other controls explains less variation in 
company value, than a constant prediction. The decrease in R-squared from Model (1) 
to Model (2) indicates, that diversity in size has a more explanatory power towards 
company value, than generated placebo measure of diversity. Drop in R-squared from 
Model (3) to Model (4) and from Model (5) and Model (6) also suggests, that diversity 
in size explains more variation in return on assets and free cash flows than the placebo 
variable. Table 1.11 also suggests a lower impact of the placebo variable on company 
value, return on assets, and free cash flows. 
One challenge of this paper is the construction of a proxy variables for 
blockholders' diversity. The diversity variables proposed in this work by no means 
captures all aspects of heterogeneity between blocks in the company. Study by 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) suggests that the effect on corporate policies varies 
from a blockholder to a blockholder. My analysis aims to captures part of 
blockholders heterogeneity associated with their identity, size of portfolio, or 
investment horizon. But if what the main variation between block types arises from 
characteristics that are not related to their identity, size of portfolio, or horizon? For 
instance, in the identity dimension, I measure the diversity between individuals, 
institutions, and corporations, assuming that a pair of individuals on average is more 
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similar to each other than a pair of an individual and an institution. But if this 
assumption does not hold, then constructed diversity in identity would not be a 
reasonable proxy for blockholders' heterogeneity. In sum, my analysis relies on the 
assumption, that on average, a pair of blocks from the same group is more 
homogeneous than a pair of blocks from different groups. This assumption could not 
be tested directly, but I can support it with indirect evidences. The analysis in this part 
implies, that diversity between selected groups of blocks has a stronger impact on 
company value than diversity between randomly created groups of blocks. 
In this exercise, all blocks are assigned to one out of four simulated groups with a 
one-fourth chance of being in each group. Consistently with the previous analysis, I 
create a simulated diversity measure between generated groups of blocks using 
Equation 2. I estimate the impact of simulated diversity on the company value using 
two stage analysis from Table 1.4. If statistical significance of both instrumental 
variables in the first stage is greater than 2%, I record the results of this simulation. If 
at least of the instrumental variables is not significant at the 2% level, I drop the 
results in this simulation and proceed to the next one. Simulations are repeated until I 
reach 100,000 results. The impact of simulated diversity measures has a lower 
statistical significance in the majority of cases. Only 1,982 out of 100,000 simulated 
variables have stronger statistical significance than any of the original diversity 
variables. Formally I compare t-statistics of simulated variables coefficient with the t-
statistical of the least significant diversity variable. In my case, diversity in identity 
has the lowest absolute value of t-statitics, and thus I compare significance of 
simulation with it. Figure 1.8 illustrates the comparison of “real” diversity measure 
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with the generated placebo variables. The hypothesis that the simulated results have a 
stronger statistical significance than diversity in identity is rejected at the 2% level. 
 
Figure 1.8 Placebo Simulated Diversity.  
The simulated results also allow us to rule out a set of alternative explanations. 
For instance, if the results shown in this paper were driven by other characteristics of 
blockholders, such as the concentration of block ownership or the maximum size of a 
company's blocks, then the results of simulations would be similar to results of the 
original analysis. Importantly, simulated tests suggest that my results are not driven by 
unobserved characteristics of company block ownership. 
Conclusion 
 
According to my new and comprehensive data on block ownership, the majority 
of US public companies in recent year have several blockholders. These blockholders 
may differ from each other in multiple ways. I explore the impact of diversity among 
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blockholders on company value. Using shocks to block ownership from the 
acquisitions of financial firms and unexpected increase payouts in other companies to 
identify the causality channel, I find that block diversity has a strong negative 
influence on company value and performance. These results are consistent for all 
diversity measures: diversity in blockholders identity, diversity in the size of a 
blockholder’s portfolio, and diversity in investment horizon of a blockholder. 
My analysis separates the impact of the level of block ownership and block 
diversity. The results of my paper suggest that the potential positive effect of the level 
of block ownership could be offset by the negative influence of diversity among the 
blocks. Block diversity has a negative impact, even when diversity is measured after 
the exclusion of institutional blockholders, long-term blockholders and large 
blockholders. The analysis of the placebo simulations, implies that negative influence 
of blockholders comes mainly from diversity in their characteristics, rather than the 
size of block position or block concentration, or other unobserved parameters. 
My results highlight the limitations of theoretical and empirical research, that 
focuses primarily on the aggregate level of block ownership or on the presence of one 
particular type of the investor. A promising avenue for the future research includes the 
theoretical predictions of block diversity, together with the investigation of potential 
mechanism behind its influence. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INFORMATION REVELATION THROUGH REGULATORY PROCESS: 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN THE SEC AND COMPANIES AHEAD OF THE IPO. 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the SEC’s role in the critical period of just before firms go 
public. Our findings provide strong evidence that regulators play an active role around 
this time, with more complex companies undergoing more rounds of SEC review, and 
companies with a higher likelihood of fraud receiving more accounting-related 
questions.  Companies with more extensive SEC reviews tend to have lower offer 
prices than previously expected and also more uncertain outcomes after the IPO.  
However, underwriters don’t initially fully incorporate this information into expected 
prices, potentially due to framing biases that cause them to only partially respond to 
external signals.   
Introduction 
Regulations are costly.  However, the costs associated with insufficient 
regulations can be equally severe. The balancing act between increased competition, 
fairness and transparency on the one hand versus the costs associated with regulatory 
requirements has been on center stage throughout the past two decades. As recent 
changes in regulations (e.g., the JOBS Act) and public debates suggest, the tension 
between these forces is paramount, especially around the time a company goes 
public.  This paper focuses on one regulatory body--the SEC--and investigates how it 
interacts with firms in the critical period of just before they go public. 
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Because investors do not have the ability to request additional information 
from a company, regulators play a unique role (Samuelson (1954), Leftwich (1980), 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), and Beaver (1998)).   Regulators such as the SEC 
influence the information that a broad spectrum of companies provides to investors.   
The SEC’s role is particularly acute when public information is limited.  For example, 
when a firm prepares to raise public equity for the first time, the SEC only gives the 
company permission to go public after ensuring that the company’s disclosures are 
adequate.  Throughout the filing period preceding a company’s IPO, the SEC 
expresses its concerns about the validity and completeness of information provided in 
each company’s prospectus. Typically, this is an interactive process of multiple 
rounds, where the SEC expresses its concerns and asks for more information in letters 
to the company, and the company adjusts its prospectus accordingly. 
The benefits of SEC reviews can be substantial: the regulatory process serves 
as a monitoring device and ensures efficient and fair information revelation practices.  
However, the costs can be substantial as well.  A prolonged process with the SEC is 
costly to firms for three reasons.  First, requests for additional disclosures may reveal 
private information the company would rather not publicly disclose, especially to its 
competitors. Second, the substantial requirements on management time distract from 
the running of the company.  Third, for firms striving to go public, SEC demands for 
further disclosure and/or clarification delay the IPO process, and such delays are risky 
because of the possibility of a deterioration in market conditions.  Dunbar and Foerster 
(2008) show that more firms tend to withdraw their IPOs when market conditions 
deteriorate.  Moreover, less than 20% of firms that withdraw their IPOs ever go 
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public.  In light of these costs, management has strong incentives to write an initial 
prospectus that will raise the least possible objections at the SEC, and thus result in the 
least number of rounds of SEC review.   
Our decision to focus on the IPO setting is driven by several factors.  First, the 
SEC’s directive to protect financially unsophisticated investors heightens the 
importance of regulators monitoring disclosures around the time of the IPO.  Prior to 
the IPO, there exists limited information about the firm in the public domain, resulting 
in a tendency of uninformed investors to disproportionately receive allocations of ‘
lemons’ (see, e.g., Rock (1986)).  Second, the IPO setting offers a unique advantage 
toward understanding the influence of regulators. The SEC conducts an in-depth 
review of the prospectus of every firm that files to go public in the United States, and 
it details its concerns in comment letters that are publicly available on EDGAR.  This 
contrasts with settings such as 10-Ks, where the SEC reviews only a subset of filings. 
The first objective of the paper is to empirically examine the role played by the 
regulator.  Theoretical literature such as Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and 
Tirole (1986) assumes an active role for the regulator, yet empirical evidence on 
regulator involvement in the IPO process is limited.  Within the context of IPOs, while 
we have gained some knowledge about firms’ initial disclosures through the 
prospectus, our knowledge regarding the extent to which the SEC affects this process 
is partial.  Thus, we empirically analyze the SEC review of IPO prospectuses, 
examining both the extent of review and the topics on which the SEC focuses.  To 
assess the topics of concern in each letter, we use a machine-learning technique 
(Latent Dirichlet Allocation, LDA) that enables us to extract the main subjects of the 
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SEC review and also to quantify the extent of each issue in each letter.  As described 
more fully in the paper, this technique is both objective in the sense that every firm 
letter is classified in exactly the same fashion, and flexible in the sense that it does not 
require any initial prior belief about the content of the documents or the appropriate 
construction of word lists.  We then employ three different approaches to infer the 
economic meaning of each LDA topic. 
Our findings provide strong evidence that regulators play an active role around 
the time of the IPO.  Companies receive between one and thirteen letters, with each 
letter having between two hundred and over seven thousand words.    Results from the 
LDA analysis indicate that the greatest number of SEC questions relate to requests for 
clarification on the business model and about the uncertainties associated with it, 
which we refer to as the Business Description topic cloud.  For the average company, 
44% of the first letter from the SEC relates to these issues.   In addition, we find that 
the SEC also focuses on issues related to:  accounting, compensation, and valuation.  
Throughout the paper we focus on these four topic clouds.  An examination of the 
content of the LDA topic clouds indicates that they map very closely into the 
components of disclosure required to register securities sold in the U.S.: “(i) a 
description of the company’s business; (ii) a description of the security to be offered 
for sale, (iii) information about the management of the company; and, (iv) financial 
statements certified by independent accountants.”  Several of the topics map almost 
one for one to these general SEC requirements. This is consistent with the SEC 
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concentrating to a large extent on its mandate when it comes to the IPO review 
process, and with our topic modeling capturing this process. 11 
Our second objective is motivated by theory such as Jovanovic (1982) and 
Verrecchia (1983), which highlights variation in companies’ disclosures that stem 
from differences in firm type, and regulators’ directive to protect investors, for 
example by lowering information asymmetry between companies and investors.12  The 
implication is that certain types of companies will have less complete and less precise 
disclosures, and regulators will pressure them to provide additional information.  Our 
empirical analysis focuses on four attributes:  company complexity, which relates to 
the costs of satisfying (with a higher probability) SEC reviewers; advisor quality, 
which relates to the value added by a financial intermediary in mitigating information 
asymmetry (see, e.g., Leland and Pyle (1977)); the likelihood of the company 
committing financial fraud; and, the extent and precision of companies’ disclosures in 
the first preliminary prospectus, which represents an indirect measure of the net costs 
of disclosure.  Results are consistent with all of these factors playing a role.   
Our third objective is to examine the relation between SEC concerns and the valuation 
of the company.  A broad body of literature, stemming from Rock (1986), Beatty and 
Ritter (1986), and Benveniste and Spindt (1989), considers the ways in which 
uncertainty and information asymmetry between the company and investors affect the 
valuation of the offerings.    Our ability to observe the regulator’s concerns enables us 
to provide insight into the ways in which the information produced by the regulator 
influences this process.  If concerns raised by regulators are positively correlated with 
                                               
11
 https://www.sec.gov/answers/regis33.htm 
12
 See Beyer et al (2010) for a review of the disclosure literature. 
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investors’ concerns, e.g., if more extensive regulator demands for additional 
disclosures suggest a greater information asymmetry between investors and the 
company, then the underwriter should consider the SEC’s concerns when valuing the 
company.   
Importantly, the majority of the SEC’s concerns precede the setting of the price 
range.  Thus, if underwriters correctly assess the relevance of the SEC’s concerns, 
then they should incorporate all information contained in the SEC review into the 
price range.  Information learned by the underwriter during bookbuilding would be 
orthogonal to anything uncovered through the SEC review process, and we would 
observe no relation between the extent of SEC review and the price revision from the 
price range to the final offer price.   In contrast, psychology literature, for example 
Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), suggests that framing and perhaps confirmation biases 
can cause the firm and its underwriter to not fully incorporate the information 
contained in the SEC letters. Simply put, they are positively biased about the firm’s 
value and only partially adjust to external, objective assessments that might suggest 
otherwise.  We indeed observe a significant negative relation between the extent of 
SEC review and the price revision, consistent with firms and their underwriters only 
partially adjusting their expectations in response to information learned through the 
interactions with the SEC.  
  In addition, we observe no relation between the extent of SEC review and the 
initial return, providing further evidence that the setting of a lower offer price was 
justified.  In sum, our results suggest that concerns raised by the SEC are correlated 
with concerns raised by institutional investors during the roadshow, but behavioral 
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biases cause underwriters to not fully appreciate the implications of these concerns 
when they are first raised by the SEC.   
To the extent that both institutional investors during the roadshow and the SEC 
have concerns about the same set of issues and companies (as suggested by the above 
results), one would expect these companies to be characterized by greater uncertainty.  
This greater uncertainty may reflect an inability of the SEC review process to 
completely resolve the uncertainty surrounding the firm, or it may reflect more 
uncertainty regarding the quality of management.  In either case, we expect these 
companies would have more volatile returns, that they would have a higher probability 
of either very good or very poor performance over the first year as a public company, 
and that the greater probability of very poor performance would be reflected in higher 
insider sales.  Results provide strong support for all three predictions. 
Finally, our last empirical analysis exploits an important institutional detail 
particular to SEC comment letters to investigate the extent of regulator information 
production in more depth.  In particular, IPO investors can estimate the total extent of 
SEC review prior to the IPO, but the precise concerns raised by the regulator are 
difficult to ascertain at that point.  Each letter necessitates a prospectus revision, 
meaning that investors can estimate the number of SEC letters and the first market 
price should incorporate this information.  However, SEC letters are not made public 
until at least 45 days after the IPO, and as a result investors are unable to observe the 
SEC’s concerns at the time of the IPO.    
Findings from the returns analysis are consistent with different types of 
information being incorporated into prices at different points.  First, we find no 
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significant relation between the total amount of SEC review, as proxied by the number 
of letters, and post-IPO returns.  This is consistent with investors being able to 
estimate this prior to the offering.  Second, we find significant negative relations 
between several of the key topics and post-IPO returns.  For example,  a one standard 
deviation increase in concerns related to the description of the business is associated 
with a statistically significant four percent lower returns over the following year.  To 
understand why certain topics are more strongly related to post-IPO returns, we 
estimate the incremental information content of SEC letters relative to information 
previously disclosed in the prospectus.  To achieve this, we develop a new method that 
builds on the properties of LDA topics and on the concept of KL-divergence.13  We 
find that the topics that are most significantly related to post-IPO performance 
represent those topics that are least closely related material in the prospectus, and thus 
least anticipated by investors.   
Several influential papers, including Hanley (1993), Hanley and Hoberg (2011, 
2012), and Loughran and McDonald (2013) examine how the quality of information 
firms share with investors in the pre-IPO process affects key post-IPO outcomes. Our 
paper extends and complements these earlier efforts, by highlighting the influence of 
the regulator throughout this disclosure process.  While companies expend 
considerable time and effort deciding how to portray their company to prospective 
investors through the prospectus, the regulator frequently requires information beyond 
what the company initially chose to disclose.  Importantly, this intervention contains 
incremental information beyond that contained in the prospectus itself.   
                                               
13
 LDA topic can be viewed as a probability distribution. A measure of KL-divergence could be used to 
measure the informational gain from one distribution to
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Our findings on the relation between concerns expressed by the SEC and post-
IPO performance suggest that the regulator produces new information, which is 
consistent with regulators playing a unique role (Samuelson (1954), Leftwich (1980), 
Watts and Zimmerman (1986), and Beaver (1998)).   Consistent with Simon’s (1989) 
analysis of companies around the time of the 1933 Securities Act and with LaPorta et 
al’s (2006) international analysis, our results suggest that investors can benefit from 
the regulator’s intervention, in our case through increased transparency as a result of 
prospectus revisions.  However, the benefit is limited by the fact that investors do not 
observe until after the IPO the underlying SEC concerns, which potentially signal 
aspects of firm and management quality.   
Finally, our paper introduces a novel methodology to analyze text similarity 
across different types of documents, or more precisely, the marginal information 
contained in one document relative to another.  The methodology, which is a 
combination of two sets of LDA analysis and KL-divergence, enables us to examine 
the incremental information contained in SEC letters that are issued in response to 
company IPO prospectuses.  Importantly, this methodology could similarly apply to 
any case where two documents have overlapping content, but different formats, e.g., 
company 10Ks and analyst reports, or company news releases and journalist reports.  
The ability to analyze incremental information and to analyze information in different 
formats makes this approach more flexible than earlier methods used in the literature, 
thus contributing to the body of literature that uses methods such as cosine similarity. 
Data and Descriptive Statistics 
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The SEC began disclosing all comment letters starting May 12, 2005, which 
dictates the beginning of our sample period. We obtain a sample of firms that went 
public between May 2005 and December 2013 from Thomson Financial SDC 
Platinum. To keep the sample relatively consistent, we omit REITs, ADRs, closed-end 
funds, unit offerings, and IPOs with an offer price of less than five dollars.  We require 
all firms to have CRSP data, in particular a CRSP price within the first ten trading 
days after the IPO, and Compustat data. We collect data from Thomson on the 
characteristics of the offer, for example the identity of the underwriter(s), the identity 
of the law firm(s), and whether it is venture backed.We obtain the year of founding 
from Jay Ritter’s website and from IPO prospectuses, and we use this to calculate firm 
age.14  
From EDGAR, we download the initial prospectus of each of these IPO firms. 
We also download all of the comment letters issued by the SEC, which were related to 
the IPOs of these firms. Our final sample consists of the 766 companies that filed their 
IPO on or after May 12, 2005 and which went public by December 31, 2013.  
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 provide descriptive statistics related to the SEC review 
process, across our sample of 766 companies.    
  
                                               
14
   These data come from the Field – Ritter dataset of company founding dates, as used in Field and 
Karpoff (2002) and Loughran and Ritter (2004).   We thank Jay Ritter for making these data publicly 
available:  https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/.  In cases where firm age was not available 
from this source, we hand-collected it from IPO prospectuses. 
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Panel A:  Distribution of Number of SEC letters, across IPO firms 
 
 
Panel B:  Distribution of Number of Words in First SEC letter, across IPO firms 
 
Figure 2.1:  Histograms depicting SEC Review Process 
The sample consists of IPOs between 2005 and 2013, for which we download SEC letters from 
EDGAR.  Panel A tabulates the total number of letters each company receives from the SEC in 
response to its IPO prospectus, and Panel B tabulates the number of words in the first letter each 
company receives from the SEC in response to its IPO prospectus. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample consists of 765 IPOs between 2005 and 2013.  Panel A shows descriptive statistics on firm 
characteristics just before going public, and Panel B shows descriptive statistics on the SEC letters that 
relate to each firm’s preliminary prospectus.  Appendix 1 provides variable descriptions. 
 
Panel A:  Firm Characteristics 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Obs 
Sales 824.5 44.0 125.5 427.3 766 
Proceeds Raised 244.3 65.0 108.6 220.0 766 
Number Segments 2.9 1.0 1.0 4.0 766 
Firm Age 19.7 6.0 10.0 20.0 766 
Underwriter Rank 5.9 0.0 8.0 9.0 766 
Law Firm Rank 3.6 1.0 3.0 4.0 766 
S1 Length 164.7 94.5 148.2 215.7 766 
S1 Uncertainty 3.25 3.01 3.22 3.46 766 
F score 1.3 0.6 1.0 1.8 532 
VC 0.7 0.0 1.0 1.0 766 
JOBS Act 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 766 
 
Panel B:  Characteristics of SEC Letters 
Variable Mean Q1 Median Q3 Obs 
Number of Letters 3.9 3.0 4.0 5.0 766 
Number of Words 2300 1610 2230 2850 766 
 
    766 
%Accounting, letter 10.21% 0.03% 1.02% 21.09% 766 
%Valuation, letter 8.31% 2.82% 7.82% 12.16% 766 
%Compensation, letter 5.69% 0.01% 0.02% 0.46% 766 
% BusinessDesc, letter 45.88% 39.74% 47.45% 54.36% 766 
 
    766 
# Accounting words, letter 244.02 0.54 19.32 433.04 766 
# Valuation words, letter 183.88 32.69 143.02 271.71 766 
# Compenation words, letter 129.85 0.30 0.32 9.38 766 
# BusinessDesc words, letter 1040.00 542.01 999.71 1440.00 766 
 
Looking first at Panel A of Table 2.1, the average firm had sales of $825 
million and 2.9 segments, raised $244 million in proceeds, and was 20 years old at the 
time of the IPO.  However, each of these distributions is skewed, and the median firm 
is smaller (sales of $126 million, proceeds of $109 million, and one segment) and 
younger (10 years old).  The mean (median) underwriter rank is 5.9 (8.0) on a one to 
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nine scale, where underwriter rank is calculated following the methods of Carter and 
Manaster (1990), as updated by Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) and Loughran and 
Ritter (2004).15  To calculate law firm rank, we place law firms into deciles based on 
the number of equity offerings over our sample period on which the law firm worked.  
The mean (median) law firm rank for our sample is 3.6 (3.0) on this one to ten scale, 
indicating that most IPO firms are advised by a law firm that works on relatively few 
deals, but a small number of law firms advise many firms.  For example, Latham & 
Watkins and Vinson & Elkins each worked on over 50 deals within our sample.  
Finally, sixty-eight percent of our IPOs are venture backed.   
In an effort to characterize the disclosures of a firm prior to SEC intervention, 
we also compute two measures related to the firm’s preliminary prospectus:  the total 
length of the document and a measure of its uncertainty.  Total length represents a 
simple count of the number of words in the prospectus.  To calculate uncertainty, we 
follow Loughran and McDonald (2011, 2013) and calculate the proportion of words in 
the preliminary prospectus that capture an uncertain tone, as measured by the 
uncertain and negative word list categories, where these word lists are developed 
based on their likely usage in financial documents.16  Within our sample, the mean 
prospectus length is 164,700 words and 3.2% of the words in the average firm’s 
prospectus have an uncertain or negative tone.17  Moreover, there is substantial 
                                               
15
 We thank Jay Ritter for making these data available on his website. 
16
 As discussed in more detail in Loughran and McDonald (2011, 2013), uncertain words include 
approximately, risk, and believe, while negative words include loss, failure, and decline. 
17
 Our measure of prospectus length is longer than that reported in Loughran and McDonald (2013) 
because it is based on the complete submission text file, including all attachments. 
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variation in both, with the interquartile range of prospectus length being 94,500 – 
215,700 words, of uncertain/negative tone being 3.01 – 3.46. 
The F-score, as developed by DeChow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan (2010), captures 
the likelihood of a financial restatement.  DeChow et al predict Accounting and 
Auditing Enforcemenet Releases (AAERs) for a sample of firms based on six 
accounting items:  accruals, change in receivables, change in inventory, percent of soft 
assets, change in cash sales, change in return on assets, and actual issuance.  Using 
their adjusted coefficients and the accounting values for our sample firms, we 
calculate the F-score for each of our firms.18  Because this variable requires two years 
of pre-IPO data, is it only available for 532 of our 766 observations.  An F-score of 
1.00 indicates that the likelihood of a restatement is equal to the unconditional 
probability, and higher values represent higher likelihoods.  Within our sample, the 
median F-score is 1.0, the mean is 1.3, and the interquartile range is 0.6 – 1.8.      
Figure 2.1 describes the characteristics of the SEC letters, related to each firm’s IPO 
prospectus.  Across all years, the average firm received 3.9 letters, but as shown in the 
histogram in Panel A, there exists substantial cross-sectional variation in this number.  
The most common outcome is for a company to receive 3 or 4 letters, and slightly 
more than 200 companies fall into each of these categories.  However, a nontrivial 
number of companies, approximately 100, receive only two letters or five letters.  
Approximately 50 companies receive one or six letters, and fewer companies receive 
seven or more letters.  The average number of letters per firm varies over time, but 
exhibits no strong time trend (not tabulated).   
                                               
18
 DeChow et al adjust coefficients such that an F-score of one equals the unconditional probability of a 
restatement. 
79 
This variation in the extent of SEC review is of great import to companies, as 
each additional letter potentially delays the offering.  While we examine the relation 
between the number of letters and the registration period in more depth later, a 
univariate analysis is highly suggestive.  On average, companies with one to two 
letters go public 88 days after the initial filing, compared to 123 days for companies 
with three to four letters and 206 days for companies with five or more letters.   
Panel B shows a histogram of the number of words in the first letter each company 
receives from the SEC.  We see similar evidence of common outcomes, with the 
greatest number of companies having between 1,500 and 3,000 words in their letter.19  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the number of words in the first letter is strongly positively 
correlated to the total number of letters that a company receives.  This potentially 
reflects one of two factors.  First, a management that writes a poorer quality initial 
prospectus is likely to both receive more SEC comments in the first round to less 
thoroughly address this set of concerns, resulting in more subsequent rounds of 
review.  Second, if the SEC had a larger number of concerns with the initial 
prospectus, then the extent of the prospectus revision will be greater and it is more 
likely that additional concerns will surface. 
Clearly, the content of the SEC review and the extent of the review cannot be 
solely characterized by the number of letters each company receives and the number 
of words per letter. In addition to variation in these measures, there exists potentially 
meaningful variation in the topics raised by the SEC and in their relative importance; 
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 The majority of SEC letters are organized into a series of numbered points.  Among the subset 
organized in this fashion, the average company had 44 points raised in the first letter.  However, 
because not all letters have this format, we do not concentrate on this metric. 
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for example, the SEC may raise significant concerns about accounting practices for 
some firms, but ask more detailed questions about valuation-related issues for another. 
The topics of the letters are interesting in their own right and they also may be related 
to the severity of the SEC concerns. To this end, we employ textual analysis 
techniques to evaluate the specific topics. 
The use of textual analysis in finance has grown in recent years, and there exist 
several alternative techniques.20  First, one can manually read the document and make 
classifications.  Used by Ertimur and Nondorf (2006) in their analysis of the SEC 
comment letters of 95 IPOs, this has the disadvantage of not being replicable and 
possibly being less precise, and it generally restricts the researcher to relatively small 
samples.  Second, one can manually define word lists, and rely on the computer to 
count the frequency of each word.  As used by Loughran and McDonald (2011, 2013) 
to analyze the tone of 10Ks and prospectuses, this is more replicable than the first 
approach, and it is also simple to implement. However, a disadvantage is that it 
requires that the researcher define the word lists, which necessitates specifying the 
topics rather than ‘learning’ what topics are most important from the document.  The 
researcher’s choices regarding word lists can affect classifications, which can be a 
disadvantage since one does not know what the important topics are in terms of their 
relative weight in the document.  The third approach, Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA), is based on machine-learning and can overcome the limitations of both these 
prior techniques:  it lets the classifications be determined by the content of the 
document, and it is objective and replicable.  Moreover, Chang et al (2009) show that 
                                               
20
 See Loughran and McDonald (2015) for a review of textual techniques in finance, accounting, and 
economics. 
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results from LDA analysis correspond to human ability to detect topics.  While the 
computer science literature highlights the advantages of this method, up until this 
point relatively few papers within the finance literature employ it.    
LDA, developed by Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003), extracts thematic structures (“
topics”) from textual documents.21 This algorithm does not require any prior 
knowledge about the content of the documents; rather, the algorithm identifies the 
topics. A topic is defined as a group of words that tend to appear in the same context. 
Words that are used in conjunction with or in the neighborhood with each other will 
tend to be categorized together.  It is a more sophisticated structure than the dictionary 
“bag of words” approach because the same word, when used in different contexts, can 
be classified into different topics. For instance, the meaning of the word "cash" is 
found within different categories, but it tends to be associated with different words in 
different cases. The phrase "cash flow" is more likely to refer to financial statements 
and thus pertain to accounting issues, whereas the phrase "cash bonus" tends to refer 
to compensation. 
The desired outcome is to both determine the important topics across all 
documents, and to determine the relative importance of each topic within each 
document.  To provide an analogy, suppose a person reads through each document 
with the objective of highlighting each word according to its topic.  On the first 
iteration the person reads through each SEC comment letter of each company and 
randomly highlights each word therein in one of ten different colors (where the exact 
number of different colors is chosen by the researcher, as discussed below).  After 
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 Blei (2012) and Blei and Lafferty (2009) provide more in-depth overviews of this methodology, with 
the former representing a more intuitive explanation and the latter focusing on the technical aspects. 
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completing the initial process, the person would return to the beginning of the 
documents and decide whether to re-color some of the words.  She looks at the output 
from the previous step and makes a decision about whether to recolor each word 
depending on the color of the words around it.  She tries to highlight the words that 
appear in the same neighborhood (i.e., words that are likely referring to the same 
topic) in the same color.  She repeats this entire process until it converges, updating 
the colors each time in a Bayesian process.22  
At the conclusion of the process, one has two informative pieces of output.  
First, one has the lists of words and phrases that fall into each topic (e.g., we can refer 
to all of the red-colored words/phrases as topic 1, all of the yellow-colored 
words/phrases as topic 2, etc.).  Related to this, the researcher now also knows the 
frequency of each word within each topic, for example the frequency of the word ‘
cash’ within the red-colored words might by 0.005, while the frequency of the word ‘
leverage’ within the red-colored words might be 0.0001, etc.  Second, for each 
document the researcher obtains the percent that discusses each topic, i.e., the percent 
that is colored red, yellow, etc.   
As mentioned above, the exact number of topics (or highlighter colors) into 
which the documents are classified is chosen by the researcher.  Reported results are 
based on a method where we specify ten topics.  While we experimented with 
different numbers of topics, we found that fewer topics (e.g., five) resulted in 
classifications that were overly broad, with multiple concepts combined together.  In 
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 We find the 3000 iterations is sufficient for the method to converge on our data. 
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contrast, a greater number of topics (e.g., twenty) produced many lists with words 
referring to the same underlying concept. 
For our purposes, it is important to also infer the economic meaning of each 
topic. The inference is based on three criteria:  an analysis of the most common words, 
an analysis of the context (i.e., sentences) in which these words tend to occur, and an 
analysis of the ten companies with the highest portion of the SEC letter related to the 
topic.  As described in more detail below, based on these criteria we conclude that 
there are topic clouds relating to accounting issues, to valuation issues, to 
compensation issues, and to requests for clarification regarding the business model 
and underlying risk factors.  In addition, there are four topic clouds that relate to 
specific industries and two that relate to boilerplate-type items. 
A key feature of our methodology is that we both let the machine learning 
algorithm determine the topics completely independently, and use various methods to 
extract the economic meaning of the topics. This potentially improves over approaches 
in prior literature that either define the topics of interest and specify the classification 
accordingly (e.g., positive vs negative tone, as in Loughran and McDonald (2011, 
2013)) or use machine learning approaches such as LDA independent from economic 
meaning (e.g., Ball, Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015), Hoberg and Lewis (2015)).  
Most similar to us in approach are contemporaneous papers by Israelson (2014), Gupta 
and Israelson (2015), and Hanley and Hoberg (2016) who also use LDA analysis to 
extract risk factors.23   We develop economically-based predictions regarding the 
                                               
23
 Gupta and Israelson (2015) investigate firms’ disclosures, with a focus on the optimal amount of soft 
versus hard information to reveal.  They find that the JOBS Act resulted in significant changes 
regarding the mix of hard versus soft information in both firm disclosures and associated SEC letters. 
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relevance of each topic, where topics that correspond to subjects of SEC focus (as 
published by the SEC) are predicted be more significant than topics that correspond to 
boilerplate-type items. 
  
  
Figure 2.2:  Topic Clouds 
 
The sample consists of IPOs between 2005 and 2013, for which we download SEC letters from 
EDGAR.  We obtain the first letter that each company receives from the SEC in response to its IPO 
prospectus.  We employ LDA Analysis (LDA) across this set of letters to identify ten topics.  Panels A 
through D illustrate the words contained in each of the four topics of focus. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Israelson (2014) focuses on explaining patterns in stock returns, and Hanley and Hoberg (2016) 
investigate banks’ emerging risks. 
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Panels A – D of Figure 2.2 show four topic clouds, each of which relates to a 
key disclosure issue for companies going public.24  In each panel, the size of the word 
is indicative of its frequency.  For example, looking first at Panel A, we see that the 
most frequently occurring word is financial, followed by consolidated, accounting, 
income, prior, net, and cash holdings.  Other frequently occurring words include 
operating, EBITDA, results, debt, fiscal, etc.  Clearly, these words pertain to 
accounting-related topics, and thus we classify this word list as accounting-related. 
Panel B depicts the valuation topic cloud, where stock, value, common, shares, 
and price are the most frequently-occurring words.  Looking at Panel C, 
compensation, financial, and executive are among the most frequently occurring 
words, and thus we label this the compensation topic cloud.     
The topic cloud shown in Panel in D is most heavily populated by words such 
as company, business, operations, offering, regulation, discuss, describe, discuss, 
summary, prospectus, etc.  An analysis of both the words in this topic cloud as well as 
the sentences in which they are used suggests that this topic cloud captures questions 
and requests for clarification regarding the business model and underlying risk factors 
of the firm.  We refer to this as the business description topic cloud.   
For other topic clouds, the word lists suggest a strong industry concentration:  
the energy industry (keywords include energy, partners, partnership, and petroleum), 
the services industry (words include services, security, wireless, and networks), and 
the pharmaceutical industry (keywords include license, trials, milestone, and FDA).   
An additional cloud that we ultimately define as being related to one industry has a 
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 All topic clouds are available on request.   
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less clear grouping of words, but we find that the ten companies with the highest 
proportion of the prospectus discussing this topic are all in the financial services 
industry.     
Finally, the remaining two topic clouds include more boilerplate-type issues.  
They have a concentration of words such as cover, furnish, requested, effective, 
accuracy, and adequacy.  We find that these nuisance issues are almost always found 
in the last letter that a company receives, immediately prior to going public.  As such, 
it contains standard language pertaining to issues related to the now imminent 
offering.  To confirm that we are not missing anything important with respect to these 
boilerplate topic clouds, we read through letters where these issues are mentioned.  We 
find the discussion to be predominantly related to what we classify as nuisance issues 
(e.g., “Please avoid use of the term “solution” as it is jargon.”), and standard, almost 
universal requirements (e.g., “Please amend your registration statement in response to 
these comments.”). 
Examination of the ten companies with the greatest portion of the SEC letter 
deriving from each topic cloud provides further support for our classifications.  For the 
accounting, governance, and business description topic clouds, we find that the top 
firms come from a range of industries.  In contrast, each of the industry topic clouds is 
heavily concentrated in the respective industry.   
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics related to the percent of the 
SEC comment letter that pertains to each topic.  Here and in all subsequent analyses, 
we focus on the first SEC letter that the company receives, i.e., the letter that the SEC 
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writes in response to the preliminary prospectus.25  For the median company, 
approximately 1% of the first letter focuses on accounting issues, 8% on valuation 
issues, and 47% on business description issues (means of 10%, 8%, and 46%, 
respectively).  As an alternative metric, which we use in some empirical tests, we also 
compute the number of words in each SEC letter that refer to each topic, which will be 
a function of both the relative weight on the topic and on the letter length.  For the 
median (mean) company there are 19 (244) words related to accounting issues, 143 
(184) related to valuation issues, and 1,000 (1,040) related to business description 
issues.   
Across both measures, the compensation topic, which the LDA analysis 
identified as a unique topic, appears to be important for a very small number of 
companies.  The median company has 0.02% of the letter (0.3 words) dedicated to 
such issues.  While means are higher, they are driven by a small number of outliers.  
For the firm at the 75th percentile, only 0.46% of the letter (9.4 words) pertain to the 
compensation topic. 
One of the unique features of the information environment surrounding IPO 
firms is that investors receive the majority of their information regarding the firm 
through the prospectus. In contrast to more mature firms, which have made public 
filings with the SEC for multiple years, this single document captures to a large extent 
investors’ knowledge of the IPO firm.  It is therefore critical to control for the 
                                               
25
 Companies that file to go public under the JOBS Act have the option to file a draft registration 
statement (DRS), which is not publicly available at the time of filing.  In these cases, the first letter that 
the SEC writes is in response to this DRS rather than the S-1.  We include a dummy in all regressions 
equal to one if the company filed under the JOBS Act, as stated in the prospectus.  In addition, we re-
estimate regressions excluding the 152 companies that filed under the JOBS Act.   
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prospectus content when evaluating the effects of the information contained in the 
SEC letters.  As described in this section, we borrow and combine two methods from 
computer science (LDA and KL-divergence) to isolate the marginal information 
content that can be attributed to the interaction between the SEC and the IPO firm, as 
characterized through the SEC letters. 
Specifically, we use both topic cloud analysis (on the prospectus and SEC 
letters separately) and a technique developed by Kullback and Leibler (1951), KL-
divergence, to identify the letters’ marginal information value.26 The first step is to 
apply the LDA topic modeling approach to the preliminary prospectus of each 
company, analogous to the previously described analysis of the SEC letters. Using 
LDA we construct the ‘prospectus’ topic clouds.  Because the prospectus is 
substantially larger in volume and likely covers many more topics than the SEC 
letters, we allow the LDA to construct 30 topic clouds from the prospectuses.27  
Intentionally, this process is conducted completely independently of the SEC letter 
classification so that we do not a priori impose any relationship between the topics 
discussed in the prospectus and the topics discussed in the letters. Thus, the prospectus 
and letter topic clouds could be completely unrelated, or they could be very closely 
related. 
The second step is to quantify the relationship between the SEC letter topic 
clouds and the prospectus topic clouds.  To capture the extent to which SEC questions 
relate to new issues that were not voluntarily disclosed in the prospectus, we measure 
                                               
26
 This technique has been used widely in the information theory literature.  See, e.g. Principe, Xu and 
Fisher (2000). 
27 All topic clouds are available on request.   
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the ‘information added’ in each SEC letter cloud, relative to each of the prospectus 
clouds.  Specifically, we characterize each topic cloud as a vector (in our case we have 
40 vectors, 10 from the letters and 30 from the prospectuses); where the length of the 
vector is equal to the total number of potential words (defined as words appearing in 
any company’s prospectus and/or SEC letter). Each component of the vector 
represents the weight of the corresponding word in the topic cloud.28    
For each of the topics we extracted from the SEC letters, we seek to determine the 
prospectus topic that includes the highest amount of similar information.  We require a 
measure that estimates the incremental information in the SEC letter cloud relative to 
the prospectus topic cloud.  Burham and Anderson (2004) highlight KL-divergence as 
a metric to capture such incremental information.  Importantly, KL-divergence 
satisfies three key criteria:  objectivity, emphasis on more frequent words, and stability 
to vocabulary selection.  It is replicable and does not rely on human judgment, it puts a 
higher emphasis on more frequent words, and it is robust to the exclusion of low 
frequency words within the topic.  In contrast, cosine similarity, which has been 
widely used to estimate the distance between two vectors of word frequencies, meets 
the first requirement, partly addresses the second, and does not satisfy the last.  
Replications of the topic cloud matchings illustrate these features.  Specifically, we 
select the most frequent words in each of the SEC letter topic clouds and in each of the 
prospectus topic clouds, where the number of words selected varies from 1000, 1100, 
1200, … 5000.  Across all cases, the KL-divergence matching stays the same, whereas 
                                               
28
 As such, each topic can be thought of as a probability distribution 
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the cosine similarity matching is sensitive to such choices.  We first outline the KL-
divergence approach, and then provide an example that illustrates these advantages. 
For each SEC letter cloud (characterized as a vector), we calculate the KL-divergence 
with each of the 30 prospectus clouds (similarly characterized as vectors).  Thus, we 
end up with a 10 x 30 matrix of KL-divergence measures, where each KL metric 
represents a measure of the incremental information in the SEC topic cloud relative to 
the respective prospectus cloud.29 The final step is to select, for each SEC letter topic 
cloud, the prospectus cloud that is most similar.  Outputs from this process are used in 
subsequent analysis as a control for information that had been previously disclosed in 
the prospectus, and as a measure of the extent of incremental information in the SEC 
letters.  
The following example highlights the ways in which we employ these topic 
cloud and KL-divergence techniques to understand the marginal information contained 
in SEC letters.  To make the example as simple as possible but still highlight the 
important properties of KL-divergence, suppose that the total dictionary consists of 
only three words: “compensation”, “financial”, and “performance”, and there is a total 
of two prospectus topic clouds.  Continuing this example and as shown in Figure 2.3, 
assume the compensation topic cloud from the SEC letters more heavily weights the 
words “compensation” (42% weight) and “financial” (40% weight), with a lower 
emphasis on “performance” (18% weight).  As shown in the last two rows of the table, 
                                               
29 Each topic vector with weights can be viewed as a probability distribution, and the KL-divergence is 
a standard measure of the similarity of two probability distributions. If  is the frequency of word  
in the selected prospectus topic and  is the frequency of the same word in the selected SEC letter 
topic, the KL-divergence of  from  is represented by the formula . This 
value captures the amount of information added by the distribution  (SEC letter topic) to the 
distribution  (Prospectus topic). 
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both prospectus topic clouds discuss “performance” frequently; the first also has a 
substantial weight on “compensation” and “financial” (20% weight on each), while the 
second includes only one of the important words from the SEC letter topic cloud (“
financial” has a 49% weight, but “compensation” has a negligible 1% weight).  While 
the first likely captures compensation issues, the second is more likely related to 
accounting issues.  
The KL-divergence metric “penalizes” heavily the fact that the second 
prospectus cloud rarely mentions one of the important words in the SEC letter 
compensation cloud.  The KL-divergence between the SEC letter cloud and 
Prospectus Topic Cloud 2 equals 1.30, substantially higher than the 0.37 with 
Prospectus Topic Cloud 1, which has a more positive weight on both “compensation” 
and “financial”.   In sum, the KL-divergence indicates that SEC compensation 
questions most closely relate to Prospectus Topic Cloud 1.  Thus, in order to isolate 
the incremental information content of the SEC letters, it is important to control for 
Prospectus Topic Cloud 1 in our analysis of the extent of SEC questions regarding 
compensation issues.30 
  
                                               
30 This asymmetry feature distinguishes the KL measure from cosine similarity and makes it a more 
appropriate approach in our context, in which we are interested in the amount of information added by 
the SEC letter relative to the information contained in the prospectus.   The example again highlights 
this contrast.  As shown in the last column of the table, the cosine similarity metric is similar for both 
prospectus topics, even though the KL-divergence metrics are substantially different.  The cosine 
similarly approach would lead the researcher to conclude that SEC compensation questions are equally 
related to prospectus Topic 1 (which appears to relate to compensation) and prospectus Topic 2 (which 
appears to relate to accounting). 
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 Words in Dictionary   
 “
Compensation” 
“
Financial” 
“
Performance” 
KL(S|.) Cos(S,.) 
SEC Letter 
Topics 
     
Compensation 
Topic 
42% 40% 18% - - 
    
 
 
Prospectus Topics    
 
 
Topic 1 20% 20% 60% 0.37 0.675 
Topic 2 1% 49% 50% 1.30 0.682 
 
 
Figure 2.3:  An example of KL divergence 
This simplified example highlights KL divergence.  In the example we construct one SEC letter topic 
and two prospectus topics. Each topic contains only three words: “compensation”, “financial” and “
performance”.  As shown in Columns 1 – 3, the frequencies of these words in the SEC letter topic are 
42%, 40% and 18%, respectively. Based on these loadings we label this topic as “Compensation” topic. 
Similarly, the table also shows the weights on each of these words in each of the prospectus topics 
(Topic 1 and Topic 2) 
KL(S|.) shows the KL divergence between the SEC letter topic and each prospectus topic. Cos(S|. ) 
reports the cosine similarity between the SEC letter topic and each prospectus topic.  The KL-
divergence measure indicates that the constructed SEC letter topic is closest to Topic1, while the cosine 
similarity measure finds that this topic is closer to Topic 2.  
KL-divergence between SEC letter topic and prospectus formula is measured with the formula 
  
Where  is a frequency of word  in the SEC letter topic and  is a frequency of selected 
Prospectus topic. 
Cosine similarity is measured with the following formula 
 
 
 For each of the ten SEC letter clouds, we use this KL-divergence metric to 
choose the prospectus cloud that has the minimum distance, i.e., the prospectus cloud 
that is ‘closest’ to the SEC letter cloud, in the sense that the SEC letter topic cloud has 
the smallest amount of incremental information.  For each topic, Table 2.2 describes 
93 
the key features of the closest prospectus cloud:  the average portion of the prospectus 
(columns 1 and 2), the distance between the SEC letter cloud and closest prospectus 
cloud (column 3), and t-tests and associated p-values from a test of whether the 
selected ‘closest’ prospectus cloud has a significantly smaller distance than the other 
prospectus clouds (columns 4 and 5).  In addition to the verification provided by the t-
tests, a reading of the words in each of the ‘closest’ prospectus clouds indicates that 
the topics correspond in a meaningful way.  For example, the prospectus cloud that is 
closest to the SEC letter compensation cloud contains the words executive, options, 
and compensation, while the prospectus cloud that is closest to the SEC letter 
accounting cloud contains the words assets, income, and cash.    Comparing the 
distance measures across topics, it is illustrative that the boilerplate issues in the SEC 
letters are least closely related to the prospectus, with a KL-divergence of nearly five.  
In comparison, the distance measure for compensation is 2.2, suggesting these 
questions are closely related to information in the prospectus, compared to 3.5 for the 
business description topic.  These KL-distance measures provide an estimate of the 
extent of incremental information contained in each SEC topic. 
 Our objective in this analysis is twofold.  First, in subsequent regressions that 
examine the extent to which the SEC’s concerns are focused on certain topics, we 
control for the extent to which the company’s prospectus (which serves as the basis for 
the SEC’s comments) focuses on these same issues.  For instance, referring back to the 
example above, in regressions that focus on the effects of compensation-related 
questions in the SEC letters, we include controls for the closest prospectus topic.  
Thus, the KL-divergence technique enables us to identify the prospectus topic cloud  
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Table 2.2.  Topic Clouds in Prospectus 
Across the 765 IPOs in our sample, we analyze both the preliminary prospectus and the first SEC letter 
that the company receives in response to this prospectus.  We use LDA analysis to classify the words in 
the first SEC letter into ten topic clouds:  the main topics of interest (accounting, valuation, 
compensation, and business description), industry topics (one of which is reported in the table, 
healthcare), and two boilerplate topics.  Similarly, we use LDA analysis to classify the prospectus into 
30 topics.  For each SEC letter topic, we then determine the prospectus topic cloud that has the KL- 
shortest distance (as described more fully in the text of the paper).  For each SEC letter topic, columns 1 
and 2 provide the percent of the prospectuses that relates to this ‘closest prospectus cloud’, and the 
number of words in this ‘closest prospectus cloud’, respectively.  Column 3 shows the KL-distance 
between the SEC letter topic cloud and this ‘closest cloud in prospectus’.  For each selected SEC letter 
topic cloud we compare the KL-divergence of the closest topic with KL-divergences with other 29 topic 
clouds in the prospectus. The last two columns show t-statistics and p-values of the minimum KL 
divergence in comparison to the set of other 29 prospectus topic cloud KL divergences.  
Topic in Letter 
% of 
Prospectus  
related to  
Closest 
Prospectus 
Cloud 
# Words in 
Prospectus 
related to  
Closest 
Prospectus 
Cloud 
Distance 
between  
SEC Letter 
Cloud and 
Closest 
Prospectus 
Cloud 
T-statistics of 
the Distance 
between SEC 
Letter Cloud 
and Prospectus 
Cloud 
P-value of the 
Distance 
between SEC 
Letter Cloud 
and Prospectus 
Cloud 
Main Topic of 
Interest 
     
Accounting 3.5 5,030 2.8 -2.20 0.02 
Valuation 3.5 5,030 3.1 -2.26 0.02 
Compensation 10.8 17,110 2.2 -3.08 0.00 
Business Risk 5.9 7,850 3.5 -1.16 0.13 
    
  
Industry Topics    
  
Healthcare 3.1 564 2.9 -2.34 0.01 
    
  
Boilerplate 
Topics 
   
  
Boilerplate 1 3.1 743 5.0 -1.70 0.05 
Boilerplate 2 2.5 595 4.8 -1.63 0.06 
 
that is closest to the SEC letter topic, and thus the topic that is most important to 
control for in the regression.  Second, we contrast the ability of various topics to 
explain post-IPO returns with the ‘closeness’ of the topic to information already 
disclosed in the prospectus, i.e., the extent to which the SEC is requesting disclosures 
on additional subjects (e.g., international operations not discussed in the prospectus) 
versus small modifications of previous disclosures (e.g., additional detail on inventory 
practices).   
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The real consequences of lengthy SEC reviews  
The SEC review process is arguably costly to companies, because of the 
potential delays in the going public process and because the process itself involves 
significant time and effort by both management and outside advisors.  Delays in 
raising capital might delay or even thwart positive NPV projects and affect firms’ 
liquidity significantly. Distraction of management attention from the core company 
business may be equally costly, especially for young firms.  Moreover, the risk of a 
change in market conditions means that the probability of having to withdraw the 
offering increases with such delays. 
Table 2.3 highlights the strong positive relation between the extent of SEC 
review and the length of time between when a company files the IPO and when it 
ultimately goes public, what is commonly known as the registration period.  Several 
conclusions emerge from this table.  First, registration period length is strongly 
positively related to the number of rounds of review with the SEC, with one additional 
letter from the SEC being associated with a 30-day longer registration period.  Second, 
comparing columns 1 and 2, the explanatory power increases from 23% to 32%, when 
we add the number of letters, in addition to firm and offer-specific characteristics.   
Third, column 3 indicates that the number of words in the first letter is strongly related 
to registration period, consistent with a greater number of SEC concerns being 
associated with a longer process and time until approval.  However, when both 
number of letters and number of words in the first letter are included (columns 4 and 
5), only number of letters is significant, indicating that companies’ ability to 
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thoroughly respond to the SEC’s concerns is more important than the original number 
of points raised.   
Table 2.3: Registration Length and Company Characteristics 
 
Our sample consist of 765 IPO from 2005 to 2013. The registration length is measured as the number of 
days between the filing date of the first public version of the IPO prospectus and the IPO date. The table 
shows the relationship between the length of the registration period and characteristics of SEC review 
process (Number of Letters, Number of Words in first letter), firm characteristics (Sales, Number of 
Segments, Firm Age, Underwriter Rank, Law Firm Rank, VC backing), and characteristics of initial 
disclosure (Prospectus Length, Prospectus Uncertainty). Detailed description of all the variables is 
available in the Appendix I.  Robust standard errors clustered by industry are shown in parentheses.  
Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
 Registration 
Length 
Registration 
Length 
Registration 
Length 
Registration 
Length 
Registration 
Length 
Log(Number of Letters)  
 
89.868*** 
(22.119) 
 
 
88.131*** 
(25.356) 
87.899*** 
(25.468) 
Log(Number of Words) 
 
 
 
 
 
44.517*** 
(8.180) 
2.919 
(9.955) 
3.059 
(10.342) 
Log(Sales) -2.402 
(2.727) 
-4.860 
(2.805) 
-4.512* 
(2.486) 
-4.951* 
(2.755) 
-4.906* 
(2.541) 
Number Segments 4.230** 
(1.785) 
3.510* 
(1.644) 
3.871** 
(1.635) 
3.500* 
(1.625) 
3.487* 
(1.623) 
Log(1 + Firm Age) 4.134 
(4.581) 
4.103 
(3.589) 
4.187 
(4.053) 
4.107 
(3.591) 
3.975 
(3.611) 
Underwriter Rank 1.912 
(1.474) 
1.921 
(1.316) 
1.889 
(1.464) 
1.919 
(1.319) 
1.945 
(1.314) 
Law Firm Rank -1.922 
(1.187) 
-2.036 
(1.237) 
-1.654 
(1.094) 
-2.016 
(1.247) 
-2.008 
(1.247) 
VC 7.180 
(11.672) 
-7.707 
(11.389) 
-0.735 
(11.105) 
-7.939 
(11.265) 
-6.286 
(11.509) 
JOBS Act -189.423*** 
(45.378) 
-178.834*** 
(39.797) 
-188.253*** 
(45.098) 
-178.961*** 
(39.802) 
-178.105*** 
(40.101) 
Log(Prospectus Length)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.076 
(5.538) 
Prospectus Uncertainty  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.328 
(16.476) 
Observations 766 766 766 766 766 
Adjusted R2 0.225 0.315 0.252 0.314 0.313 
 
    
Interestingly, we find that the aggregate amount of SEC concerns (as proxied 
by total number of words in first letter or by total number of letters) is more important 
than the specific topics of SEC questions, in explaining the length of the registration 
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period (not tabulated).  This finding highlights that SEC concerns over any issue can 
prolong the registration period.  We note that this conclusion is supported by 
conversations with practitioners, who comment that the characteristics of the 
management team have a large influence on the dynamics of the SEC review process:  
teams that are more amenable to making necessary revisions tend to get all issues 
resolved more quickly.   
 This strong relation between the extent of SEC review and the length of the 
registration period raises questions over which types of companies are more likely to 
suffer lengthier reviews.  We turn to this issue in the next section. 
Factors influencing the SEC review process  
We hypothesize four factors that potentially affect the length of the SEC 
review process: firm complexity, the quality of the firm’s advisors, the firm’s 
disclosure choices in the preliminary prospectus, and the likelihood of underlying 
problems at the firm.  First, more complex firms will find it more difficult and 
potentially prohibitively costly to pre-empt every possible concern of the SEC, 
suggesting that they are likely to face more questions.  Second, more experienced 
advisors have the advantage of having multiple past interactions with the SEC on 
similar manners, and therefore they should be able to help advise the firm on how to 
write a prospectus that will be more quickly approved by the SEC. Further, such 
advisors are arguably better able to help companies navigate the SEC process more 
smoothly, for example by helping them to more quickly satisfy any SEC concerns.  
Third, all else equal, a company that writes a more complete prospectus and a 
prospectus with a less uncertain tone should experience a shorter SEC review process.  
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Finally, the SEC may more rigorously examine companies with a higher probability of 
future problems, as measured by the likelihood of a financial restatement. 
Table 2.4: Determinants of SEC Review 
The sample consists of IPOs between 2005 and 2013.  The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 
(Columns 3 and 4) is the natural logarithm of the total number of words in the first SEC comment letter 
to the IPO prospectus (number of letters from the SEC in response to the IPO prospectus).  Independent 
variables include the proxies for complexity, advisor quality, disclosure, and probability of fraud. 
Complexity proxies include: Sales, Number of Segments, Firm Age, and VC backing. Advisor quality 
proxies include Underwriter Rank and Law Firm Rank. Disclosure proxies include Prospectus Length 
and Prospectus Uncertainty.  F score is used as a proxy for the probability of fraud. The F-statistic and 
associated p-value test the joint significance of each group of variables in every specification, as 
reported at the bottom of the table. Appendix I provides a detailed description of all variables.  Robust 
standard errors clustered by industry are shown in parentheses.  Industry and year fixed effects are 
included in all regressions. 
 
 
 
 
Log(# Words)  Log(# Letters) 
Complexity      
Log(Sales) 0.051*** 
(0.016) 
0.035* 
(0.016) 
 0.029* 
(0.016) 
0.011 
(0.013) 
Number Segments 0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
 0.007** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
Log(1+ Firm Age) -0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.030) 
 0.000 
(0.024) 
0.012 
(0.023) 
VC 0.164*** 
(0.033) 
0.152** 
(0.058) 
 0.166*** 
(0.038) 
0.152*** 
(0.031) 
Advisor Quality      
Underwriter Rank 0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
 -0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
Law Firm Rank -0.004 
(0.011) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
 0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
Firm Disclosure      
Log(S1 Length) -0.063 
(0.038) 
-0.081 
(0.048) 
 -0.050 
(0.031) 
-0.040 
(0.037) 
S1 Uncertainty 0.257*** 
(0.076) 
0.294*** 
(0.063) 
 0.106* 
(0.054) 
0.087 
(0.079) 
Likelihood Fraud      
F score  
 
0.014 
(0.012) 
  
 
0.016 
(0.016) 
      
JOBS Act 0.001 
(0.108) 
-0.069 
(0.126) 
 -0.101 
(0.085) 
-0.122 
(0.103) 
Observations 766 532  766 532 
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.084  0.126 0.087 
Complexity 0.000 0.026  0.009 0.000 
Advisors 0.916 0.147  0.978 0.532 
Disclosure 0.019 0.001  0.122 0.407 
Fraud  0.257   0.345 
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Table 2.5: Determinates of the Content of the First SEC Comment Letter 
The sample consists of 765 IPOs between 2005 and 2013.  We use LDA to extract topics from each 
firm’s first SEC comment letter and each firm’s preliminary IPO prospectus. We classify ten topics 
extracted from SEC comment letters, four of which we focus on in this table: accounting, valuation, 
compensation, and business description. In the similar manner we extract 30 topics from the initial 
prospectus. For each SEC letter topic, we find the closest corresponding prospectus topic, using the KL-
divergence measure. Each panel reports OLS regressions of the log amount of each topic in the first 
SEC letter on firm characteristics and the amount of corresponding topic in the initial prospectus. The 
sample in Panel A is smaller (532 observations) because F score can be calculated only for the firms 
with available financial information for the two year prior to the IPO. Panel B report the regression 
results for the broader sample after the exclusion F score variable. Panel C reports the results of similar 
regression for the boilerplate topic. See Appendix I for detailed definition of all variables.  Robust 
standard errors are shown in parentheses.  Industry and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
Panel A: 4 Main topics of interest, with Proxies for Complexity, Advisor Quality, Disclosure, 
Likelihood Fraud 
 Log of #Words in first SEC Letter related to following topics: 
 Accounting Valuation Compensation BusinessDesc 
Complexity     
Log(Sales) 0.368*** -0.070 -0.010 0.053** 
 (5.69) (-1.37) (-0.17) (2.30) 
Number Segments -0.034 0.007 -0.004 0.013 
 (-1.38) (0.40) (-0.15) (1.33) 
Log(1 + Firm Age) 0.152 0.088 0.036 0.014 
 (1.41) (1.00) (0.43) (0.31) 
VC -0.141 0.709*** 0.625*** 0.198* 
 (-0.59) (3.41) (3.09) (1.91) 
Advisor Quality     
Underwriter Rank -0.032 0.007 0.016 -0.009 
 (-1.39) (0.37) (0.67) (-1.13) 
Law Firm Rank -0.013 -0.065** -0.046 -0.022* 
 (-0.39) (-2.33) (-1.51) (-1.71) 
Firm Disclosure     
Log(S1 Length) -0.232 -0.275* -0.085 -0.186** 
 (-1.14) (-1.76) (-0.42) (-2.11) 
S1 Uncertainty -0.191 0.822*** 0.565* 0.458*** 
 (-0.56) (3.50) (1.95) (3.56) 
Likelihood Fraud     
F score 0.310*** 0.093 -0.101 0.033 
 (3.27) (1.37) (-1.04) (0.90) 
     
JOBS Act -0.280 -0.249 0.364 -0.311** 
 (-0.75) (-0.78) (0.96) (-2.26) 
Log(CorrespondingTopic
,S1) 
-114.843** 184.996*** 12.257 9.966 
 (-2.30) (5.09) (1.43) (0.54) 
Observations 532 532 532 532 
Adjusted R2 0.441 0.330 0.410 0.116 
Complexity 0.000 0.007 0.027 0.009 
Advisors 0.336 0.065 0.290 0.136 
Disclosure 0.402 0.001 0.122 0.000 
Fraud 0.001 0.170 0.301 0.369 
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Panel B: 4 Main Topics of Interest, with proxies for Complexity, Advisor Quality, Disclosure 
 
 Log of #Words in first SEC Letter related to following topics: 
 Accounting Valuation Compensation BusinessDesc 
Complexity     
Log(Sales) 0.402*** -0.041 -0.049 0.070*** 
 (7.42) (-1.06) (-1.23) (3.95) 
Number Segments -0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.010 
 (-0.16) (0.19) (-0.33) (1.24) 
Log(1 + Firm Age) 0.138 0.054 0.123** 0.038 
 (1.48) (0.77) (2.02) (1.25) 
VC 0.128 0.764*** 0.580*** 0.232*** 
 (0.67) (4.44) (3.76) (3.07) 
Advisor Quality     
Underwriter Rank -0.017 0.006 0.007 -0.003 
 (-0.87) (0.41) (0.36) (-0.40) 
Law Firm Rank -0.009 -0.070*** -0.027 -0.016 
 (-0.32) (-2.94) (-1.11) (-1.56) 
Firm Disclosure     
Log(S1 Length) -0.097 -0.183 0.044 -0.196*** 
 (-0.58) (-1.34) (0.30) (-2.92) 
S1 Uncertainty 0.070 0.445** 0.235 0.331*** 
 (0.29) (2.25) (1.30) (3.51) 
     
JOBS Act 0.189 -0.037 0.382 -0.094 
 (0.55) (-0.13) (1.31) (-0.74) 
Log(CorrespondingTopic
,S1) 
-95.573** 180.699*** 5.336 39.356*** 
 (-2.18) (5.76) (0.80) (2.72) 
Observations 766 766 766 766 
Adjusted R2 0.431 0.322 0.410 0.167 
Complexity 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
Advisors 0.628 0.013 0.535 0.283 
Disclosure 0.824 0.032 0.422 0.000 
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Panel C: Boilerplate Topic 
 
 Log(#Words on Boiler Plate Topic) 
in First SEC Letter 
 
Complexity   
Log(Sales) -0.001 -0.001 
 (-0.08) (-0.05) 
Number Segments 0.005 0.011* 
 (0.89) (1.66) 
Log(1 + Firm Age) -0.015 -0.007 
 (-0.64) (-0.22) 
VC -0.071 -0.142** 
 (-1.21) (-2.05) 
Advisor Quality   
Underwriter Rank 0.004 0.001 
 (0.65) (0.17) 
Law Firm Rank 0.006 0.009 
 (0.62) (0.80) 
Firm Disclosure   
Log(S1 Length) -0.088* -0.096 
 (-1.81) (-1.62) 
S1 Uncertainty 0.079 0.089 
 (1.15) (1.01) 
Likelihood Fraud   
F score  -0.033 
  (-1.23) 
   
JOBS Act -1.314*** -1.500*** 
 (-7.94) (-8.89) 
Observations 766 532 
Adjusted R2 0.528 0.543 
Complexity 0.664 0.208 
Advisors 0.667 0.719 
Disclosure 0.114 0.199 
Fraud  0.220 
 
 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 examine these effects, with Table 2.4 focusing on measures 
of aggregate SEC review and Table 2.5 focusing on the specific topics of SEC focus.  
Looking first at Table 2.4, columns 1 and 2 show regressions of the log of the number 
of words in the first letter on proxies for the hypothesized determinants of SEC 
review.  Columns 3 and 4 are similar, but the dependent variable is the number of SEC 
letters (written in response to the company’s prospectus).  All regressions include year 
and industry fixed effects, using the Fama-French twelve industry definitions, as well 
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as a dummy equal to one if the firm filed under the JOBS Act.  Regressions are OLS, 
with robust standard errors clustered at the industry level.   
Our proxies for complexity include the log of firm sales, the number of firm 
segments, the log of firm age, and venture capital backing.  We conjecture that each of 
these variables will be positively related to the extent of SEC review, as such firms 
arguably have a greater breadth of operations and/or more intricate contracts, and as a 
result there are more issues on which the SEC will potentially ask for clarification.  
For example, venture capitalists frequently enter into relatively complex contracts with 
firms, and most firms with VC backing are involved with multiple VCs.  Also, 
Dambra, Field and Gustafson (2015) highlight that VCs tend to invest in industries 
such as biotech that are characterized by greater proprietary information.  Consistent 
with predictions, the coefficients on three of the four variables are positive, with the 
only exception being firm age which has a coefficient that is close to zero.  Looking at 
column 1, coefficients on both log(sales) and VC backing are significant at the 1% 
level.  In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of sales is 
associated with approximately 0.1 more letters, with each additional letter causing 
additional delay before the company is permitted to go public.  The F-statistic reported 
at the bottom of column 1 indicates that the joint hypothesis that all complexity 
proxies equal zero can be rejected with a p-value less than 0.001.  Our results on the 
effects of complexity are consistent with Cassell, Dreher and Myers (2013), who find 
firm complexity is positively related to the probability of receiving a letter from the 
SEC in response to the 10K. 
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Column 1 indicates that firms’ disclosure choices in the preliminary prospectus 
are also significantly related to the extent of SEC review.  Proxies include both 
prospectus uncertainty, measured as the percent of uncertain words following 
Loughran and McDonald (2011, 2013), and prospectus length, measured as the 
number of words in the prospectus.   The former is positive and highly significant, 
indicating that more uncertain prospectuses have longer letters from the SEC, and the 
F-statistic for the joint significance of the two disclosure variables is highly 
significant.  In economic terms, a one standard deviation increase in prospectus 
uncertainty is associated with 0.1 fewer letters. 
Looking at column 3, which employs the number of letters as the dependent 
variable capturing the extent of SEC review, firm complexity continues to be a 
significant effect in the full sample, but the quality of firm disclosure is not significant 
in either specification.  In sum, the tone of the initial prospectus appears to influence 
the length of the SEC letter but not the total number of SEC letters, suggesting that it 
perhaps relates to some types of SEC comments more than others.  We examine this 
possibility in more depth in Table 2.5.    
Regressions in columns 2 and 4 are similar to those reported in columns 1 and 
3, respectively, but add a measure for the likelihood of fraud as an additional 
independent variable.  When we limit the sample to those observations for which we 
can compute likelihood of fraud, results regarding complexity and firm disclosure are 
similar.  The likelihood of fraud is not significant at conventional levels in explaining 
these aggregate measures of SEC review.  The next section examines whether this 
firm characteristic is more closely related to certain types of SEC questions. 
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The final conclusion from Table 2.4 is that advisor quality is not related to the 
total amount of SEC review.  To the extent that higher quality advisors such as 
underwriters or law firms have more influence over certain portions of the prospectus, 
they potentially impact only certain topics of SEC questions.  Such dynamics would 
weaken the power of the tests in Table 2.4; Table 2.5 focuses on the specific topics of 
SEC concern, e.g., accounting, business description, etc. 
Looking first at Panel A of Table 2.5, column 1 focuses on accounting issues, 
column 2 on valuation issues, column 3 on compensation issues, and column 4 on 
business description issues.  For each column, the dependent variable represents the 
log of the number of words in the first SEC letter that focus on the respective issue.  
Explanatory variables represent the same factors on which we focused in Table 2.4, 
i.e., the proxies for complexity, advisor quality, firm disclosure, and likelihood of 
fraud.  All regressions include year and industry fixed effects as well as the JOBS Act 
dummy, and have robust standard errors clustered by industry. 
 Consistent with the strong significance of firm complexity in explaining the 
total amount of SEC review (shown in Table 2.4), columns 1 through 4 of Table 2.5, 
Panel A show that greater firm complexity contributes strongly to more questions on 
each of the four main topics.  The F-statistic has a p-value of less than 0.01 in three of 
the regressions and less than 0.05 in the fourth.  Further, signs on the significant 
coefficients are all consistent with greater complexity contributing to more questions 
on each topic.   
Other factors similarly exhibit variation in ways that are consistent with both 
economic intuition and anecdotal evidence.  We find strong evidence that the 
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likelihood of fraud is related to the amount of SEC attention on accounting-related 
issues (Column 1).  The F-statistic has a p-value less than 0.001.  Because fraud 
generally relates to accounting items, the fact that a higher probability of fraud results 
in more questions on these issues from the SEC is perhaps reassuring.   
 As shown in column 2, higher quality advisors are associated with significantly 
fewer questions on valuation.  This is consistent with conversations with practitioners, 
indicating that the ways in which the firm arrived at various valuation-related 
estimates, for example the valuation of options or restricted stock at various point 
prior to the IPO, is of concern to the SEC.  Advisors spend considerable time with 
companies reviewing these issues, and advisors that have more experience dealing 
with the SEC on such manners are likely positioned to provide better advice.   
 Finally, the quality of firms’ voluntary disclosure in the preliminary prospectus 
is significantly related to SEC questions concerning the description of the business, 
including for example the business model and the risk factors (column 4).  
Specifically, longer prospectuses are associated with fewer questions on business 
description, while prospectuses with a more uncertain tone are associated with more 
questions.  This is consistent with this being the section of the prospectus for which 
SEC disclosure rules are least defined.  While firms have very specific guidelines 
regarding the compensation information they are required to provide, disclosure 
requirements related to the overall description of the business are much vaguer:  
Section 4A of Security and Exchange of 1933 requires companies to disclose “a 
description of the business of the issuer and the anticipated business plan of the 
issuer.”  Firms that choose to satisfy this requirement through more complete and 
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longer descriptions appear to be subject to fewer SEC questions.  However, it is worth 
noting that the explanatory power of these regressions is substantially lower.  Firm 
characteristics explained between 30 and 40% of the extent of SEC attention on other 
issues, compared to only 11% for questions related to the firm’s description of the 
business.  This suggests that the latter questions are much more idiosyncratic in nature, 
perhaps making it more difficult for the market to predict which firms will face more 
of such concerns. 
 Panel B of Table 2.5 shows similar regressions, but excludes the F-score and 
thus enables us to include the broader sample.  Results are broadly consistent with 
those reported in Panel A.  Specifically, firms with higher complexity receive, on 
average, more questions with respect to every topic.  Also, higher quality advisors are 
particularly valuable in lessening the extent of questions regarding valuation issues, 
and greater firm disclosure in the preliminary prospectus is associated with fewer SEC 
questions related to the description of the business. 
Finally, Panel C of Table 2.5 provides a counterfactual analysis, examining the 
relation between each of the two boilerplate topic clouds and the same four factors:  
complexity, advisor quality, firm voluntary disclosure, and likelihood of fraud.  To the 
extent that our topic cloud analysis correctly identifies these topics as boilerplate, the 
extent of SEC questions on these issues should not be significantly related to firm 
characteristics.  Results support this prediction. 
Findings throughout this section highlight the role of the SEC in increasing 
transparency.  When viewed in this way, our results provide an interesting contrast to 
those of Boone, Floros and Johnson (2016) who examine the effects of the SEC’s 
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permission for IPO companies to redact information from their SEC registration 
filings, for example proprietary information that is sensitive for competitive reasons.   
 
Relation between SEC review process and post-IPO dynamics 
The SEC’s mission is to ensure that companies "disclose meaningful financial 
and other information to the public".31  Our findings in the previous section suggest 
that the SEC review process is indeed related to the extent of uncertainty surrounding 
the company, for example as represented by the complexity of the firm, the quality of 
the advisors, the extent of firm voluntary disclosure, and the probability of a financial 
restatement at the company.  In this section, we investigate the extent to which this 
information is related both to underwriters’ valuation of the company and to post-IPO 
prices.   
We focus in this subsection on the log of the number of SEC letters as a proxy 
for the number of SEC concerns.  This choice is based on several factors.  First, it is 
highly correlated with the number of words in the first letter and with the number of 
individual points raised in the first letter in the subset of cases where letters are 
arranged into points.  Second, the number of SEC letters has the advantage of 
capturing aspects related to the severity of concerns and to management quality, as 
more serious concerns and lower quality management will likely experience more 
rounds of SEC review.  
We begin by considering the relation between this measure of the SEC review 
process and underwriters’ pricing of the issue.  The majority of the SEC review 
                                               
31
 https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml 
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process precedes the setting of the price range.  In a typical scenario, a company first 
files to go public, second exchanges in a back-and-forth written dialog with the SEC 
regarding the completeness of disclosure provided in the prospectus, third has an 
initial price range set by the underwriter, fourth goes on the roadshow to market the 
issue to institutional investors and solicit their feedback regarding the proposed 
valuation, and finally has the final offer price set and goes public.32  If the underwriter 
deems the information learned through the SEC review process to be relevant to firm 
value, then it should set a lower price range.  Only information learned during 
bookbuilding should influence the price update between the initial price range and the 
final offer price.  In sum, if underwriters incorporate all available information when 
setting the price range, we would not expect a significant relation between the extent 
of SEC review and the price update.  Alternatively, if behavioral biases limit the 
extent to which the firm and its underwriters respond to external objective 
assessments, then we would predict a negative relation. 
Table 2.6 tests this proposition.  Specifically, we regress the price update on 
the log of the number of letters received from the SEC, plus control variables from 
earlier tables.  The price update is defined as the percentage difference from the 
midpoint of the filing range to the offer price.  Regressions are OLS, include industry 
and year fixed effects, and have robust standard errors clustered by industry. 
Table 2.6. Is SEC review related to prices that underwriter sets?  
The sample consists of IPOs between 2005 and 2013.  The dependent variable, initial return, equals the 
change from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading. The number of words for 
each firm related to the accounting, valuation, compensation and business descriptions topics in the 
SEC letter and in the S1 are extracted with LDA from the first SEC letters and initial prospectus, 
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 While there are sometimes a small number of letters after the commencement of the roadshow, these 
tend to be relatively short, and represent the resolution of issues previously raised. 
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respectively. We use the KL-divergence technique to pair the LDA topics from the SEC letters and 
prospectus. Appendix I provides detailed definition of all variables.  Year and industry fixed effects are 
included in all regressions, and robust standard errors are clustered by year. 
 Price Update Initial Return 
   
Log(# Letters) -3.570** 0.020 
 (-2.86) (1.04) 
Log(Sales) 0.881*** 0.004 
 (4.88) (0.68) 
Number Segments -0.137 -0.002 
 (-1.36) (-1.00) 
Log(1 + Firm Age) -1.368* -0.008 
 (-2.10) (-0.64) 
VC 0.710 0.089*** 
 (0.70) (6.28) 
Underwriter Rank -0.187 -0.002 
 (-1.18) (-0.77) 
Law Firm Rank 0.010 -0.000 
 (0.05) (-0.14) 
Log(S1 Length) -1.326 0.018* 
 (-1.51) (2.20) 
S1 Uncertainty -1.034 -0.003 
 (-0.66) (-0.09) 
JOBS Act 3.500 0.020 
 (1.29) (0.84) 
Price Update  0.005*** 
  (7.66) 
   
Observations 750 750 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.222 
 
Contrary to predictions, column 1 of Table 2.6 shows a significant negative relation 
between the price update and the log of the number of letters.  A company receiving 
two letters from the SEC has a price update that is on average 2.5% lower than a 
company that receives just one letter.  Compared to the average price update of -1.7%, 
this is a substantial effect.  This effect is also statistically significant, at the 5% level 
(t-statistic of -2.86)  This finding suggests that information learned during the 
bookbuilding period is correlated with the extent of SEC review, i.e., companies with 
longer SEC review processes also receive more negative concerns from the 
institutional investors on the roadshow.  Our findings indicating that underwriters do 
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not incorporate this negative information into the price range is consistent with 
behavioral models such as the framing bias (see, e.g., Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993).  
The firm and its underwriters have upward biased assessments of firm value, and they 
only partially respond to external signals suggesting that true value is lower than they 
had believed. 
Column 2 of Table 2.6 provides additional evidence consistent with the lower 
offer price being appropriate.  Lowry and Schwert (2004) and Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) find that underwriters fully incorporate all negative information learned during 
the filing period into the offer price.33  Underwriters have strong incentives to avoid 
overpricing the issue, and therefore they lower the offer price to fully reflect all 
negative information.  This suggests that longer SEC reviews, which represent 
negative information and which column 1 shows to be negatively related to price 
updates, should not be related to initial returns.  Results in column 2 are consistent 
with this prediction.  In sum, behavioral biases such as a framing effect cause 
underwriters to pay insufficient attention to information revealed through the SEC 
review process, but they are forced to listen to the market, i.e., to institutional 
investors who are only willing to purchase shares at lower prices. 
Coefficients on other control variables across both columns are largely 
consistent with findings of prior literature.  For example, consistent with Hanley 
(1993), price update is significantly positively related to initial returns.  In addition, 
venture-backed issues also have significantly higher initial returns.   
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 The partial adjustment phenomenon (Hanley, 1989) whereby underwriters only partially incorporate 
information learned during the filing period only applies to positive information learned during the 
filing period. 
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In sum, results in Table 2.6 indicate that the same companies about which the 
SEC had the most concerns, in terms of requests for additional disclosure, also had the 
greatest concerns from institutional investors.  The fact that both the regulator and 
institutional investors tend to be concerned suggests that uncertainty among these 
types of companies is likely to be higher.  Several dynamics potentially drive this 
relation.  For example, a longer SEC review might indicate the presence of a more 
vague business plan and thus greater uncertainty regarding the future direction of the 
company.  While a more extensive SEC review might force management to more 
thoroughly think through and provide disclosure on certain components of the firm’s 
business plan, it is unlikely to lead to fundamental changes in the plan.  It is also 
possible that a longer SEC review represents a signal of management quality, for 
example a management that is less able to satisfy all SEC demands in a timely fashion.  
While the SEC review might lead management to change their behavior in certain 
ways, in particular with respect to what they disclose, it does not result in changes to 
the fundamental qualities of management.   
Table 2.7 examines the relation between the extent of SEC review, again 
measured as the number of letters, and several measures related to post-IPO 
uncertainty about the firm.  Column 1 focuses on volatility, measured as the 
annualized standard deviation of the daily stock returns during the year starting one 
month after the IPO date.34  (We exclude the first month because of the various 
regulatory restrictions that potentially affect prices, for example price support and 
restrictions on information disclosures during the quiet period.).  Column 2 focuses on 
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 , where  are measured between 22nd trading day (a month) after the IPO 
and 274th trading day (a year and a month) after the IPO.  
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the absolute value of the abnormal return over the first year after the IPO.  Abnormal 
returns equal raw firm returns over one year minus returns on the corresponding 
Fama-French Size and Book-to-Market portfolio (using the 25 size, book-to-market 
portfolios, as described more fully in Fama and French (1993)).  
  To the extent that uncertainty is higher about these firms, we would expect 
higher volatility of returns and more extreme return realizations.  The significantly 
positive coefficients on the log of the number of SEC letters in both columns 1 and 2 
are consistent with these predictions.  A company with two letters from the SEC has 
on average 3.6% higher volatility and 7.6% higher absolute value of post-IPO 
abnormal returns in the year after the IPO, compared to a firm receiving only one 
letter.  Compared to mean volatility of 54% and mean absolute value of returns of 
39%, these represent 7% and 20% increases, respectively.   
Column 3 examines whether this higher abnormal return is concentrated in one 
direction, either positive or negative.  Specifically, we examine the relation between 
abnormal returns (rather than the absolute value of these returns) and the log of the 
number of SEC letters.  We find no significant relation.  In other words, the number of 
SEC letters predicts uncertainty, but this simple measure of SEC review does not 
provide a trading strategy.  This is perhaps not surprising, as it is relatively easy for 
investors to infer with a reasonable degree of accuracy the number of SEC letters, as 
each letter results in a revision of the company’s prospectus that is filed with the SEC 
and publicly observable.  As discussed in more detail later, more nuanced facets of the 
SEC review, for example related to the specific topics of questions, are not publicly 
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observable at the time of the IPO and thus more likely to be related to subsequent 
performance. 
Together, columns 1, 2, and 3 suggest that companies about which the SEC 
had the most concerns tend to have the highest uncertainty, and the most extreme 
outcomes.  A subset of these firms ultimately perform quite well and a subset perform 
quite poorly.  These firms had difficulty explaining their business to the SEC, thus 
resulting in multiple requests for further disclosures, and in a similar vein the market 
also had difficulty understanding these businesses.    The market requires both 
additional information (which cannot be credibly disclosed at the time of the IPO) and 
additional time to observe the firm, before it can more accurately assess firm value.  
Managers of high uncertainty firms, for example the firms with more extensive SEC 
reviews, arguably have a greater ability to understand the business and to forecast 
future performance, compared to outside investors.  Consistent with this, prior 
literature (see, e.g., Cohen et al, 2012) concludes that insider sales predict company 
performance.  Based on our findings suggesting that firms with more extensive SEC 
reviews include a disproportionate number of firms that ultimately perform quite 
poorly, we conjecture that companies that experienced more extensive SEC reviews 
will also have greater insider sales.   
Column 4 examines the relation between insider sales and the extent of SEC 
review.  Insiders are generally not permitted to sell until the expiration of the lockup 
period, which in most cases is 180 days after the IPO.  We thus concentrate on insider 
sales over the 180 – 220 day period, after the IPO.  We regress a dummy, equal to 1 if 
the company had insider sales and 0 otherwise, on the log of the number of SEC 
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letters.  Consistent with predictions, we find a significantly positive coefficient on 
insider sales.  Compared to a company receiving just one letter from the SEC, a 
company receiving two letters has a 5.5% higher probability of insider sales.   Relative 
to the mean probability of 29%, this represents a 19% increase.  While DeChow, 
Lawrence and Ryans (2016) find that insiders sell around the release of SEC comment 
letters issued in response to the 10K, the lock-up period means that insiders cannot sell 
at a similar time in the case of IPOs.  Nevertheless, our results indicate that a full six 
months after the IPO insiders still have concerns about many of the same firms about 
which the SEC had concerns.     
The finding that more extensive SEC reviews are associated with higher post-
IPO uncertainty is insightful when contrasted with prior literature suggesting that SEC 
reviews decrease various metrics of firm uncertainty, e.g., Johnston and Petacchi 
(2016), Benus, Cheng and Neamtiu (2016), and Bozanic, Kietrich and Johnson (2015).   
Together, the findings suggest that more extensive reviews both reduce uncertainty 
and signal greater remaining uncertainty.  This is consistent with the costs of putting 
all firms on an equal playing field outweighing the benefits, for example because of 
challenges related to fully explaining a firm’s business without divulging critical 
secrets to competitors.  
As noted previously, investors can infer with a reasonable degree of accuracy 
prior to the IPO the total extent of SEC review, measured as the number of SEC 
letters.  While the letters themselves are not public, the updated versions of the 
prospectuses in which companies address the SEC’s concerns become public 
immediately. Hence, at the time of the IPO, investors can estimate the number of SEC 
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comment letters by observing the number of S1 amendments.35   However, as explored 
earlier, the SEC review process also contains many other potentially informative 
details, over and above these more aggregate measures.  Specifically, SEC reviews 
tend to concentrate on certain topics, and there exists substantial variation in the topics 
of focus.   
Several factors influence the ways in which the individual topics of SEC focus 
are predicted to relate to the IPO firm’s pricing and post-IPO outcomes.  Most 
importantly, because the SEC’s letters are not disclosed until a minimum of 45 days 
after the IPO, nobody but the company and its advisors know the SEC’s specific 
concerns at the time of the IPO.36  While an investor could theoretically compare 
different versions of the prospectus to infer SEC concerns, this process would be 
highly imprecise (suggesting relatively low benefit) and time consuming (suggesting 
relatively high cost).  This means that information regarding topics is arguably more  
Table 2.7. Is SEC review related to post-IPO measures of market uncertainty?  
The sample consists of IPOs between 2005 and 2013.  The dependent variable, initial return, equals the 
change from the offer price to the closing price on the first day of trading. The number of words for 
each firm related to the accounting, valuation, compensation and business descriptions topics in the 
SEC letter and in the S1 are extracted with LDA from the first SEC letters and initial prospectus, 
respectively. We use the KL-divergence technique to pair the LDA topics from the SEC letters and 
prospectus. Appendix I provides detailed definition of all variables.  Year and industry fixed effects are 
included in all regressions, and robust standard errors are clustered by year. 
 Volatility |1-yr return| Insider Sales 1-yr Abnormal Return 
     
Log(# Letters) 5.193* 0.110*** 0.079*** 0.060 
 (2.12) (3.38) (3.38) (0.97) 
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 Clearly, this is not a perfect measure. For example, when companies update the IPO price range they 
have to refile—even if it is not a response to an SEC query. Also, for companies filed under the JOBS 
Act a subset of letters are issued prior to the release of any prospectus.  We control for filing under the 
JOBS Act in regressions, and we also have re-estimated all regressions omitting those companies that 
filed under the JOBS Act. 
36
 SEC comment letters between May 12th 2005 and January 1st 2012 become publicly available “no 
earlier than 45 days after the review of the disclosure filing is complete”. And SEC comment letters 
after January 1st 2012 become public “no earlier than 20 business days following the completion of a 
filing review” http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfannouncements/edgarcorrespondence.htm 
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Log(Sales) -3.453*** -0.011 0.015 0.014 
 (-4.52) (-1.31) (1.20) (0.96) 
Number Segments 0.299 -0.000 -0.004 -0.004 
 (1.67) (-0.12) (-0.53) (-0.61) 
Log(1 + Firm Age) 0.837 -0.016 0.016 0.002 
 (1.00) (-0.95) (1.37) (0.06) 
VC 2.695 -0.045 0.146*** -0.104** 
 (1.29) (-1.00) (5.86) (-2.80) 
Underwriter Rank -0.306** -0.001 0.003 -0.003 
 (-2.69) (-0.13) (0.49) (-0.70) 
Law Firm Rank -0.264 -0.000 -0.002 0.005 
 (-0.80) (-0.03) (-0.46) (0.76) 
Log(S1 Length) 1.530 -0.033 0.042 -0.006 
 (1.00) (-1.75) (1.19) (-0.14) 
S1 Uncertainty 0.890 0.081** 0.077 0.140*** 
 (0.47) (2.89) (1.70) (5.31) 
JOBS Act 2.389 0.015 -0.023 0.177** 
 (1.17) (0.21) (-0.25) (2.62) 
     
Observations 763 766 766 766 
Adjusted R2 0.370 0.046 0.105 0.008 
 
likely to influence prices during the months after the IPO, as the market learns about 
these concerns (either directly through reading the SEC’s letters or indirectly by 
independently coming to similar conclusions through other sources of information).    
The prediction that information related to the coarse summary measure of SEC review 
- # letters - should be incorporated into the prices at the time of the IPO is supported 
by evidence in Table 2.7; we find no evidence of a significant relation between the 
number of SEC letters and post-IPO abnormal returns.  Table 2.8 examines the 
relation between the specific topics and post-IPO abnormal returns.  The table contains 
three column, where each focuses on one SEC topic.  We focus on those topics-clouds 
that are both economically important and that are prevalent within more than a trivial 
portion of companies.  Thus, we focus on topics-clouds related to the description of 
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the business (column 1), to valuation (column 2), and to accounting (column 3).37  The 
dependent variable in all regression is post-IPO performance, measured as abnormal 
one-year returns.  The independent variable of focus is the log of the number of words 
in the topic.  In addition, we also include controls from earlier tables (not tabulated), 
the log of the number of SEC letters to capture the total extent of SEC review, and the 
log of the number of words in the corresponding topic in the prospectus.   
We find that certain topics are significantly negatively related to post-IPO 
performance.  Specifically, we find strong evidence that companies that receive more 
questions about their business description exhibit significantly lower abnormal returns 
during the year after the IPO. A one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of the 
number of business-related topic words is linked to a 3.80% decline in abnormal 
returns in the next year.38  Results using returns over the six-month period produce 
qualitatively similar results (not tabulated).  We also find weak evidence that 
accounting-related questions are significantly negatively related to post-IPO returns, 
but the relation is only significant at the 10% level. 
Table 2.8 Are topic clouds related to post-IPO abnormal returns? 
 
The sample consists of IPOs between 2005 and 2013.  The dependent variable is post-IPO abnormal 
returns, measured as raw firm returns over one year minus returns on the corresponding Fama-French 
Size and Book-to-Market portfolio (using the 25 size, book-to-market portfolios). The number of words 
for each firm related to the accounting, valuation, and business descriptions topics in the SEC letter and 
in the S1 are extracted with LDA from the first SEC letters and initial prospectus, respectively. We use 
the KL-divergence technique to pair the LDA topics from the SEC letters and prospectus. Appendix I 
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 We do not analyze the effects of compensation-related questions because the SEC focuses on this 
issue in so few companies.  As shown in Table 1, the median company has 0.02% of the first SEC letter 
devoted to compensation questions, and the analogous statistic for the company at the 75th percentile is 
only 0.46%.  
38
 The economic significance of the accounting topic (business description topic) equals the coefficient 
of -0.022 times the standard deviation of 2.64 (-0.045 coefficient multiplied by the standard deviation of 
0.85).  The predictive power of accounting and business related topics is robust to the model 
specification. These topics are similarly significant if we use the total number of the topic related words 
instead of the logarithm, and also if we use the percent of the first letter devoted to the topic. 
119 
provides detailed definition of all variables.  Year and industry fixed effects are included in all 
regressions, and robust standard errors are clustered by year. 
 
 Business 
Description 
Topic Cloud  
Valuation 
Topic Cloud 
Accounting 
Topic Cloud 
Log(# Letters) 0.102 0.063 0.071 
 (1.43) (0.98) (1.04) 
Log(Topic Cloud words, letter) -0.055** -0.014 -0.026* 
 (-2.31) (-1.49) (-1.97) 
Log(Topic Cloud words, S1) -16.337 -29.077* -33.950** 
 (-1.48) (-2.17) (-2.49) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 766 766 766 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.016 0.022 
 
In an effort to understand why some topics are more strongly related to post-
IPO returns (and thus less incorporated into price at the time of the IPO), we consider 
the extent to which concerns on different topics provide incremental information to 
investors.  Some types of SEC questions relate closely to material voluntarily provided 
by companies in the preliminary prospectus.  In contrast, other topics more frequently 
include questions that relate less closely.  For example, SEC demands to provide more 
detail on the valuation of options would be closely related to information in the 
prospectus, as other details regarding these options would have already been provided 
by the company.  In contrast, SEC requests for information regarding contracts with 
overseas suppliers or risk related to transportation of goods would be substantially less 
closely related, in particular if companies don’t tend to disclose any details regarding 
such suppliers or transportation channels in the first version of the prospectus. 
Looking back at Table 2.2, we see that the topics that are significantly related to post-
IPO performance are also the topics that are least closely related to information in the 
prospectus.  In particular, the topic that is most strongly related to post-IPO returns is 
also least closely related to what was in the prospectus.  The KL-divergence measure 
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for business description is the highest at 3.5.39  While the absolute value of this 
number is not particularly informative, the fact that it is greater in relative terms than 
others indicates that SEC questions on this topic are less closely related to information 
in the prospectus.   
Our results are related to a contemporaneous paper by Ryans (2016), who 
examines letters in response to 10-K filings by mature firms and finds that some types 
of concerns are related to firm valuation, whereas others are not.  He takes a very 
different approach of identifying the important issues from market reactions at the 
time of letter disclosure, which relies to some extent on investors paying sufficient 
attention to the release of the letters. 
In sum, using information that can be easily inferred at the time of the IPO, 
i.e., the number of SEC letters, investors are unable to predict post-IPO abnormal 
performance.  However, the details on the topics of SEC concern, which are released a 
minimum of 45 days after the IPO, are significantly related to post-IPO performance.  
This evidence is consistent with the regulator playing a unique role and identifying 
information that investors do not. 
Conclusion 
The IPO process is complex, with many players taking an active role. There is 
a large literature on the role of the issuer, underwriter, analysts, market makers, 
auditor and lawyers.  In addition to these entities, while regulators play a substantial 
                                               
39
 The only topics to have higher KL-divergence measures are the boilerplate topics.  As mentioned 
earlier, these contain phrases such as “Please avoid use of the term ‘solution’ as it is jargon”.  Such 
phrases are obviously not closely related to material in the prospectus, and thus it is intuitive that the 
KL-divergence measures are high. 
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role, there is limited information about how the regulator influences the IPO process.  
This paper strives to fill some of this gap.  
We find that the SEC is actively involved in each IPO, communicating with 
the company an average four times between the filing of the initial prospectus and the 
IPO date. The extent of scrutiny is higher for more complex companies, for companies 
with lower quality advisors, and for companies with less complete disclosure in the 
preliminary prospectus. The more concerns the SEC has the longer it takes the firm 
going public, which in turn make the IPO process more costly and risky for the 
company. Moreover, the extent of SEC review contains information regarding post-
IPO dynamics:  companies with the most extensive reviews have significantly higher 
initial returns and post-IPO volatility.  
Using LDA techniques, we extract the main subjects of the SEC review and 
also quantify the extent of each topic in each letter.  Results indicate that the greatest 
number of SEC questions relate to requests for clarification on the business model and 
underlying risk factors; in addition, the SEC also focuses on issues related to 
accounting, compensation, and valuation.   
Using a new method that builds on the properties of LDA topics and on the concept of 
KL-divergence, we find that SEC concerns related to the underlying business model 
contain the most incremental information, in the sense that they are least closely 
related to material in the preliminary prospectus.  Moreover, these topics of SEC 
concern that contain the most incremental information also represent the strongest 
negative signals regarding subsequent firm performance.   Our findings suggest that 
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firms that were subject to greater scrutiny by the SEC experienced significantly higher 
initial returns and significantly higher post-IPO volatility. 
Our findings indicate that the process of SEC review highlights issues that are 
relevant to underlying company value and which investors do not independently 
uncover.  This conclusion contrasts with a Coase (1960) – type framework where there 
is no role for a regulator.   The public-good nature of information about companies 
going public means that the regulator’s ability to both demand information and impose 
enforcement criteria has value.40    Along this dimension, our results are consistent 
with the regulator’s influence increasing transparency for investors.  However, the fact 
that much of the regulator’s information is not made public until at least 45 days after 
the IPO raises questions related to why this additional transparency is not made 
immediately available to investors. 
 
  
                                               
40
 See La Porta et al (2006) for a discussion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
INTIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS: 
A SYNTHESIS OF THE LITERATURE AND DIRECTION FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH  
Abstract  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the IPO literature 
since 2000.  The fewer numbers of companies going public in recent years has raised 
many questions regarding the IPO process, in both academic and regulatory circles.  
As we all strive to understand these changes in the market, it is especially important to 
understand the dynamics underlying the IPO process.  If the process of going public is 
too costly or the IPO mechanism is plagued by too many conflicts of interest among 
the various intermediaries, then private companies may rationally choose other 
methods of raising capital.  In a related vein, it is imperative that new regulations not 
be based on research focusing solely on large, more mature firms.  Newly public firms 
have unique characteristics, and an increased understanding of such issues will 
contribute positively to well-functioning public markets and further growth of the 
entrepreneurial sector. 
 
Introduction 
Transitioning from private to public status is a watershed event in the life of 
any firm.  For most firms and managers, the process of conducting an IPO is 
something they will only go through once.  As such, there exists much uncertainty 
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over the process, starting with the decision of whether to go public and including 
issues such as when to go public, who to select as advisors, how to price the offering 
and how to structure the governance of the newly public firm.  A broad set of 
academic literature has studied all of these issues, and the purpose of this chapter is to 
review the existing evidence and also to suggest areas in which our understanding is 
less complete and which would benefit from further research.   
We begin with a discussion of why firms go public.  While the most obvious 
factor would seem to be the raising of capital, this is far from the only determinant and 
many studies conclude that it is not the most important determinant.  A continuing 
debate in the literature concerns whether firms go public primarily to raise money for 
future investment or for other reasons such as market timing, i.e., because they expect 
the market to value them higher than their ‘true’ value.  We review the evidence on 
both sides of this debate and also discuss the myriad of other factors that potentially 
play at least some role in managers’ decisions to take their firms public:  capital 
structure re-adjustment, providing liquidity for the owners, advantages of having a 
publicly observable stock price, compensation, and the credibility that comes with 
having multiple parties scrutinize the firm (e.g., analysts, institutional investors, etc.). 
Given the broad array of factors that motivate companies to go public, it is 
perhaps not surprising that the types of firms going public varies widely.  In the 
interests of providing the reader with an informed overview of this market, we 
highlight a number of important stylized facts concerning the IPO market in Section 2.  
One of the many fascinating things about this market concerns the ways it has varied 
over time, and for this reason we disaggregate many of these stylized facts by time.  
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Capital markets in the U.S. change and evolve at a relatively rapid pace, and consistent 
with this we observe strong differences in the types of companies choosing to go 
public and also in the ways in which they structure their offerings.  It will perhaps be 
informative to consider jointly some of these time trends as a way to better understand 
the changes in our markets, including for example the lower frequency of IPOs over 
the past 15 years. 
More than most corporate events, IPOs present a number of “puzzles”.  For 
example, it is well known that IPOs are on average underpriced, with average first day 
returns of approximately 15% - but the reasons for such large one-day returns continue 
to be debated.  Beyond this one-day return, the returns associated with IPOs over 
longer time intervals are more complex.  Do IPOs underperform over the long-term, 
measured as the three or five years following the offering?  The answer is yes if we 
compare them to a broad market index, but the answer is no if we compare them to 
firms of similar size and book-to-market.   
The story becomes even more complex when we consider the strong time-
series fluctuations within each of these pricing patterns.  We know that many 
companies go public during some periods but relatively few in others.  Over many 
decades, this variation was explained largely by fluctuations in companies’ demands 
for capital and by changing investor sentiment that influenced the price at which a 
company could sell itself.  However, neither of these factors is sufficient to explain the 
dramatic fall in the number of IPOs since 2000.   Finally, the type of company going 
public in “hot” versus “cold” markets is different and there is some evidence that 
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companies going public during hot markets perform worse, but measurement issues 
can make definitive conclusions difficult.   
These fluctuations in performance highlight the extent of uncertainty 
surrounding these companies.  In fact, 36% of IPO firms delist within the first five 
years after the IPO, with 12% being due to poor performance and 24% because they 
are acquired.  In addition, many companies that start the process to go public do not 
complete the process:  20% of IPOs are withdrawn, and of those that are withdrawn 
relatively few ever successfully complete an IPO. 
Given this high uncertainty combined with the fact that most companies only 
ever conduct an IPO one time, intermediaries have the potential to play a particularly 
important role.  The number of intermediaries involved in the months surrounding 
many firms’ IPOs is large:  venture capitalists, underwriter banks, lawyers, analysts, 
institutional investors, regulators, etc.  While the effects of some of these 
intermediaries has received considerable attention, the influence of other parties, e.g., 
regulators, is less understood.  We both overview the current state of knowledge 
regarding the roles of these various entities, and comment on what we perceive to be 
gaps in our understanding. 
Finally, an area of growing research concerns the governance of newly public 
firms.  While multiple forces in the markets (e.g., exchange listing requirements, 
pension fund recommendations, proxy advisory service company recommendations) 
have been pushing firms toward a common set of governance standards, there are 
reasons to believe that the governance demands of newly public firms are unique and 
very different from those of their more mature counterparts.  Because the vast majority 
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of corporate governance research is based on similar samples of mostly mature firms 
such as the S&P1500, the aforementioned recommendations are largely based on these 
mature firms.  We argue that these conclusions are frequently not appropriate for 
younger firms.  We review the still nascent literature in this area, and encourage 
further research along this dimension. 
Perhaps the issue that has garnered the most attention in recent years with 
respect to IPOs is the decreased number of them.  Why are fewer companies choosing 
to raise public equity on US markets?  While new companies are being founded on a 
regular basis, these small private companies are with increasing frequency being 
acquired by large, already public companies.   As a result, a smaller number of 
companies are controlling an increasing percentage of entrepreneurial activity.  From 
an antitrust perspective, this raises obvious concerns.  A lack of sufficient competition 
has the potential to put a downward bias on future innovative activity. We hope that a 
more complete understanding of many dynamics surrounding IPOs, as overviewed in 
this chapter, will help guide researchers in efforts to better address these issues.  To 
the extent that companies are increasingly concluding that the costs issuing public 
equity for the first time exceed the benefits, it is clear that we need a better 
understanding of these costs and benefits and the ways they have changed over time. 
The literature on going public is rich and vast. Given the depth and breadth of 
the literature we made a decision to concentrate this review mainly on research 
published in the 21st century. And even within this prism we were not able to both 
cover all grounds and keep this review within a manageable length, while delving into 
some of the topics more deeply.  To facilitate discussion and analysis of the most 
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important facets of the IPO process, we also decided to replicate some of the main 
empirical results concerning IPOs ourselves using the most comprehensive coverage 
in terms of the length of the sample period and the cross section of firms included. 
This enables us to see how some of the empirical regularities have changed over time 
and how others are more immune to the time period one examines.  
Why do firms go Public? 
Why do firms go public? On the face of it, the answer sounds obvious: firms 
go public to raise capital because they need money for investments. Let’s assume for a 
moment that this is indeed an important reason why firms go public. Still it cannot be 
the complete answer: A question still remains. Why do firms choose to raise capital in 
the public equity market and not in the private equity market or in the debt market? In 
other words, why do some firms go public while others refrain from doing so and raise 
capital through other means? In this section we attempt to give some perspective about 
these very important questions. We feel that the issues we discuss here are not only 
important, but that our current knowledge is insufficient. These questions provide 
fertile ground for future research.  
Our starting point is the relation between a firm’s investment needs and the 
decision to go public. The striking result Pagano Panetta, Zingales (1998) document is 
that the answer to this question is not obvious. They examine the determinants of 
going public in the Italian market and find that future investment needs is not the 
dominant reason why firms go public, at least not in the sample of the 66 IPO firms 
they examined. They find that the main factor affecting the probability of going public 
is the industry market to book ratio. This result suggests that perhaps firms in 
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industries with higher investment opportunities-- and hence higher investment needs -- 
are more likely to tap the public equity market. However, it may also suggest that 
firms in industries that are over-valued are those who decide to go to the public equity 
markets. Possibly, firms go public because they can. Not because they need. 
Examining those firms’ performance in the years after the IPO, Pagano et. al. (1998) 
find that both their investment and profitability decline, suggesting over-valuation as 
the more likely explanation.41 
 Pagano et al (1998) also find that larger firms and firms that have experienced 
higher growth are more likely to IPO. These latter findings may be unique to Italy or 
to the time period of the study. In a very interesting paper Brau and Fawcett (2006) 
use a survey method and ask 336 CFOs why firms go public.  Strikingly, there is no 
evidence that a need for cash is the driving force behind the IPO decision. This result, 
that a need for cash does not show up as a dominant motive for going public, is 
interesting and surprising. It is not what we would expect.  
Using a large set of firms from across the globe Kim and Weisbach (2008) 
took another look at a related question: They analyze how firms spend the money they 
raise through equity issuances. (So unlike the Pagano et al paper, they do not examine 
why firms go public rather than staying private. The question they ask is what IPO and 
SEO firms do with the money they raise.) Not surprisingly, they find that in the year 
of the IPO cash reserves increase by about 50 cents on every dollar raised. Four years 
after the IPO the cash reserves are still significant higher (about 40 cents on the 
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 Pastor, Taylor and Veronesi (2009) develop a model in which post-IPO declines in profitability occur 
in spite of no overvaluation or behavioral effects.  Such declines are the result of owners rationally 
choosing to go public when the diversification benefits are sufficiently high to outweigh the loss of 
private benefits of control.   
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dollar). The second largest impact is on investment (capital expenditure and R&D). 
There they find an increase of about 28 cents on each dollar raised in the first year and 
a much larger increase after four years. These are important findings, suggesting that a 
significant portion of the money raised through the IPO is being used for investments. 
Of course, money has no color, so we do not know whether the IPO money went to 
finance investments, or came from other sources such as earnings over the years 
following the IPO. Likewise, some of this money may have been channeled back to 
investors through share repurchase programs or dividends. Kim and Weisbach control 
for the first issue (other sources of funds) but not for the second. Nevertheless, the 
Kim and Weisbach study presents important evidence suggesting that a significant 
portion, though not the majority, of the money raised through the IPO financed firms’ 
investments.  
At the same time it is important to note that the study, by design, does not 
attempt to address the question of whether the IPO firms could have achieved their 
goals through other means of equity capital raising, be it through VCs or other private 
equity vehicles that are becoming more and more popular; or through private debt.  
At this point it is worth summarizing the possible objectives for firms to go 
public and whether those objectives can be achieved through other vehicles such as 
private equity or debt. We can think of many possible reasons, which are not mutually 
exclusive. The first, is the need for cash for investment. As also summarized in Table 
A, this need can be achieved through private equity or debt. Thus if investment is the 
main motive for going public we would like , ideally, to be able to show that firms use 
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the proceeds for investments and to understand why they chose this channel (IPO) 
rather than other channels.  
The second reason is over-valuation. If over-valuation is common for both 
public and private equity (as we expect), it can be a good reason for why firms raise 
equity capital; but not why they go public. For the latter, there must be another 
friction. For example, over-valuation is more pronounced in public than in private 
markets.  Lowry’s (2003) finding that more companies go public when investor 
sentiment is higher suggests that overvaluation is a significant determinant of the 
decision to go public.  In economic terms, her findings suggest that it is more 
important than demand for capital (e.g., for future investments).  
The third reason is capital structure adjustment. This clearly can be achieved 
both with public and private equity markets.  
The fourth reason is owners’ need for liquidity. Shortly after a firm goes public 
its owners, both individuals and VCs can liquidate (part or all of) their positions with 
minimal transaction costs. The liquidity provision allows holders to buy and sell their 
stocks any time after the end of the lockup period.  This goal can be achieved only 
through the public equity channel. Selling securities of private firms can be 
prohibitively costly. This liquidity reason may be even more acute when VCs have 
stakes in the company, as they must liquidate their investments within a set number of 
years. (This of course can be done either through an IPO or through an acquisition by 
another company.) Using data on industrial firms from the census, Chemmanur, He 
and Nandy (2009) find that firms in industries with great average liquidity of already 
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listed equities are more likely to go public. Like Pagano et al, they also find that larger 
and more successful firms are more likely to go public.  
Owners’ diversification (reason #5 below) represents another potential reason 
to go public. IPOs allow the original owners to diversify their holdings and increase 
liquidity by selling shares in the secondary market. (To the extent that an occasional 
secondary equity offering is possible also in the private equity markets, owners’ 
diversification, at least to an extent, can be achieved both in the public and private 
markets). A natural extension of the basic diversification story is that less diversified 
shareholders have more to gain from taking their firm public, and hence may be 
willing to accept a lower IPO price. Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, and Simonov (2008) 
study the effect of controlling owners’ diversification on the IPO price, specifically 
whether they are more willing to accept a lower price for shares. Using Swedish data 
with detailed information about owners’ portfolio composition between 1995-2001, 
the paper finds that: (1) private firms held by less diversified controlling shareholders 
are more likely to go public; (2) less diversified individual shareholders sell more of 
their shares at the IPO; (3) the extent of owners’ diversification is related to the 
underpricing of the IPO. While the data used in this study is limited, its findings are 
interesting and insightful, suggesting that diversification is an important factor in the 
decision to go public. Chod and Lyandres (2011) examine a different aspect of 
diversification, arguing that public firms’ owners tolerate higher profit variability than 
owners of private firms because of their ability to diversify. Hence, public firms can 
take riskier investment strategies than private firms -- which improves their 
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competitive position. This adds another aspect why diversification through IPO may 
be beneficial.  
The sixth reason in the table below encompasses several motives, as related to 
the presence of a publicly available market value of the firm’s equity. It is argued that 
often firms go public because they want to use their publicly traded stocks as 
acquisition currency (versus having to pay for acquisitions with cash). This is a valid 
motive to go public, in the presence of some market friction such as financial 
constraint that may prevent companies to raise additional equity if they need cash for 
acquisition. Alternatively, if insiders believe the firm is overvalued then paying with 
equity rather than cash may be preferred. This motive is unique to IPOs and cannot be 
achieved if the company remains private, even if it issues shares in the private market. 
Brau and Fawcett (2006) using surveys, find that the primary motivation for going 
public is to facilitate acquisitions (#6 in the Table above). They also find support for 
the notion that market timing plays a role in the decision. Relatedly, Hsieh, Lyandres, 
and Zhdanov (2011) suggest that the reduction of valuation uncertainly associated 
with having a market value through the IPO process leads firms to a more efficient 
acquisition strategy—and hence also increases its value. Some theoretical research 
argues that the going public decision strengthens the insiders’ bargaining position in 
the case of an acquisition (Zingales 1995), and allows insiders to cash out at a higher 
valuation-- and hence increases the firm value.  
Another reason (# 7 in the table below) that is closely tied to having a publicly 
available market value relates to compensation, specifically the ability for firms to use 
the price of their publicly traded shares to value stock options given to owners and 
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employees. Going public allows firm’s stakeholders to have an agreed upon firm-
value which can be used for various purposes. Relatedly, the 8th reason is based on the 
idea that since market prices aggregate the valuation of many market investors (e.g., 
Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) they can also be used as a source of information to the 
firm about its value or even the course of action it is taking.  
Being a public firm offers an additional benefit to firms, in the form of 
certification and reduction of uncertainty (#9). The scrutiny of the SEC (e.g., Lowry, 
Michaely, and Volkova,  2016) combined with the constant watching and nudging of 
sell-side analysts, activists, and other investors adds credibility to the firm, certifies its 
value. The reduced risk and greater transparency achieved through the going public 
process also increases the confidence of suppliers and consumer about its value and 
well-being; which in turn affect its cost of dealing with suppliers, its cost of debt 
capital and revenues. This value certification reduces the uncertainty and potentially 
results in high valuation. However, the flip side is that for the right or wrong reasons, 
many managers do not like the scrutiny by market participants. In either case, it is 
difficult to see how this can be achieved in the private equity market.  
Finally, reason # 10 suggests that going public may be an effective marketing 
device: it puts the firm in center stage both in the financial community and perhaps 
more importantly, among consumers. Thus going public can increase its consumer 
base, increase consumer loyalty—especially since consumers can now become 
shareholders. This can both increase revenue and decrease the cost of capital. The 
broadening of investors’ base can also increase stock liquidity. Neither private equity 
nor debt instruments will achieve these goals.  
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These motives and how they relate to the decision of whether to raise capital 
(public equity, private equity, or debt) and how they relate to the decision to go public 
(vs. private equity or debt) are summarized in Table 3.0. Nine out of the ten reasons 
we outlined are not related to the fact that firms exchange stocks for cash during the 
IPO process. That is, they do not suggest that firms go through an IPO because they 
need cash. The relative importance of these motives remains an open empirical 
question.  
Table 3.0:  Summary of reasons companies go public 
 Source Of Capital Public 
Equity 
Private 
Equity 
Debt 
1 Investment + + + 
2 Overvaluation (market timing) + + 0 
3 Capital Structure Adjustment + + - 
4 Stock liquidity + 0 0 
5 Owners' Diversification + + 0 
6 Currency for Acquisitions + 0 0 
7 Compensation and Market 
Valuation 
+ 0 0 
8 Feedback effects from market + 0 0 
9 Certification by analysts, SEC and 
markets 
+ 0 0 
10 Marketing + 0  
11 Corporate control + 0  
 
So why do firms go public? We believe we know the possible motives (as we 
outlined in the Table above), but we need more direct evidence on the relative 
importance of the various motives. Interesting evidence from Sweden suggests that 
diversification is an important motive. The evidence we discussed on the need for cash 
as a reason for IPO is mixed, but it is very likely to play some role. There is more 
consistent evidence that having a verifiable market value is an important motive, be it 
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for acquisition currency, stock options, or ability to take more aggressive strategies. 
Why firms go (or do not go) public is perhaps one of the most important questions 
related to IPOs, with significant possible implication on policies, governance, and on 
firms’ cost of capital. It would be wonderful to have more, and more complete 
evidence on this issue. 
Many of the models described above incorporate the costs as well as the 
benefits of going public vs. staying private, as well as how these costs and benefits 
may change over time.  The Maug (2001) model, for example, suggests that an IPO 
occurs when insiders’ information advantage over outsiders disappears; a natural 
progression over the firm’s life cycle. More generally, the going public decision is an 
equilibrium outcome such that at the time of going public, the benefits outweighs the 
costs. It is therefore important to study the timing of going public as well as the type 
of firm that decides to go this route. 
The reduction in the number of public firms in the last 25 years (Grullon, 
Larkin and Michaely, 2016) and the reduction in the number of firms going public 
(Gao, Ritter, and Zhu 2013) suggest that the costs of being public may have increased 
and/or the benefits of being public decreased over the last several decades. Several 
papers have attempted to shed light on this issue. 
Regarding the costs of being a publicly listed firm, reporting requirements 
have become more complicated and time consuming, and there is increased pressure 
on management to pursue short term, rather than long-term objectives. Interestingly, 
neither Gao, Ritter, and Zhu (2013) nor Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2013) find support 
for increased regulation playing an important role:  they find no evidence that either 
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the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 or the 2003 Global Settlement had a material effect 
on IPO activity.  However, Ritter (2011) conjectures that such regulatory changes 
have probably had at least some effect.  
Doidge et al (2013) conjecture that financial globalization has contributed 
toward the lower numbers of companies going public in the U.S., i.e., that the net 
benefits of going public in the US versus in other markets have decreased.  Consistent 
with this, the fraction of worldwide IPOs occurring on US markets has fallen from 
50% or more in the early 1990s, to approximately 30% in the late 1990s, to 10% or 
less in the 2007 – 2011 period.  At the same time, financial globalization has 
increased.  While these trends appear consistent with increased globalization 
contributing to the fall in US IPO volume, a more critical examination casts doubt on 
this conclusion.  Specifically, while the fall in US IPOs is significantly related to the 
increased globalization, Doidge et al’s findings are not consistent with IPOs in the rest 
of the world simultaneously increasing.  In other words, they find no evidence that 
companies are choosing to go public in other markets rather than in the US.42 
Gao et al (2013) highlight that the decrease in the number of companies going 
public is concentrated among small offerings, and they offer an economies of scope 
argument for the observed trends.  They conjecture that it is increasingly difficult for 
small firms to operate independently in today’s rapidly changing markets.  Thus, small 
firms find it increasingly optimal to sell out to larger firms, who have a broader 
network to develop products more quickly and to bring the products to market faster.  
Consistent with this, both Brau, Francis and Kohers (2003) and Gao et al document 
                                               
42
 Specifically, Column 2 of Table 8 of Doidge et al indicates a small negative effect of globalization on 
Non-US IPOs,  -0.297 (= βGlobalization + βNonUS*Globalization = -1.656 + 1.359). 
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that venture-backed firms are increasingly likely to be acquired:  the percentage of 
VC-backed firms exiting via acquisition as opposed to IPO has increased from the 25-
35% range over the 1991 – 1996 period, to the 40 – 60% range over 1997 – 2000, to 
over 80% since 2001.   Moreover, these trends are particularly strong among small 
venture-backed private firms.  Along the same lines, Grullon et. al (2017) report that 
the average US firm tripled in size (in real terms) since the turn of the century, 
consistent with the notion of economies of scope. We note that these patterns are 
informative, and we would like to encourage future research that could examine the 
causal effects of such influences. 
Finally, while historically a key benefit of being a public firm was broader 
access to capital from a disperse group of shareholders, in recent years such capital has 
become increasingly available to private firms.   In other words, some researchers 
suggested that the spread between the opportunity cost of capital for private and public 
firms had narrowed in the last decade. In a study of 13 mutual fund families (103 
unique funds) across the 1995 – 2015 period, Kwon, Lowry, and Qian (2017) 
document that these funds in aggregate held less than $20 million in VC-backed 
private firms in 1995 and 1996, $70 – 120 million between 2000 and 2010, and $7 
billion in 2015.  They find some evidence that this increased availability of funding 
enables companies to stay private for longer.  Importantly, mutual funds represent just 
one of several sources of funding available to private firms, with other sources 
including pension funds and sovereign wealth funds.  The extent to which changes in 
the market continue to make such capital increasingly available has the potential to 
substantially influence the IPO market in the future.   
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Stylized Facts 
 In this section, we review the stylized facts about IPOs using a long-term data 
sample of initial public offerings in U.S.  While some aspects of IPOs remain 
relatively constant throughout the 43 years of our sample period, other relations vary 
with the time and with market conditions. IPO data for this section is pulled from the 
SDC Platinum database and consists of the companies that went public on the NYSE, 
AMEX and Nasdaq stock exchanges between 1972 and 2015. Consistent with the vast 
majority of academic research, the constructed sample excludes REITs, units, ADRs, 
closed-end funds, offerings with the stock price below $5, and companies not listed on 
CRSP within 14 days of the IPO.  The start of the sample corresponds to the beginning 
of SDC Platinum IPO coverage. The total sample includes information on 
approximately 9,145 initial public offerings that satisfy these criteria.  Additional data 
is collected from CSRP and Compustat.  
We decided to replicate many of the results concerning IPOs for three reasons. 
First, it allows us to verify many of the results reported in prior literature and to 
examine their empirical validity over longer time periods. Second, while many studies 
use different sample selection criteria and different methodologies, here we use a 
unified and consistent empirical framework allowing for better comparison among the 
different results in the literature. Third, results presented in this section are based on a 
sample of IPO that is larger than that of any published paper of which we are aware.43 
                                               
43For example, our sample includes a greater number of IPOs than Ritter 
(https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/files/2016/12/IPOs2016Statistics_Dec21_2016.pdf) because we do 
not exclude banks.  
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Figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 show how both the number of IPOs and total proceeds raised 
in IPOs vary over time.   
 
Figure 3.1. Number of IPOs and Aggregate Proceeds. 
The IPO sample is constructed based on information from the SDC Platinum 
database. The sample consists of companies that went public between 1972 and 2015 
on NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX stock exchanges. IPOs with an offer price below $5, 
REITs, ADRs, units, and companies without CRSP records are excluded. The final 
sample includes 8,543 IPOs. Proceeds (obtained from SDC) are expressed in real 2015 
billion dollars, using the GDP implicit price deflator. 
  
 
Table 3.1. Mean IPO Initial Returns and Average Proceeds, 1972-2015 
The IPO sample is constructed based on information from the SDC Platinum database. The sample 
consists of companies that went public between 1972 and 2015 on NYSE, Nasdaq and AMEX stock 
exchanges. IPOs with an offer price below $5, REITs, ADRs, units, and companies without CRSP 
records are excluded. The final sample includes 8,543 IPOs. Proceeds (obtained from SDC) are 
expressed in real 2015 million dollars, using the GDP implicit price deflator.  Initial returns equal the 
return from the offering price to the first day closing price, where the offer price is from SDC and the 
first closing price from CRSP. 
Year # IPOs Initial Average Aggregate 
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Number of IPOs and Aggregate Proceeds, 1972-
2015 
Number of IPOs Total Proceeds (in bln 2015)
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Returns Proceeds 
(mil) 
Proceeds 
(mil) 
1972 1 2.0%  43.9   43.9  
1973 13 10.8%  39.0   507.3  
1974 4 5.7%  24.1   96.3  
1975 9 3.8%  91.1   820.2  
1976 26 3.0%  26.9   699.5  
1977 17 4.3%  23.7   402.8  
1978 19 14.9%  29.1   553.5  
1979 42 13.5%  26.4   1,110.3  
1980 66 15.8%  33.9   2,237.5  
1981 183 6.6%  30.2   5,529.9  
1982 68 12.5%  30.0   2,037.6  
1983 461 10.2%  47.2   21,747.1  
1984 181 2.7%  25.9   4,679.7  
1985 219 8.2%  42.3   9,259.9  
1986 505 7.5%  56.2   28,384.6  
1987 337 6.0%  60.3   20,322.7  
1988 138 4.6%  50.1   6,917.1  
1989 125 7.7%  64.8   8,103.4  
1990 115 9.3%  60.7   6,977.4  
1991 324 10.1%  70.0   22,674.8  
1992 450 9.0%  75.3   33,865.1  
1993 576 12.0%  74.4   42,830.2  
1994 418 8.1%  55.4   23,152.0  
1995 494 20.2%  75.8   37,445.8  
1996 709 15.6%  81.4   57,708.8  
1997 495 13.7%  75.3   37,292.4  
1998 356 22.1%  122.2   43,507.8  
1999 633 76.9%  132.2   83,708.4  
2000 506 59.4%  148.4   75,076.2  
2001 102 14.4%  443.3   45,220.8  
2002 78 8.8%  302.2   23,575.3  
2003 67 13.1%  179.1   11,997.0  
2004 167 12.4%  214.9   35,894.3  
2005 156 9.3%  202.0   31,518.8  
2006 138 12.7%  205.1   28,297.0  
2007 142 13.1%  197.3   28,013.8  
2008 20 5.0%  1,249.9   24,997.9  
2009 40 12.5%  337.2   13,489.1  
2010 93 7.3%  345.3   32,115.8  
2011 80 13.8%  324.4   25,953.1  
2012 96 19.5%  342.7   32,895.2  
2013 157 20.0%  258.7   40,618.1  
2014 202 16.4%  208.5   42,111.3  
2015 117 16.5%  195.2   22,832.6  
Total 9145 19.1%  111.2  
 
1,017,222.1  
 
Throughout the 1970s, the number of companies going public each year was 
quite low, with an average of 16 IPOs per year.  During the mid-1980s IPO volume 
was markedly higher, with 341 IPOs per year over the 1983 – 1987 period.  After 
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another dip in the late 1980s and early 1990s, IPO volume rose to record levels in the 
mid to late 1990s.  The year 1996 witnessed the highest number of IPOs, with 709 
offerings in that single year—an average of almost three IPOs per trading day.  There 
continued to be many IPOs over the rest of the 1990s, and then very few following the 
crash of the internet bubble in 2000.  Many of these fluctuations in IPO volume are 
strongly positively correlated with market-wide returns.  However, since 2000 IPO 
volume has never recovered to anywhere close to the levels observed in the 1990s, 
despite strong market performance during much of this period.  As shown in Figure 
3.4 (and also discussed by Gao et al (2013)), the majority of this drop in IPO volume 
has been among smaller companies.  Larger companies have continued to go public at 
a similar pace.  Smaller private companies have become increasingly likely to be 
acquired rather than to go public. 
Total annual IPO proceeds (all expressed in constant 2015 USD) follow a trend 
similar to that shown for the number of firms going public, throughout much of this 
period.44  Aggregate proceeds raised averaged $530 million per year in the 1970s, 
compared to $11 billion per year in the 1980s, and $39 billion per year in the 1990s.  
Following the crash of the internet bubble in 2000, aggregate proceeds have recovered 
to a greater extent than the raw number of offerings.  While the average number of 
companies going public since 2000 (135 per year) is about a third of the number of 
IPOs in the 1990s (457 per year), proceeds raised during the two periods are more 
similar (an annual average of $39 billion during the 1990s compared to an annual 
                                               
44
 We deflate using the GDP Implicit Price Deflator rather than the CPI because the GDP Deflator 
reflects changes in prices in the entire economy, rather than changes in prices of a fixed basket of 
consumer goods.  
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average of $32 billion between 2000 – 2015).  This is driven by the fact that the 
average size of companies going public has increased substantially over the past 15 
years.  Over the entire sample period, the annual correlation between number of IPOs 
and total annual proceeds is 0.71, and it is an even higher 0.89 over the early sample 
period 1972 - 2000.  
 
Figure 3.2. Number of IPOs and Initial Returns  
Figure 3.2 shows average initial returns across all companies going public each 
year, with the number of IPOs plotted on the same graph to facilitate comparisons of 
the two.  Initial returns are defined as the percent difference between the offer price 
and the closing price on the first day of trading.  Across our entire sample of 9,145 
IPOs average initial returns equal 19.1%, but the figure highlights the extent to which 
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this average has varied over time.  Average initial returns each year ranged between 2 
– 15% in the 1970s, 2 – 16% in the 1980s, 8 – 77% in the 1990s, and 5 – 20% since 
2001. During the height of the Internet Bubble period, average initial returns reached 
record levels:  77% in 1999 and 59% in 2000.  In addition to varying substantially 
over time, there is also a co-movement between IPO volume and initial returns. Using 
lower frequency monthly data, Lowry and Schwert (2002) show that initial returns 
tends to lead IPO volume by approximately three months, meaning that high initial 
return periods tend to be followed by many companies going public.  While this lead-
lag feature of the data is difficult to discern at the annual frequency shown in Figure 
3.2, the positive correlation between the two series is evident. 
Figure 3.3 is similar to Figure 3.2, but it plots average annual initial returns 
against aggregate proceeds raised in IPOs each year.  The strong positive relation 
between the series is even more evident here.  Both metrics spike in 1999: aggregate 
IPO proceeds reach $83.7 billion and initial returns average 77%. 
 Figure 3.4 provides some more details on the relation between initial returns 
and proceeds.  Specifically, we divide the sample into three bins:  IPOs with proceeds 
less than $30 million, IPOs with proceeds between $30 and $120 million, and IPOs 
with proceeds greater than $120 million (all measured in constant 2015 USD).  This  
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Figure 3.3. Initial Returns and Aggregate Proceeds. 
 
Figure 3.4. IPO Initial Returns and Proceeds. 
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Initial Returns by Proceeds, 1980-2015 
Number of IPOs with proceeds > 120mln
Number of IPOs with proceeds between 30mln and 120mln
Number of IPOs with proceeds < 30mln
Initial Returns for IPOs with proceeds < 30mln
Initial Returns for IPOs with proceeds betwen 30mln and 120 mln
Initial Returns for IPOs with proceeds > 120mln
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Table 3.2. IPO Initial Returns by the Proceeds Amount, 1972-2015 
This table presents the number of IPOs and average initial returns within three groups:  IPOs with 
proceeds below $30 million, IPOs with proceeds between $30 million and $120 million, and IPOs with 
proceeds above $120 million. Proceeds are in real 2015 million dollars.   
Year # IPOs # IPOs, 
Proceed < 
30mln 
# IPOs, 
Proceeds 
between 
30mln and 
120mln 
# IPOs, 
Proceeds > 
120mln 
Initial 
Returns, 
Proceeds < 
30 mln 
Initial 
Returns, 
Proceeds 
between 30 
mln and 120 
mln 
Initial 
Returns, 
Proceeds > 
120 mln 
1972 1 0 1 0 NA 2.0% NA 
1973 13 8 5 0 12.5% 8.1% NA 
1974 4 3 1 0 7.2% 1.4% NA 
1975 9 3 5 1 10.5% 0.8% -0.8% 
1976 26 19 7 0 2.8% 3.5% NA 
1977 17 15 2 0 4.4% 3.2% NA 
1978 19 11 8 0 15.0% 14.8% NA 
1979 42 32 9 1 8.3% 16.9% 150.0% 
1980 66 42 21 3 12.1% 22.8% 19.0% 
1981 183 125 55 3 6.9% 6.3% 1.0% 
1982 68 49 18 1 10.7% 15.7% 44.6% 
1983 461 256 173 32 10.8% 9.8% 7.1% 
1984 181 138 40 3 2.9% 2.1% 0.8% 
1985 219 143 63 13 9.9% 4.9% 5.3% 
1986 505 296 169 40 7.9% 7.3% 5.9% 
1987 337 180 132 25 6.4% 5.3% 6.4% 
1988 138 79 48 11 5.6% 3.7% 1.4% 
1989 125 58 58 9 8.7% 7.6% 2.8% 
1990 115 40 63 12 9.6% 10.3% 3.4% 
1991 324 114 172 38 8.2% 11.8% 8.7% 
1992 450 159 222 69 7.6% 10.8% 6.4% 
1993 576 210 292 74 10.3% 14.0% 9.3% 
1994 418 182 200 36 5.8% 10.5% 5.9% 
1995 494 128 301 65 17.2% 22.7% 14.6% 
1996 709 205 407 97 10.8% 17.4% 18.1% 
1997 495 138 294 63 8.5% 15.8% 15.1% 
1998 356 115 183 58 18.7% 27.2% 12.9% 
1999 633 158 336 139 81.2% 72.6% 82.2% 
2000 506 127 256 123 64.7% 49.6% 74.4% 
2001 102 25 31 46 16.7% 15.6% 12.2% 
2002 78 14 30 34 7.3% 6.3% 11.6% 
2003 67 6 25 36 15.9% 13.1% 12.7% 
2004 167 11 91 65 3.1% 10.3% 16.9% 
2005 156 18 64 74 3.7% 7.6% 12.2% 
2006 138 9 67 62 -0.1% 10.5% 17.0% 
2007 142 6 71 65 -13.3% 10.9% 18.0% 
2008 20 2 6 12 9.3% -0.1% 6.9% 
2009 40 0 13 27 NA 9.7% 13.8% 
2010 93 5 43 45 -15.1% 6.6% 10.6% 
2011 80 4 29 47 10.8% 12.4% 14.9% 
2012 96 6 51 39 18.6% 19.2% 20.1% 
2013 157 15 72 70 -2.0% 21.8% 22.8% 
2014 202 15 115 72 15.4% 16.3% 16.7% 
2015 117 9 64 44 3.5% 13.2% 24.0% 
Total 9145 3178 4313 1654 14.8% 20.4% 23.9% 
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disaggregation highlights several patterns.  First, the number of the small IPOs has 
decreased markedly over time, and there are very few IPOs with proceeds less than 
$30 million since 2001.  Between 2001 and 2015, there were a total of 145 IPOs in 
this category, which represents less than 9% of all IPOs over this period.  Second, the 
number of the largest IPOs, i.e., those with proceeds greater than $120 million, as a 
portion of all companies going public has risen dramatically.  Third, in the earlier part 
of the sample the smallest IPOs tended to be more underpriced, but since the 1990s 
this relation has reversed and it is the largest IPOs that are frequently the most 
underpriced. 
 
Figure 3.5. IPO Initial Returns and Initial Price Range. 
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Table 3.3. Initial Returns and the Initial Price Range, 1983-2015 
This table presents the number of IPOs and average initial returns for three groups:  IPOs with whose 
offer price is below the initial price range, within the initial price range, and above the initial price 
range. Further details on the sample composition are provided in Figure 1.  The sample in this figure is 
additionally restricted to companies that went public in 1983 - 2015, as SDC does not have the initial 
price range information for IPOs in earlier years. 
Year # IPOs # IPOs, 
offer price 
< range 
# IPOs, 
offer price 
within 
initial 
range 
# IPOs, 
offer price 
above the 
range 
Initial 
Returns, 
offer price 
below 
initial 
range 
Initial 
Returns, 
offer price 
within 
initial 
range 
Initial 
Returns, 
offer price 
above 
initial 
range 
1983 342 100 193 49 2.1% 11.5% 24.7% 
1984 129 67 58 4 1.2% 3.2% 17.2% 
1985 187 43 131 13 2.6% 8.3% 13.6% 
1986 405 86 296 23 0.4% 8.0% 22.9% 
1987 277 70 188 19 0.0% 6.6% 16.7% 
1988 100 28 68 4 1.6% 7.9% 7.1% 
1989 104 9 81 14 0.5% 8.7% 10.4% 
1990 103 18 67 18 2.6% 9.2% 19.7% 
1991 286 42 204 40 2.8% 10.8% 18.7% 
1992 408 68 287 53 2.0% 9.0% 20.9% 
1993 518 68 368 82 2.7% 10.8% 26.3% 
1994 377 97 249 31 2.1% 8.6% 22.3% 
1995 440 48 281 111 2.8% 14.9% 41.0% 
1996 702 84 489 129 2.9% 13.0% 33.0% 
1997 491 80 331 80 3.9% 13.2% 25.0% 
1998 350 42 250 58 0.7% 19.6% 47.3% 
1999 604 38 360 206 1.2% 51.9% 128.6% 
2000 499 53 272 174 6.0% 27.1% 127.1% 
2001 99 14 71 14 5.8% 13.8% 25.2% 
2002 75 17 49 9 0.7% 7.7% 29.1% 
2003 67 8 45 14 11.5% 9.6% 25.3% 
2004 164 35 102 27 5.4% 11.2% 25.7% 
2005 149 34 86 29 0.1% 8.7% 23.1% 
2006 138 39 72 27 2.1% 8.9% 38.1% 
2007 139 35 72 32 1.4% 11.2% 30.9% 
2008 19 3 13 3 -4.2% 1.1% 34.2% 
2009 39 14 15 10 2.0% 12.4% 28.4% 
2010 93 29 54 10 4.2% 5.7% 25.3% 
2011 80 17 40 23 -1.3% 11.3% 29.4% 
2012 95 25 49 21 5.2% 17.8% 39.7% 
2013 154 31 85 38 2.4% 16.4% 44.0% 
2014 196 64 102 30 4.0% 12.8% 56.2% 
2015 116 31 59 26 3.1% 12.0% 44.0% 
Total 7945 1437 5087 1421 2.4% 15.0% 56.8% 
 
 
Figure 3.5 depicts how the level of underpricing varies depending on where the 
offer price was relative to the initial price range, as stated in the prospectus.  
Companies that are priced below the initial range have average underpricing of 2.4% 
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and this level is relatively stable over the all sample years. In comparison, companies 
that are priced within the initial price range have average underpricing of 15.0%, while 
companies priced above the range have an average underpricing of 56.8%. Initial 
returns for these two latter groups is even higher during the Internet Bubble period. 
 
Figure 3.6. IPO Initial Returns and Venture Capital Backing 
Figure 3.6 shows show the level of initial returns varies across offerings that 
are VC- versus nonVC-backed, and it also shows patterns in VC backing over time, 
where firms are denoted as VC-backed according to the Venture Capital Backed IPO 
Issue Flag in the SDC Platinum database.  Across our entire sample period 37% of our 
IPOs are VC backed.   This proportion has risen somewhat over our sample period, 
from 33% in the 1970s and 24% in the 1980s, to 37% in the 1990s and 49% over the 
2000 – 2015 period.  VC-backed issues tend to be more underpriced than their non-VC  
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Table 3.4 Mean Initial Return for IPOs with and without Venture Capitalist Backing, 1972-2015 
For IPOs with versus without VC backing, this table shows:  the number of IPOs, average initial 
returns, firm age, and portion of companies in a technology industry.  We rely on SDC for information 
on VC backing (‘Venture Backed’ variable), offer price, and membership in a technology industry (‘
Technology Industry’ variable).  Firm age is obtained from Jay Ritter website.45  
Year # IPOs #IPOs, VC 
#IPOs, 
no VC 
Initial 
Returns, 
VC 
Initial 
Returns, 
no VC 
Age, VC Age, no VC 
% Tech 
IPO, VC 
% Tech 
IPO, no 
VC 
1972 1 0 1 NA 2.0% NA NA NA 0.0% 
1973 13 3 10 13.8% 9.9% NA NA 33.3% 30.0% 
1974 4 1 3 9.8% 4.4% NA NA 100.0% 0.0% 
1975 9 0 9 NA 3.8% NA 43.8 NA 22.2% 
1976 26 11 15 6.8% 0.2% 8.7 32.3 63.6% 20.0% 
1977 17 3 14 14.5% 2.1% 2.7 10.6 33.3% 7.1% 
1978 19 9 10 22.8% 7.9% 9.1 24.6 88.9% 20.0% 
1979 42 16 26 13.9% 13.3% 9.7 15.0 62.5% 23.1% 
1980 66 26 40 23.5% 10.8% 7.3 10.9 73.1% 32.5% 
1981 183 60 123 8.9% 5.5% 10.1 13.1 63.3% 29.3% 
1982 68 22 46 14.3% 11.6% 9.0 9.9 90.9% 32.6% 
1983 461 112 349 12.8% 9.3% 7.2 20.3 68.8% 24.1% 
1984 181 47 134 2.8% 2.6% 8.1 24.4 70.2% 16.4% 
1985 219 36 183 4.9% 8.9% 9.3 26.1 52.8% 14.2% 
1986 505 94 411 8.4% 7.3% 9.3 26.4 60.6% 12.7% 
1987 337 80 257 8.0% 5.3% 7.3 29.4 73.8% 10.9% 
1988 138 34 104 8.9% 3.2% 5.8 36.1 70.6% 17.3% 
1989 125 37 88 11.8% 6.0% 7.3 21.2 59.5% 21.6% 
1990 115 38 77 12.8% 7.6% 9.3 26.5 76.3% 11.7% 
1991 324 119 205 13.6% 8.1% 8.9 27.5 77.3% 22.9% 
1992 450 154 296 12.7% 7.1% 10.8 30.1 68.2% 23.0% 
1993 576 174 402 14.1% 11.1% 9.9 20.3 68.4% 16.9% 
1994 418 131 287 12.2% 6.2% 10.3 19.4 66.4% 23.0% 
1995 494 196 298 28.6% 14.7% 10.7 15.6 79.1% 36.2% 
1996 709 257 452 17.7% 14.4% 10.4 18.6 75.5% 38.9% 
1997 495 150 345 17.7% 11.9% 10.4 24.6 68.0% 35.9% 
1998 356 100 256 32.8% 18.0% 8.4 21.2 86.0% 35.2% 
1999 633 381 252 99.9% 42.0% 5.8 19.8 89.2% 62.7% 
2000 506 356 150 73.7% 25.5% 6.0 22.3 95.5% 62.0% 
2001 102 44 57 18.9% 11.1% 10.4 31.7 75.0% 45.6% 
2002 78 29 49 11.5% 7.3% 22.6 28.7 69.0% 34.7% 
2003 67 27 40 16.3% 11.0% 11.5 33.1 81.5% 27.5% 
2004 167 75 92 13.6% 11.5% 8.3 26.0 85.3% 25.0% 
2005 156 44 112 11.9% 8.3% 9.5 37.0 90.9% 25.9% 
2006 138 58 80 16.6% 9.9% 9.3 36.2 81.0% 23.8% 
2007 142 70 72 21.6% 4.9% 8.6 26.8 85.7% 25.0% 
2008 20 7 13 3.8% 5.7% 11.3 40.7 85.7% 7.7% 
2009 40 10 30 21.8% 9.4% 9.1 36.5 70.0% 50.0% 
2010 93 33 60 11.6% 5.0% 10.0 27.2 63.6% 20.0% 
2011 80 36 44 21.0% 7.9% 8.7 22.3 83.3% 25.0% 
2012 96 44 52 22.5% 17.0% 9.7 31.8 86.4% 17.3% 
2013 157 67 90 26.2% 15.4% 10.3 34.7 85.1% 22.2% 
2014 202 99 103 23.0% 10.0% 9.9 24.5 89.9% 25.2% 
2015 117 58 59 24.9% 8.3% 8.4 14.8 89.7% 32.2% 
Total 9145 3348 5796 32.2% 11.5% 8.8 23.7 78.6% 27.5% 
                                               
45
 We thank Jay Ritter for making this information publicly available on his website.  
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backed counterparts, with average initial returns of 32% versus 11%.  This difference 
is particularly pronounced during the Internet Bubble, with average initial returns of 
100% versus 42% among VC-backed versus non-VC backed IPOs, respectively, in 
1999.  At least part of this difference likely stems from differences in underlying 
company type.   VC-backed companies tend to be younger (9 versus 24 years old, on 
average, for VC vs non-VC backed IPOs, respectively) and are more likely to belong 
to a technology industry (79% of VC-backed IPOs are in technology, compared to 
28% of non-VC backed IPOs).  
 
Figure 3.7. Underwriter Spread  
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Table 3.5. IPO Initial Returns and Underwriter Spread, 1980-2015 
The left-hand side of the table shows the portion of IPOs per year with the underwriter spread below, 
equal to and above 7%. The right-hand side of the table shows average spreads among IPOs with 
proceeds less than $30 million, between 30 and $120 million, and greater than $120 million. 
Information regarding proceeds (which are expressed in real 2015 dollars) and the underwriter spread 
are obtained from SDC. The composition of the IPO sample is described in Figure 1, and the sample in 
further restricted to offerings in 1980-2015 with non-missing information on the underwriter spread. 
   Percent of IPOs with spread:  Average spread among IPOs with proceeds: 
Year # IPOs  < 7% = 7% > 7%  < 30 mln 30 -120 mln > 120 mln 
1980 66  10.6% 3.0% 86.4%  8.3% 7.2% 6.0% 
1981 183  12.6% 4.4% 83.1%  8.2% 7.2% 6.3% 
1982 68  8.8% 10.3% 80.9%  8.2% 7.1% 7.0% 
1983 461  29.3% 14.1% 56.5%  8.1% 6.9% 6.2% 
1984 181  11.0% 15.5% 73.5%  7.9% 7.0% 6.6% 
1985 219  24.2% 12.3% 63.5%  8.0% 6.9% 6.2% 
1986 505  34.5% 14.7% 50.9%  7.8% 6.9% 5.9% 
1987 337  35.3% 21.1% 43.6%  7.6% 6.8% 5.6% 
1988 138  34.8% 29.0% 36.2%  7.4% 6.7% 5.7% 
1989 125  31.4% 38.0% 30.6%  7.6% 6.8% 5.8% 
1990 115  29.8% 44.7% 25.4%  7.5% 6.9% 5.5% 
1991 324  31.8% 45.5% 22.7%  7.4% 6.7% 5.9% 
1992 450  29.6% 48.9% 21.6%  7.7% 6.8% 5.9% 
1993 576  25.6% 53.5% 20.9%  7.8% 6.9% 6.0% 
1994 418  21.1% 53.7% 25.2%  7.6% 6.9% 5.8% 
1995 494  22.2% 62.5% 15.3%  7.9% 6.9% 6.0% 
1996 709  21.0% 65.6% 13.5%  7.6% 6.9% 6.2% 
1997 495  18.9% 68.8% 12.4%  7.6% 6.9% 6.4% 
1998 356  21.1% 69.1% 9.7%  7.5% 6.9% 6.0% 
1999 633  15.3% 79.8% 4.8%  7.2% 6.9% 6.4% 
2000 506  13.1% 84.7% 2.2%  7.2% 7.0% 6.5% 
2001 102  33.0% 64.0% 3.0%  7.1% 6.9% 5.9% 
2002 78  19.5% 76.6% 3.9%  6.8% 6.9% 6.6% 
2003 67  22.4% 76.1% 1.5%  7.0% 7.0% 6.7% 
2004 167  20.4% 79.0% 0.6%  7.0% 7.0% 6.4% 
2005 156  34.0% 63.4% 2.6%  6.9% 6.9% 6.3% 
2006 138  24.8% 70.1% 5.1%  7.2% 7.0% 6.5% 
2007 142  24.6% 72.5% 2.9%  6.8% 7.0% 6.5% 
2008 20  36.8% 63.2% 0.0%  7.0% 7.0% 6.0% 
2009 40  50.0% 50.0% 0.0%  NA 6.9% 6.1% 
2010 93  34.5% 62.1% 3.4%  7.1% 7.1% 6.4% 
2011 80  37.3% 58.7% 4.0%  6.5% 7.0% 6.1% 
2012 96  29.2% 68.5% 2.2%  7.0% 7.0% 6.1% 
2013 157  35.7% 61.7% 2.6%  7.0% 6.9% 6.1% 
2014 202  27.8% 70.6% 1.5%  7.1% 6.9% 6.0% 
2015 117  31.0% 65.5% 3.4%  7.1% 6.9% 6.3% 
Total 9014  24.5% 52.4% 23.1%  7.7% 6.9% 6.2% 
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Figure 3.8. Average Underwriter Spread and IPO proceeds 
Figures 3.7 – 3.9 examine various aspects of the underwriting syndicate, with 
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 focusing on the percent of proceeds that goes toward underwriter 
compensation and Figure 3.9 looking at the members of the syndicate beyond the lead 
underwriter(s).  Direct underwriter compensation for managing an IPO represents a 
fixed portion of IPO proceeds and is called the underwriter spread. As shown in Figure 
3.7 and Table 3.5, the underwriter spread most commonly equals 7%. In our sample, 
more than a half of all IPOs have an underwriter spread of this magnitude. On average, 
the underwriter spread has decreased over time. For instance, more than three quarters 
of all IPOs in the first years of our sample had a spread above 7%, compared to less 
than 5% of all IPOs in the last decade of the sample.  At the same time, the portion of  
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Table 3.6. Number of Lead Underwriters and Co-managers, 1972-2015 
This table presents the average number of lead underwriters and co-managers for IPOs between 1972 
and 2015. Last six columns of the table present the average lead managers and co-managers for the 
IPOs with proceeds below $30 million, between $30 million and $120 million, and above $120 million. 
Information about the managers and syndicate member is obtained from SDC, where codes “BM”, “JB”
, “JL” (book manager, joint book, and joint lead, respectively) are defined as lead managers, “CM” as 
co-managers, and “SD” as other syndicate members.   
 
     IPOs with prceeds < $30 
mln 
 IPOs with proceeds 
between $30 - 120 mln 
 IPOs with proceeds > 
$120 mln 
Year # IPOs # Leads # Co-mgrs  # Leads # Co-mgrs   # Leads # Co-mgrs   # Leads # Co-mgrs  
1980 66 1.00 0.38  1.00 0.14  1.00 0.76  1.00 1.00 
1981 183 1.04 0.38  1.03 0.23  1.04 0.73  1.67 0.33 
1982 68 1.00 0.44  1.00 0.27  1.00 0.89  1.00 1.00 
1983 461 1.04 0.49  1.01 0.24  1.07 0.71  1.09 1.25 
1984 181 1.03 0.59  1.03 0.45  1.05 1.03  1.00 1.33 
1985 219 1.03 0.42  1.03 0.21  1.03 0.68  1.00 1.54 
1986 505 1.03 0.99  1.03 0.52  1.03 0.98  1.00 4.50 
1987 337 1.02 1.73  1.02 0.82  1.02 1.98  1.00 6.96 
1988 138 1.02 1.91  1.04 1.25  1.00 2.90  1.00 2.27 
1989 125 1.00 1.88  1.00 1.59  1.00 1.74  1.00 4.67 
1990 115 1.01 1.73  1.03 1.58  1.00 1.70  1.00 2.42 
1991 324 1.05 2.10  1.03 1.35  1.04 2.24  1.16 3.66 
1992 450 1.02 1.87  1.02 0.89  1.03 2.04  1.03 3.58 
1993 576 1.02 1.59  1.00 0.83  1.02 1.97  1.04 2.28 
1994 418 1.01 1.34  1.01 0.82  1.01 1.40  1.03 3.61 
1995 494 1.04 2.19  1.00 1.70  1.02 1.90  1.20 4.54 
1996 709 1.02 1.71  1.00 0.80  1.01 1.78  1.09 3.36 
1997 495 1.04 1.83  1.01 1.54  1.04 1.79  1.11 2.62 
1998 356 1.07 2.17  1.03 1.17  1.04 2.04  1.24 4.57 
1999 633 1.17 2.48  1.18 1.95  1.10 2.35  1.32 3.41 
2000 506 1.24 2.50  1.15 1.92  1.20 2.19  1.43 3.72 
2001 102 1.50 3.13  1.32 1.72  1.42 2.06  1.65 4.61 
2002 78 1.51 4.46  1.29 7.86  1.37 3.00  1.74 4.35 
2003 67 1.54 2.85  1.50 4.33  1.28 2.16  1.72 3.08 
2004 167 1.72 2.75  1.18 0.82  1.55 1.86  2.05 4.32 
2005 156 1.81 2.63  1.06 0.44  1.44 2.08  2.32 3.64 
2006 138 1.88 2.75  1.22 0.89  1.54 2.16  2.35 3.65 
2007 142 1.92 3.06  1.00 1.67  1.56 2.54  2.40 3.75 
2008 20 2.40 5.00  1.00 0.50  1.50 2.00  3.08 7.25 
2009 40 2.93 3.78  NA NA  2.00 2.08  3.37 4.59 
2010 93 2.57 3.29  1.40 0.20  1.95 2.67  3.29 4.22 
2011 80 2.88 3.84  1.25 0.75  2.14 2.17  3.47 5.13 
2012 96 3.01 3.25  1.67 0.67  2.37 2.37  4.05 4.79 
2013 157 3.41 3.38  1.13 1.27  2.51 1.90  4.83 5.36 
2014 202 3.22 3.02  1.20 0.33  2.46 2.04  4.85 5.15 
2015 117 3.27 2.26  1.33 0.78  2.52 1.78  4.77 3.25 
Total 9145 1.30 1.89  1.04 0.93  1.20 1.85  2.04 3.87 
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Panel A. Number of IPO Lead Managers and Co-managers 
 
Panel B. Syndicate Size 
 
Figure 3.9. Investment Banks and IPO 
companies with a spread equal to 7% grew throughout the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
portion of companies with a spread less than 7% has increased over the past 15 years.   
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Underwriters tend to charge larger IPOs a smaller spread. For instance, the average 
spreads are 7.7%, 6.9%, and 6.2%, for IPOs with proceeds below $30 million, $30 – 
$120 million, and above $120 million, respectively.  Thus, the decrease in the average 
underwriter spread over the past 15 years partially reflects the higher prevalence of 
large deals over this period.  Figure 3.8 depicts the time-series dynamics of 
underwriter spreads by IPO size. One of the most pronounced observations from this 
figure is that the average spread for the medium size IPO remains unchanged over the 
entire period, at 7.0%. Average spreads for the large IPOs are more volatile, but there 
is no apparent time trend.  Finally, spreads for smaller IPOs have tended to decrease 
over time. Thus, the decrease in spread shown in Figure 3.7 is likely due to the 
changing nature of the type of firms that go public rather than a fundamental change in 
the equilibrium level of the spread.  
Figure 3.9 and Table 3.6 show the composition of the IPO investment bank 
syndicate, which consists of lead managers, co-managers and other syndicate 
members. Panel A shows statistics related to the lead manager and co-managers over 
the entire 1972 – 2015 sample period, whereas Panel B focuses on the shorter 1997 – 
2015 period for which available data allow us to look at the total syndicate 
composition.  The panels show an interesting contrast.  The average number of lead 
and co-managers has increased up through 2009 and then remained relatively constant, 
whereas total syndicate size has decreased over the 1997 – 2015 period.  Looking first 
at panel A, in the 1970s, the average IPO had only one lead underwriter and only one 
out of three IPOs had a co-manager.  Over our 43-year sample period, the number of 
lead underwriters has increased from 1 to 3.3, on average.  At the same time, the 
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number of co-managers has increased markedly as well. Panel B shows that 
contemporaneous with this increase in participation of lead and co-managers, 
participation of other syndicate members has fallen dramatically.  SDC data, on which 
these figures are based, indicate that the average IPO had 15 syndicate members in 
1997 compared to zero in 2015.  This is surprising. It suggests that all the IPOs in 
2015 had no syndicate members other than lead underwriters and co-managers. We 
therefore verified manually all of the prospectuses of the 2015 IPOs; in addition, a 
random sample of IPOs in other years revealed no systematic errors in these SDC data. 
 
Figure 3.10. Number of IPO and Registration Period 
Figure 3.10 and Table 3.7 illustrate the average registration length, for 
companies going public between 1983 (the first year necessary data are available on 
SDC) and 2015.  The registration period is defined as the number of days between the  
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Table 3.7. IPO Registration Length, 1983-2015 
This table shows the length of the registration period and the number of IPOs by year. The last three 
columns present the average length of the registration period for the IPOs with proceeds below $30 
million, between $30 million and $120 million, and above $120 million. The length of the registration 
period is defined as the number of days between the filing of the first IPO prospectus and the IPO date, 
where both variables are taken from SDC. The composition of the sample is described in Table 1, and 
the sample is further restricted to the companies that went public between 1983 and 2015 as SDC does 
not include information on the filing date prior to 1983. 
 
Year # IPOs 
Registration 
Period  
Length 
(days) 
 Registration Period Length (days) among 
IPOs with: 
 Proceeds  
< 30 mln 
Proceeds  
30 – 120  mln  
Proceeds 
> 120 mln  
1983 343 48.7  50.6 47.0 41.6 
1984 130 48.7  49.4 48.4 17.5 
1985 187 38.5  40.0 36.4 30.9 
1986 423 33.6  36.1 30.8 26.8 
1987 297 45.8  48.0 44.8 36.8 
1988 119 45.4  48.2 40.3 52.7 
1989 122 50.0  56.7 44.4 43.9 
1990 114 56.7  68.4 48.3 62.3 
1991 322 61.3  65.4 58.6 61.0 
1992 448 67.8  72.8 63.4 70.7 
1993 572 69.9  69.7 68.7 75.1 
1994 417 67.7  69.8 64.5 75.1 
1995 494 67.6  65.8 68.4 67.6 
1996 708 96.4  80.6 78.9 203.1 
1997 495 97.8  103.2 97.8 86.0 
1998 356 97.9  95.8 103.9 83.4 
1999 632 93.8  83.9 99.6 91.0 
2000 505 103.9  108.9 104.1 98.3 
2001 102 160.6  191.9 189.0 124.4 
2002 78 142.0  169.9 133.7 137.9 
2003 67 131.9  74.3 112.3 155.1 
2004 165 113.7  136.7 113.0 110.8 
2005 155 132.2  79.6 140.0 138.4 
2006 138 134.6  157.8 138.3 127.2 
2007 141 131.7  177.2 134.4 124.4 
2008 19 191.5  318.5 151.4 187.0 
2009 40 269.0  NA 281.8 262.7 
2010 93 162.2  99.0 156.6 174.5 
2011 80 182.7  344.3 211.6 151.1 
2012 96 192.3  105.0 219.6 169.9 
2013 157 100.7  108.0 76.4 124.0 
2014 202 76.9  95.4 53.3 110.8 
2015 117 78.0  172.4 51.2 97.7 
Total 8334 84.8  71.3 82.9 111.6 
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filing date and the offer date.  During the 1980s the average length of the registration 
period was 44 days.  It has increased steadily over most of the sample period, then 
spiked upwards during the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009 and fell following 
the passage of the JOBS Act in 2012.  While the exact causes of the spike around the 
Financial Crisis are beyond the scope of this review chapter, we posit that the 
substantially greater demands on regulatory agencies, highly uncertain market 
conditions, and offering postponements by the IPO companies were all contributing 
factors.  The JOBS Act has a more mechanical effect on registration periods.  
Companies filing under the JOBS Act are allowed to ‘test the waters’ by distributing a 
version of the prospectus with qualified investors before the roadshow and before any 
version of the prospectus is publicly filed on EDGAR.  Thus, the filing date, as 
measured by the first prospectus filing on EDGAR and recorded as such in SDC, 
occurs later in the process for companies filing under the JOBS ACT.  This results in a 
shorter registration period for these companies. 
One of the key determinants of the registration period involves interactions 
with the SEC regarding approval of the prospectus.  The SEC reviews the prospectus 
of each company going public, and issues comment letters detailing issues that need to 
be clarified, elaborated upon, etc.  In response to each comment letter the company 
must issue a revised prospectus, and the company is not permitted to go public until it 
has satisfied all SEC concerns.  As shown in Figure 3.11, the extent of SEC review, as 
measured by the number of comment letters, varies considerably across companies, 
from a minimum of one letter to more than eight letters.  There is a nearly monotonic 
relation between the number of SEC letters and the length of the registration period.  
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On average, each additional round of SEC review is associated with 28 extra days in 
registration. 
 
Figure 3.11. Registration Period and Number of SEC letters. 
 In addition to the SEC review process influencing the length of the registration 
period and thus the timing of the IPO, there are other factors that also affect the timing 
of a companies’ offerings.  These other factors primarily relate to an effort to time 
both their roadshows and offerings for period when market attention will be 
sufficiently high.  Because companies go on roadshows several weeks prior to the 
IPO, this means that IPO volume tends to be lower both immediately following 
vacation times.  As shown in Panel A of Figure 3.12, companies are less likely to go 
public in January (following the December holiday season) and in September 
(following the August vacation season).  Somewhat surprisingly, volume is not 
markedly lower in the months of August or December. 
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Panel A. Number of IPO by Month 
 
Panel B. Number of IPO by Weekday 
 
Figure 3.12. Monthly and Weekly Paterns of the IPO Date. 
The general objective of going public when market attention is sufficiently 
high also yields within-week patterns.  Only 136 out of 9,145 IPOs started trading on 
Mondays. Trading volume and daily returns tend to be lower on Mondays (Lo and 
Wang, 2009), and consistent with this Panel B of Figure 3.12 shows fewer IPOs on 
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these days.  In addition, the fact that the offer price is generally set the night prior to 
the offering further decreases the number of Monday IPOs.  Finally, there are also a 
greater number of holidays on Mondays when the market is closed, which also 
contributes to these patterns. 
 
Figure 3.13. Dynamics of Nominal IPO Offer Price. 
While many of the above figures highlight substantial time-series variation in 
many aspects of IPOs, a striking contrast is the relative constant level of offer prices 
throughout our 43-year sample period.  Despite average inflation per year of 3.6% 
over the sample period, Figure 3.13 shows that there has been no upward trend in the 
offer price.   This relatively constant offer price holds across offer size categorizations, 
but is higher among larger IPOs.  Average offer prices equal $9.90, $13.60, and 
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greater than $120 million, respectively.  It is possible that higher offer prices represent 
a signal about company characteristics, though we are unaware of any model that 
formalizes such a scenario.  While we find the lack of an upward trend in prices over 
time to be puzzling, we note that it is consistent with relatively constant average prices 
among publicly traded stocks.  Specifically, Benartzi, Michaely, Thaler, and Weld 
(2009) find that the nominal stock price has been $30 over a long time period. 
Table 3.8. Dynamics of the Average Offer IPO Price 
This table shows the average nominal offer price by year. Last three columns of the table present the 
average nominal offer price for the IPOs with proceeds below $30 million, between $30 million and 
$120 million, and above $120 million.  
 
Year # IPO Offer Price 
 Offer Price among IPOs with: 
 Proceeds  
< 30 mln 
Proceeds  
30 – 120  mln  
Proceeds 
> 120 mln  
1980 66 14.0  11.3 18.2 23.0 
1981 183 12.2  10.2 16.1 20.6 
1982 68 11.7  10.1 15.7 21.0 
1983 461 12.5  10.1 14.9 18.9 
1984 181 9.6  8.8 11.5 15.6 
1985 219 11.0  9.5 13.2 16.1 
1986 505 11.7  9.8 13.4 18.2 
1987 337 11.7  9.2 13.3 21.3 
1988 138 11.5  9.2 13.3 19.8 
1989 125 12.6  9.9 14.0 21.0 
1990 115 12.1  9.0 12.6 19.2 
1991 324 12.6  9.7 13.3 18.1 
1992 450 12.5  8.7 13.8 17.5 
1993 576 12.9  9.5 13.8 19.0 
1994 418 11.8  9.0 13.2 18.0 
1995 494 13.3  8.7 14.0 18.9 
1996 709 14.8  8.8 14.0 30.6 
1997 495 12.9  9.2 13.3 19.2 
1998 356 13.4  10.8 13.5 18.2 
1999 633 15.4  13.6 14.1 20.8 
2000 506 15.2  14.0 14.1 18.8 
2001 102 16.2  13.9 12.3 20.0 
2002 78 15.1  12.8 13.0 18.0 
2003 67 15.4  15.2 13.1 17.0 
2004 167 13.8  9.7 11.3 17.9 
2005 156 14.9  10.3 13.1 17.5 
2006 138 14.5  8.4 11.6 18.5 
2007 142 14.6  9.0 12.5 17.4 
2008 20 15.6  8.4 12.2 18.6 
2009 40 14.7  NA 13.1 15.4 
2010 93 13.5  9.6 10.8 16.4 
2011 80 15.3  9.5 11.5 18.1 
2012 96 15.1  8.4 13.1 18.6 
2013 157 15.8  8.5 13.5 19.8 
2014 202 15.0  7.5 13.5 18.9 
2015 117 15.4  10.4 13.9 18.7 
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Panel A. Delisting for Poor Performance 
 
Panel B. Acquisition after IPO 
 
Figure 3.14. Delisting and Acquisition of the Companies after IPO. 
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Table 3.9. IPO Delisting for Poor Performance and Acquisition, 1972-2015 
The table shows the percent of IPOs delisted for the poor performance within 3, 5 and 10 years after the 
offering, and the percent of IPO that were acquired within 3, 5 and 10 years after the offering. Delisting 
and acquisition information are obtained from CRSP.  
   Percent of IPOs delisted within  Percent of IPOs acquired within 
Year # IPO  3 years 5 years 10 years  3 years 5 years 10 years 
1972 1  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
1973 13  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  7.7% 15.4% 38.5% 
1974 4  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 
1975 9  0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  11.1% 11.1% 33.3% 
1976 26  0.0% 3.8% 15.4%  15.4% 30.8% 50.0% 
1977 17  0.0% 0.0% 11.8%  23.5% 29.4% 58.8% 
1978 19  5.3% 5.3% 5.3%  15.8% 21.1% 31.6% 
1979 42  0.0% 2.4% 14.3%  4.8% 21.4% 42.9% 
1980 66  3.0% 4.5% 21.2%  4.5% 7.6% 25.8% 
1981 183  3.8% 10.4% 25.1%  5.5% 15.3% 33.9% 
1982 68  5.9% 7.4% 16.2%  11.8% 19.1% 35.3% 
1983 461  4.6% 9.8% 25.2%  7.6% 19.5% 32.8% 
1984 181  3.9% 12.7% 26.5%  12.7% 22.1% 32.6% 
1985 219  6.4% 11.9% 21.5%  12.8% 21.0% 33.3% 
1986 505  5.5% 13.1% 22.6%  9.9% 15.8% 30.5% 
1987 337  3.9% 11.6% 17.2%  14.5% 18.7% 35.0% 
1988 138  5.1% 10.1% 15.2%  5.8% 15.2% 37.7% 
1989 125  3.2% 5.6% 14.4%  8.8% 19.2% 38.4% 
1990 115  1.7% 3.5% 13.0%  4.3% 13.9% 41.7% 
1991 324  1.9% 4.9% 16.4%  3.1% 15.4% 37.0% 
1992 450  2.4% 8.2% 20.7%  10.4% 20.7% 42.4% 
1993 576  4.7% 8.2% 22.4%  9.0% 23.8% 42.4% 
1994 418  4.5% 9.1% 21.1%  12.4% 27.0% 45.9% 
1995 494  4.9% 9.7% 20.2%  18.8% 33.4% 45.7% 
1996 709  8.5% 17.2% 25.5%  19.3% 35.1% 46.1% 
1997 495  8.7% 19.4% 26.9%  19.6% 32.3% 42.6% 
1998 356  9.0% 21.6% 27.8%  16.0% 23.3% 40.2% 
1999 633  14.4% 20.4% 26.2%  22.1% 29.2% 42.3% 
2000 506  11.9% 16.4% 23.1%  16.6% 27.7% 46.6% 
2001 102  5.9% 7.8% 8.8%  9.8% 19.6% 36.3% 
2002 78  3.8% 5.1% 14.1%  15.4% 32.1% 41.0% 
2003 67  3.0% 10.4% 17.9%  13.4% 31.3% 38.8% 
2004 167  1.2% 4.8% 10.8%  15.6% 29.9% 49.7% 
2005 156  2.6% 12.8% 15.4%  14.1% 17.9% 37.8% 
2006 138  5.8% 8.7% 
 
 13.8% 26.8% 
 2007 142  5.6% 8.5% 
 
 10.6% 22.5% 
 2008 20  10.0% 10.0% 
 
 10.0% 10.0% 
 2009 40  0.0% 5.0% 
 
 15.0% 25.0% 
 2010 93  4.3% 9.7% 
 
 7.5% 16.1% 
 2011 80  2.5% 
  
 10.0% 
  2012 96  1.0% 
  
 14.6% 
  Total 9145  6.1% 12.1% 21.8%  13.4% 24.4% 40.4% 
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Finally, Figure 3.14 and Table 3.9 provide evidence on the outcome of these 
IPO companies, three, five and ten years after the IPO.  Panel A shows the percent that 
are delisted for poor performance, and Panel B shows the percent that are acquired.  
For comparison purposes, each panel also shows the number of companies going 
public each year.  Looking first at Panel A, it is striking that a greater percent of 
companies going public during ‘hot markets’ tend to delist for poor performance over 
subsequent periods.  There is some evidence that this effect is greatest for companies 
going public during the latter part of these hot markets.  For example, over the 1990s 
boom period, the greatest number of companies went public during 1996, and the rate 
of delisting was greatest for those that went public during 1998 and 1999.  Almost 
30% of companies that went public in 1998 were delisted for poor performance within 
the subsequent ten years. 
Panel B of Figure 3.14 shows a similar albeit weaker pattern in the percent of 
IPOs that are acquired.  There is some evidence that companies going public in hotter 
markets are more likely to be subsequently acquired.  For example, 40% of companies 
that went public during 1998 were subsequently acquired (in addition to the 30% that 
delisted for poor performance).   Together, Panels A and B highlight that a relatively 
small portion of companies that go public are still independent and publicly traded ten 
years later. 
The IPO process46 
A milestone for any company is the issuance of publicly traded stock.  While 
companies may have many motivations for an initial public offering, the mechanism 
                                               
46
 This section is largely based on Elis, Michaely, O’Hara (1999). 
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for successfully completing an IPO is not trivial.  In this section, we outline the 
process by which companies are brought to market in an initial public offering.   
When a company wishes to make a public offering, its typical first step is to 
select an investment bank to advise it and to perform underwriting functions in 
connection with the issue. During the selection process, commonly referred to as the 
bake-off, the company considers potential investment banks’ general reputation, their 
expertise, and their quality of research coverage in the company’s specific industry. 
The selection also depends on whether the issuer would like to see its securities held 
more by individuals or by institutional investors (i.e., the investment bank’s 
distribution expertise).  Prior banking relationships the issuer and members of its 
board (especially the venture capitalists) have with specific firms in the investment 
banking community also influence the selection outcome. Often, the selection process 
is a two-way affair, with the reputable investment banker choosing its clients at least 
as carefully as the company should choose the investment banker.  
The most common type of underwriting arrangement is the “firm commitment” 
underwriting in which the underwriter “purchases” the entire issue of securities from 
the issuer and then attempts to resell the securities to the public. We put “purchases” 
in quotes because the underwriter, at best, purchases the shares from the issuer only on 
the night before it goes public, when most of the uncertainty has been resolved. The 
difference between the price at which the underwriter buys and subsequently sells the 
issue is called the gross spread and in the majority of cases represents 7% of gross 
proceeds.  
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Public offerings can be managed by one underwriter (sole managed) or by 
multiple mangers. The trend in the last two decades has been toward greater number of 
underwriters acting as co-managers; and at the same time toward fewer number of 
investment banks as part of the syndicate (Corwin and Schultz, 2005). When there are 
multiple managers, one investment bank is selected as the lead or book-running 
manager. The lead manager almost always appears on the top left of the cover of the 
prospectus, and it plays the major role throughout the transaction. The managing 
underwriter makes all the arrangements with the issuer, establishes the schedule of the 
issue, and has the primary responsibility for the due diligence process, pricing and 
distribution of the stock. The lead manager is also responsible for assembling a group 
of underwriters (the syndicate) to assist in the sale of the shares to the public.  
Members of the syndicate are paid a portion of the gross spread for their participation. 
Figure 3.9 reports dynamics of the number of lead managers and the co-
managers for all IPOs between 1972 and 2015. The majority of IPOs in 1970s were 
managed by one lead underwriter. Over the years the mean number of book-running 
managers rises to 3.2 per offering. The number of co-managers in the offering 
increases as well; and in the last decade the IPO is managed by six underwriters on 
average. 
Panel B of Figure 3.9 provides more detail on syndicate composition.  We 
begin this analysis in 1997, because Corwin and Schultz state that the SDC data on 
these variables are unreliable prior to this.  Since 1997, at the same time as the number 
of lead managers and co-managers has increased (as shown in Panel A), total 
syndicate size has decreased (as shown in Panel B).  This divergence is driven by 
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changes in the participation of other syndicate members.  Companies going public in 
1997 had an average 14 other syndicate members, which decreased steadily to 8 for 
companies going public in 2002.  Since 2002, SDC reports zero other syndicate 
members.  Hand-checking of all prospectuses among 2015 IPOs verifies that there 
were no other syndicate members.  
The lead underwriter, the co-managers and the other syndicate members all 
receive compensation from the company for being involved in the IPO process. This 
compensation comes from the gross spread—the difference between the price the 
securities are bought from the issuer, and the price at which they are delivered to the 
public. The lead underwriter receives a fee for its efforts that is typically 20% of the 
gross spread. The second portion of the spread is called the “selling concession”, and 
it is the amount paid to the underwriter and other syndicate members for actually 
selling the securities. This is typically equal to 60% of the gross spread.  Each 
syndicate member receives a selling concession based on the amount of the issue it 
sells to its customers. Institutions occasionally directly designate the selling 
concession credit associated with their stock purchase to a specific syndicate member 
regardless of who actually sold the stock. These designated orders usually arise as 
compensation for sell side equity research services performed by investment houses. 
(These research services are not about the upcoming IPO but rather about research on 
other firms that has been provided by the sell side analysts.) The remaining portion of 
the gross spread (approximately 20%) is used to cover underwriting expenses 
(underwriter counsel, road show expenses, etc.). If anything remains after deducting 
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all expenses, it is divided proportionately among the underwriter and syndicate 
members depending on the amount of securities each underwrote. 
One of the lead underwriter’s first-agenda items (usually before any significant 
expenses have been incurred) is to draft a letter of intent.  An important aspect of the 
letter of intent is to protect the underwriter against any uncovered expenses in the 
event the offer is withdrawn either during the due diligence and registration stage, or 
during the marketing stage. Thus, the letter of intent contains a clause requiring the 
company to reimburse the underwriter for any out-of-pocket expenses incurred during 
the process. Another important aspect of the letter is to specify the gross spread or the 
underwriting discount. In most cases, the gross spread is 7% of the proceeds (see Chen 
and Ritter (2000) for an excellent discussion of the uniform size of the gross spread).  
Figure 3.7 reports the time trend in the gross spread. The portion of offerings 
with a gross spread above 7% drops sharply after 1980 while the percent of companies 
with a spread below 7% increases. In the last decade approximately half of companies 
have a spread of exactly 7%, with most other companies having a spread below 7%.   
Figure 3.8 shows the dynamics of the gross spread for each of three size groups: IPOs 
with gross proceeds up to $30M, IPOs with gross proceeds between $30M and 
$120M; and IPOs with gross proceeds above $120M. The average spread for the 
medium-size companies constantly stays on the 7% level, while the spread of large 
companies tends to decrease. 
The letter of intent also typically includes: a commitment by the underwriter to 
enter into a firm commitment agreement (or other underwriting agreements, as the 
case may be); an agreement by the company to cooperate in all due diligence efforts, 
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and to make available all relevant information to the underwriter and its counsel; and a 
commitment by the company to grant a 15% overallotment option to the underwriter. 
The over-allotment option is an integral part of almost any underwriting 
agreement, allowing the underwriter the option to sell an additional 15% of the issue. 
In practice the underwriter sells 115% of the size of the original issue at the time of the 
offer (effectively selling 100% of the issue and short-selling an additional 15% of the 
issue). If the issue is successful and its price goes up in the aftermarket, the 
underwriter exercises the overallotment option, receives the proceeds from the 
additional 15% of shares, and covers its short position. Alternatively, if the issue is 
less successful, the underwriter covers its short position in the aftermarket by buying 
back some of the overallotment shares, thereby supporting the price of the newly 
traded firm in the market.  By regulation, the underwriter is permitted to buy back 
shares at any price less than or equal to the offer price. (For a more detailed 
description of the over-allotment option and how it is being used, see Ellis, Michaely 
and O’Hara (2000)).  
It is important to note that there is no guarantee of the final offering price (and, 
in most cases, no mention of any valuation) in the letter of intent. The letter of intent 
remains in force until the Underwriting Agreement is executed at pricing, on the night 
before the firm goes public. Only then is the underwriter firmly committed to buy the 
securities at a specific price from the issuer. By that point, the underwriter has very 
good indications on how successful the deal will be and at what price the market will 
be willing to buy the deal.  This knowledge allows the underwriter to determine a 
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price for the issue. It also allows it to “firmly commit” to buy the shares at a price, 
with minimal risk exposure.  
The Securities Act of 1933 mandates that the company and its counsel draft 
and file with the SEC a registration statement, based upon an outline that is frequently 
provided by the lead underwriter. It usually takes several weeks and many meetings of 
the working group (the company management, its counsel and auditors, the 
underwriters, the underwriters’ counsel and accountants) before the registration 
statement is ready to file. The registration statement is circumscribed by Section 5 of 
the Act, which gives specific requirements for the registration statement. The 
registration statement consists of two parts: the prospectus, which must be furnished to 
every purchaser of the securities, and “Part II” which contains information that need 
not be furnished to the public through the prospectus, but is made available for public 
inspection by the SEC.  (Part II contains information such as other expenses on 
issuance and distribution, indemnification of directors and officers, and recent sales of 
unregistered securities.) 
The purpose of the registration and disclosure requirements is to ensure that 
the public has adequate and reliable information regarding securities that are offered 
for sale.  To achieve this, the underwriter has a “due diligence” requirement to 
investigate the company and verify the information it provides about the company to 
investors.  Companies have some ability to exclude information from the prospectus 
that is deemed to be sensitive for competitive reasons.  As discussed by Boone, Floros 
and Johnson (2016), companies can request that certain information be given 
confidential treatment, e.g., details about a product or service, trade secrets, etc.  
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While such ‘redactions’ of proprietary information decrease transparency and thus 
may be costly to companies, they have the benefit of protecting the company from 
disclosing competitive secrets.  
The Securities Act also makes it illegal to offer or sell securities to the public 
unless they have first been registered.  It is important to note, however, that the SEC 
has no authority to prevent a public offering based on the quality of the securities 
involved.  It only has the power to require that the issuer disclose all material facts.  
As a safeguard, the Securities Act requires that the registration statement be signed by 
the directors and principal officers of the issuer as well as the underwriters, 
accountants, appraisers and other experts who assisted in the preparation of the 
registration statement.  Any purchaser of the securities who is damaged as a result of a 
misstatement or omission of a material fact in the registration statement may sue these 
signatories under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act.  Such disclosure-based 
lawsuits have been relatively constant at around 6% of the IPOs (see for example 
Lowry and Shu, 2002).  
The version of the registration statement that is filed with the SEC is referred 
to as the preliminary prospectus (or “Red Herring”.) The preliminary prospectus is one 
of the primary tools in marketing the issue. During the period after the filing, the SEC 
examines the registration statement and engages in a series of communications with 
issuer regarding any changes necessary to bring about SEC approval.  The company 
typically responds to these comments and issues through letters to the SEC and via 
amended prospectuses. This back and forth between the issuer and the company can, 
and often does, continue through multiple rounds. Each round of correspondence 
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between the company and SEC takes about 30 days on average, Figure 3.11 shows the 
relationship between length of registration and number of rounds. Our knowledge of 
how the SEC affects the IPO process is limited. A recent paper by Lowry et al (2016) 
tries to fill this gap by examining the role of the SEC from the time the company files 
it prospectus until the IPO. Their findings highlight the ways in which the SEC 
influences the information that companies provide to investors during the IPO 
process.   Throughout the filing period, the SEC expresses its concerns about the 
validity and completeness of information provided in each company’s prospectus. 
Typically, this is an interactive process of multiple rounds, where the SEC expresses 
its concerns and asks for more information in letters to the company, and the company 
adjusts its prospectus accordingly. The benefits of SEC reviews can be substantial: the 
regulatory process serves as a monitoring device and ensures efficient and fair 
information revelation practices.  However, the costs can be substantial as well.  A 
prolonged process with the SEC may force the company to reveal private information 
that will reduce its competitive advantage. It also distracts management from the 
running of the company and may delay the entire process. 
Lowry et al (2016) find evidence that regulators play an active role around the 
time of the IPO.  Companies receive between one and thirteen comment letters, with 
each letter having between two hundred and over seven thousand words.    The 
greatest number of SEC questions relate to requests for clarification on the business 
model and about the uncertainties associated with it. The paper also finds that more 
complex companies tend to receive longer letters from the SEC and a greater number 
of letters.  Companies with higher quality advisors tend to receive fewer questions on 
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issues related to valuation and business description, while companies with a more 
uncertain tone in the prospectus receive significantly more questions on both these 
topics.  Finally, companies with a higher likelihood of fraud receive significantly more 
questions related to accounting.    
Once the company has addressed the substantial issues raised by the SEC, the 
marketing of the offering begins. Often the prospectus is sent to sales people as well as 
to institutional investors around the country.  At the same time, the company and the 
underwriter promote the IPO through the road show, in which the company officers 
make numerous presentations to (mainly) institutional investors as well some retail 
salespeople. A typical road show lasts 3-4 weeks and includes two or more meetings a 
day. 
As the road show progresses, the underwriter receives indications of interest, 
the majority of which tend to be from institutional investors. The indications of 
interest by individual investors and by institutions differ along several dimensions. 
First, retail investors typically submit a “market order” in which only the quantity 
desired is stated. Institutions, on the other hand, sometimes submit limit orders where 
the quantity demanded is subject to a maximum price. Second, retail orders are 
received earlier than institutional orders since institutions prefer to wait to a later stage 
of the process before submitting their orders. Third, in some cases, institutions submit 
an order with a commitment to purchase more shares in the open market if their order 
is fulfilled, a process that is referred to as laddering (see Griffin, Harris, and Topaloglu 
(2007) for a detailed analysis of laddering). These differences between retail and 
institutional investors may affect the investment bank’s marketing strategy. However, 
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regardless of the source of the indication of interest, at this stage, prior to the effective 
day, no shares can be officially sold, so any orders submitted are only indications of 
interest and are not legally binding. 
The registration and marketing process can take several months, and it is 
therefore impossible for the underwriter to include certain information (such as the 
final IPO price, or the exact number of shares to be offered) in its initial filing with the 
SEC.  The initial price range is typically included in one of the amended prospectuses, 
which is filed after the company has addressed the majority of the SEC’s comments 
and before the roadshow begins.  If the company and its underwriter learn particularly 
positive or negative news during the roadshow period, then the company issues an 
amended prospectus with an amended price range.  Specifically, the company must 
increase (decrease) the price range if the expected offering proceeds will be more than 
20% above the maximum amount (more than 20% below the minimum amount) 
previously designated. Figure 10 reports the distribution of the length of the IPO 
process from the time of the filing of the initial prospectus until the IPO. The number 
of days between the filing and the IPO increases from 50 days in the mid-1980s to 120 
days in the last decade.  
On the day prior to the effective date, after the market closes, the firm and the 
lead underwriter meet to discuss two final (and very important) details: the offer price 
and the exact number of shares to be sold.  Particular attention during the pricing 
decision is given to the order books (where institutions and other investors’ indications 
of interest are recorded). Discussions with investment bankers indicate that they 
perceive that an offer should be two to three times oversubscribed to create a “good 
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IPO”.47  There is extensive evidence (see, for example, Ritter (1991)) that IPOs tend to 
be “underpriced”.  This means that investors in an IPO can expect the price to rise on 
the offer day, a characteristic that enhances demand for the issue.  From the company’
s perspective, such underpricing “leaves money on the table” in the sense that the 
company is not getting the full value for its shares, but it may be preferable for the 
company if it guarantees that the issue succeeds. Why firms are willing to leave so 
much money on the table is one of the biggest puzzles surrounding IPOs.   
After those final terms are negotiated, the underwriter and the issuer execute 
the Underwriting Agreement, the final prospectus is printed, and the underwriter files 
a “price amendment” on the morning of the chosen effective date. Once approved, the 
distribution of the stock begins. On this morning, the company stock opens for trade 
for the first time. The closing of the transaction occurs two to three days later, when 
the company delivers its stock, and the underwriter deposits the net proceeds from the 
IPO into the firm’s account. 
However, the IPO is far from being completed. Once the issue is brought to 
market, the underwriter has several additional activities to complete.  These include 
the after-market stabilization, the provision of analyst recommendations, and making a 
market in the stock. The stabilization activities essentially require the underwriter to 
support the stock by buying shares if order imbalances arise.  This price support can 
be done only at or below the offering price, and it is limited to a relatively short period 
of time after the stock has began trading. Interestingly, during this period, the standard 
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 This “pricing meeting” will never be held on Friday since the underwriter does not want to take the 
risk of pricing a firm on Friday and being able to sell the firm only on Monday. Indeed, there are 
practically no firm commitments IPOs on Mondays. 
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prohibitions against price manipulation do not apply to the underwriters, and they are 
free to trade so as to influence the price of stock. (See Ellis Michaely and O’Hara, 
2000 and Aggarwal 2000 for an in-depth analysis of the underwriters’ activities in the 
post-IPO period).  In general, the underwriter will continue to actively trade the stock 
in the months and years following the offering.  By “making a market in the stock”, 
the underwriter essentially guarantees liquidity to the investors, and thus again 
enhances demand for the shares. 
The final stage of the IPO begins 25-40 calendar days after the IPO when the 
so-called “quiet period” ends.  (The exact length of the quiet period has varied over 
time and also depends on issue size). This “quiet period” is mandated by the SEC, and 
it marks a transition from investor reliance solely on the prospectus and disclosures 
mandated under security laws to a more open, market environment. It is only after this 
point that underwriters (and other syndicate members) can comment on the valuation 
and provide earnings estimates on the new company. The underwriter’s role thus 
evolves in this after-market period into an advisory and evaluatory function (e.g., see 
Michaely and Womack (1999), Cliff and Denis (2004), Ljungqvist, Marston, and 
Wilhelm (2006, 2009), for an evaluation of the role of the underwriters’ post-issuance 
recommendations). 
Importantly as a response to the low IPO volume since 2000 and in an attempt 
to jump-start the market, some of the regulations relevant to IPOs have recently 
changed. In April 2012, the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act) was 
enacted to help revitalize the initial public offering (IPO) market, especially for small 
firms. Most importantly, it allows small firms (less than $1b in annual revenues) to file 
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IPO draft registration statements confidentially and thus reduce the risk associated 
with the IPO process by enabling issuers to disclose information to the SEC, but not 
competitors. Further, partially motivated by the argument that internal controls 
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) increased the burden on small 
firms who want to become public, the JOBS act exempts small firms from certain 
accounting and disclosure requirements.  
Dambra, Field, and Gustafson (2015) document increased US IPO activity in 
the two years after the JOBS act, not found on other active IPO markets around the 
world. Further the higher IPO volume is concentrated in small IPOs for which the 
JOBS act applies. Equally interesting Dambra et al (2015) find that the risk reduction 
is likely to be the more dominant reason for the increased IPO activity in the post 
JOBS act era.  Specifically, they find a shift in IPO activity towards firms associated 
with high proprietary costs of disclosure (measured by research intensity and industry 
concentration). Small firms have been using the de-risking provision quite often and 
the JOBS act seems to have had a significant impact in the IPO landscape.  
Overall, the initial public offering process thus involves a complex 
combination of tasks by the company, the underwriter, the syndicate members and 
regulators.  Throughout the process, the company relies on the underwriter’s expertise 
to market, price, distribute, stabilize, and support the issue. The completion of the 
process provides new capital for the firm, and a new investment opportunity for the 
public. In the following sections we discuss many of these issues (such as the role of 
the underwriter, and the pricing and performance of IPOs as an investment vehicle) 
and related them to the rich academic literature on IPOs in more detail.  
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IPO Pricing and the role of the underwriter 
Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) are underpriced on average.  Over our sample 
period, less than one out of every five IPOs has negative first-day returns, and the 
average return to purchasing an IPO at the offer price and selling at the end of the first 
day is 19.1%.  Many of the theories advanced in the literature to explain this 
phenomenon are based on the existence of information asymmetry between the 
underwriter, the company, and/or the market.  Each party has a certain information 
advantage, but at the same time lacks other critical information.   Management of the 
company arguably has the most detailed information about the company, but they 
likely find it difficult to credibly convey this information to the market without 
disclosing valuable information to competitors.   In contrast, market participants as a 
whole know more than the firm about one critical input to the IPO pricing process:  
aggregate demand for the firm’s shares.  Most of the fundamental models of IPO 
underpricing focus on one of these levels of information asymmetry. 
A second critical component of most of the fundamental models of IPO 
underpricing concerns the role of the underwriter, which is consistent with the fact that 
nearly every company issuing public equity for the first time relies on the services of 
an underwriter.  The precise role of the underwriter is a function of the IPO 
mechanism and process, which has varied over time and across countries.  The 
majority of our discussion of IPO pricing focuses on the bookbuilding mechanism, 
which represents the dominant method of bringing companies public in the US and 
increasingly around the world.  However, in subsection 4.5 we consider differences 
between bookbuilding and auctions.  A distinguishing feature of bookbuilding is that 
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the underwriter both sets the price at which the company goes public and controls 
allocations.  As discussed in detail in this section, underwriters’ control over both 
these factors generates potential advantages as well as potential disadvantages.  At a 
minimum, underwriters’ incentives in setting the offer prices are not straightforward. 
Information asymmetry between the company and investors:  Rock model 
Rock’s (1986) model of underpricing is based on information asymmetry 
between the company and investors.  In the model, the underwriter controls price but 
not allocations, meaning it is not strictly consistent with bookbuilding.  Specifically, 
the model assumes that the company has superior information to any particular 
investor, but some investors are better informed than others.  There are two classes of 
investors:  informed and uninformed.  The informed investors are able to determine 
whether the firm is high or low quality (i.e., given the offer price, whether the offering 
is overpriced or underpriced), and they only subscribe to the high quality issues.  In 
contrast, uninformed investors are unable to determine the quality of the firm, and they 
subscribe to all or no offers.  Because the informed investors only subscribe to the 
high quality issues, uninformed investors receive a disproportionate allocation of the 
low quality issues.  Hence, in order to ensure that the uninformed investors receive a 
fair rate of return and thus participate in the market, issues must be underpriced on 
average.   
Because the underwriter controls price but not allocations, this model is only 
partially consistent with the bookbuilding mechanism.  Nevertheless, it receives wide 
empirical support in both the US and in other countries that employ bookbuilding.  For 
example, Michaely and Shaw (1994) find that master limited partnerships (MLPs), 
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which are known to have limited institutional participation and thus greater 
homogeneity among investors, have significantly lower underpricing.  Moreover, 
consistent with Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) extension of Rock’s model, issues with 
lower information asymmetry, such as issues backed by higher ranked underwriters, 
also have lower underpricing.   
Amihud, Hauser and Kirsh (2003) are able to conduct a particularly powerful 
test of Rock’s model, using data from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange.  They have the 
subscriptions of each investor for a sample of IPOs, and allocations were made by 
equal proration during their sample period.  Consistent with Rock’s model, individual 
investors received larger allocations in overpriced IPOs.  Further, the number of 
investors submitting orders is higher in underpriced offerings, which is consistent with 
both informed and uninformed investors participating in more underpriced offerings, 
while only the latter investors participate in overpriced offerings.  However, the 
average underpricing of 12% was not sufficient to compensate these uninformed 
investors for the allocations they received, and they earned a negative average initial 
returns across all the IPOs in which they invested. 
Empirical tests of Rock’s model have also focused on the extent to which 
higher quality advisors, which should lower the information asymmetry associated 
with the company, contribute to lower underpricing.  All else equal, a company that 
has the backing and thus the certification of a higher quality underwriter should have 
less information asymmetry and therefore lower initial returns.  In a similar vein, 
backing by a venture capitalist should also lower underpricing.  Early tests of these 
idea using samples of IPOs in the 1970s and 1980s, including both Carter and 
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Manaster (1990) and Michaely and Shaw (1994), supported these predictions.48  
However, more recent papers lack a consensus on the robustness of those findings 
across different time periods. It seems that in the more recent period some of these 
relationships, such as the impact of VCs on IPO underpricing, have changed signs. 
Beatty and Welch (1996) find that higher ranked underwriters began to have a 
positive effect on underpricing in the 1990s.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) conjecture 
that this reflects a change in issuers’ objective function as issuers became increasingly 
focused on analyst coverage:  an issuer may be willing to accept higher underpricing 
as the cost of higher quality analyst coverage.  Because the higher quality analysts 
tend to be concentrated among the banks that represent the highest quality 
underwriters, this will cause a positive relation between underwriter rank and 
underpricing.  In contrast, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that the observed 
positive relation between underwriter rank and underpricing stems from endogeneity, 
i.e., the highest quality banks are more likely to underwrite the IPOs of firm types that 
tend to have higher information asymmetry and underpricing.  They conclude that 
after controlling for the endogeneity, there is no evidence that the higher ranked 
underwriters underprice IPOs by a greater amount (in the second stage regression of 
underpricing on rank, the coefficient on rank is insignificantly negative).  While we 
agree that endogeneity is likely to be an issue, and underwriters and companies are not 
matched randomly, we are not totally convinced by Habib and Ljungqvist’s choice of 
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 Carter and Manaster’s (1990) rankings, as updated by Carter, Dark and Singh (1998) and Loughran 
and Ritter (2004) are based on placements on tombstone ads, while Megginson and Weiss’s rankings 
are based on underwriter market share.  Loughran and Ritter (2004) offer a more updated ranking 
(available on Jay Ritter’s website) that is based on both tombstone ad placements and conversations 
with practitioners. 
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pre-IPO assets and pre-IPO earnings as instruments.  These variables are likely to be 
related to firm information asymmetry and thus to expected underpricing, meaning 
they may not satisfy the exclusion criterion. 
In sum, using firm characteristics as proxies for information asymmetry, Rock’
s model as extended by Beatty and Ritter receives broad empirical support.  It is 
commonly viewed as one of the fundamental models of underpricing.  While in theory 
higher reputation intermediaries should decrease the level of information asymmetry 
and thus contribute to lower underpricing, there are many confounding factors that 
make it difficult to ascertain the true nature of these relationships. 
Information production and collection by underwriters:  Benveniste and Spindt model 
Benveniste and Spindt’s (1989) model focuses more directly on underwriters’ 
control over both price and allocations, as is the case in bookbuilding IPOs.  Key 
aspects of the model include the information advantage of market participants, the 
decisions of investors whether to provide information to underwriters, and the fact that 
underwriters will be better able to forecast aggregate market demand if they have this 
information.  After determining a preliminary estimate of firm value, the underwriter 
and the firm go together on a road show to market the issue to prospective institutional 
investors.  The underwriter wants to learn about investors’ valuations, so that it can 
more accurately price the deal.  If investors believe that the company is worth more 
than the original estimate, the underwriter would be able to raise the offer price and 
hence raise more money for the company (and earn greater fees for itself).49  However, 
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 While beyond the Benveniste and Spindt model, we note that the precise relation between the offer 
price and underwriters’ incentives is complex.  Underwriters’ direct compensation represents a fraction 
of proceeds raised, meaning a higher offer price will result in higher fees.  However, the direct benefits 
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investors have an incentive not to share this information; they prefer to buy the offer at 
a lower price and pocket a higher return.  Benveniste and Spindt note that the repeated 
game nature of this problem enables a solution.   The equilibrium outcome is for 
investors to share the positive information, but for underwriters to only partially 
incorporate this information into the final offer price.  Investors benefit from the fact 
that the issues are still underpriced, enabling them to earn a positive abnormal return.  
Underwriters benefit from the more accurate pricing compared to what they would 
have achieved without investors’ information, and hence they reward investors that 
provide this information with higher allocations of the underpriced shares. 
Extending this model further, Sherman (2000) and Sherman and Titman (2002) 
focus on the extent to which underwriters can motivate investors to engage in 
information collection on these heretofore private firms, about which there tends to be 
little readily available  public information.50  Under the assumption that there are costs 
to investors of collecting information, an underwriter that strives for both a high offer 
price and high price accuracy will optimally underprice new issues;  the incentive of 
receiving allocations of underpriced shares causes investors to engage in this costly 
information collection and to disclose their information to underwriters.  Thus, similar 
to Benveniste and Spindt, the result is that underwriters are able to more accurately 
price the issue.  
                                                                                                                                       
of a higher offer price (and thus higher proceeds) are generally perceived to be outweighed by the 
benefits of the indirect compensation related to allocating more underpriced shares to favored clients.  
These issues are discussed in more detail in section 4.4.  
50
 They argue that information collection is a more binding constraint than truth telling, which is the 
focus of Benveniste and Spindt. 
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An additional implication of both Sherman (2000) and Sherman and Titman 
(2002) is that the underwriter will optimally limit the investor pool as a means of 
controlling information collection costs, a conclusion that Yung (2005) also reaches 
after endogenizing the information production of both banks and investors.  In 
addition to limiting the size of the investor pool, Sherman (2000) concludes that there 
are reasons for underwriters to build long-term relationships with investors and to 
favor these regular investors in allocations. 
Empirical evidence on the extent to which underwriters rely on the information 
production/collection of investors in book building offerings is mixed.  Hanley (1993) 
provides the first empirical test of an important implication of the Benveniste and 
Spindt model.  If information learned during the filing period is only partially 
incorporated into the offer price, then there should be a significant positive relation 
between the price update and the initial return, where the price update is measured as 
the percentage difference between the midpoint of the filing range and the offer price, 
and the initial return is measured as the percentage difference between the offer price 
and the first aftermarket closing price.  Consistent with this logic, Hanley finds that 
offers that are priced above the upper bound of the price range have average initial 
returns of 20.7%, compared to 0.6% for offers that are priced below the lower bound 
of the range.  This pattern is quite stable over time.  As shown in Table 3.3, across the 
entire sample period of 1983 to 2015, we find that the analogous initial returns are 
56.8% versus 2.4%, respectively.  As we discuss later in this section, while this result 
is consistent with the Benveniste and Spindt model, it is also consistent with other 
explanations of why IPOs are underpriced. 
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An obstacle to more detailed tests of the Benveniste and Spindt model relates 
to the general lack of data on both allocations and the underwriter’s order book.  
While no researcher has been able to obtain detailed U.S. data on underwriters’ books 
containing investors’ indications of interest, several papers have obtained such data on 
samples of European offerings.  Earlier papers were based on relatively small samples 
and found conflicting results.  Cornelli and Goldreich (2001) find that bidders who 
include limit prices and who revise their bids obtain more shares, and Cornelli and 
Goldreich (2003) find that bids by large, regular bidders who include limit prices 
affect the issue price.  However, Jenkinson and Jones (2004) find little support for the 
importance of information production.  They find that the extent to which an investor 
is expected to be a long-term holder of the stock is substantially more important than 
whether or not they submit more informative bids.  This conclusion is further 
substantiated in a subsequent survey by the same authors (Jenkinson and Jones, 2009).   
More recently, Jenkinson, Jones and Suntheim (2016) conduct a broader study, 
which is based on detailed information related to bids, allocations, and fees for 220 
IPOs predominantly in Europe between January 2010 and May 2015.  They find some 
support for bookbuilding theories, i.e., that investors who provide more information 
through bids are rewarded with larger bids.  First, there is weak evidence that price-
sensitive bids (as opposed to strike bids) receive higher allocations, but the effect 
varies substantially across banks and allocations in some banks are completely 
independent of bid type.  Second, investors who participate in pre-IPO meetings, an 
interaction that is potentially associated with information exchange, tend to receive 
higher allocations.  Third, regular investors tend to receive larger allocations.  
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However, Jenkinson et al also find substantial evidence that factors other than 
information exchange affect allocations; we discuss these finding in subsection 4.4 on 
conflicts of interest.   
 In light of the lack of detailed US data, several papers have attempted to assess 
the extent of investor information production through other means.  For example, 
Wang and Yung (2011) posit that higher ranked underwriters should have an 
advantage in information production, either because of greater networks of investors 
or greater skill.  Consistent with this conjecture, they find that firms brought public by 
higher ranked underwriters have greater filing price revisions and lower secondary 
market volatility.  Price revisions of firms brought public by less reputable banks 
cluster on exactly zero dollars - the partial adjustment phenomenon is primarily due to 
higher ranked underwriters. One could argue, however, that more reputable 
underwriters, might be able to gather more precise information even before the 
roadshow begins, through the due diligence process, through conversations with more 
qualified sell-side analysts, etc, Such advantages would cause their initial price ranges 
to be more precise, resulting in fewer revisions. Wang and Yung’s findings on the 
magnitude of high reputation banks’ price revisions may be subject to more than one 
interpretation.  
As an alternative way to test the extent of information production, several 
papers have examined either IPO allocations or post-IPO holdings.  Bookbuilding 
theories predict that investors who engage in the most information production should 
obtain the largest allocations.  Consistent with this, Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri 
(2002) find a strong positive relation between institutional allocations and first day 
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returns.  During their 1998 – 1999 sample period, institutions are allocated 
approximately 75% of underpriced issues on average, compared to an average 55% of 
overpriced issues.51  In addition to obtaining substantial allocations, Chemmanur, Hu 
and Huang (2010) are able to verify that institutions earn substantial profits from these 
IPO investments.  They find that institutions earn an average 67% abnormal return on 
their IPO investments, calculated based on numbers of allocated shares and detailed 
transaction data on when they sold the shares.52   However, as discussed in detail in 
subsequent subsections, agency-related issues such as favoritism or quid-pro-quo for 
other services are very likely to contribute to these relations. In sum, these studies in 
aggregate provide some support for the Benveniste and Spindt model of bookbuliding, 
but suggest that factors other than those incorporated in this model likely have a 
greater influence on the IPO process.   
Both Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2004) highlight two 
additional implications of the Benveniste and Spindt model.  First, the model implies 
that private information should be partially incorporated into offer prices, but that 
public information should be fully incorporated.  In other words, underwriters have no 
reason to reward investors by only partially incorporating public information into the 
offer price; underwriters can observe this information themselves and thus have reason 
to rely on institutional investors.  Second, while positive private information should 
only be partially incorporated, negative information should be fully incorporated.  
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 As noted by the authors, this finding is also consistent with Rock’s model, under which informed 
investors are able to avoid the lemons. 
52 Boehmer, Boehmer, and Fishe (2006) find further that institutions receive higher allocations in IPOs 
with the highest long-run performance.  However, the importance of this to institutions is unclear, given 
Chemmanur et al’s finding that institutional investors are not penalized for flipping shares soon after the 
IPO, a phenomenon commonly referred to as flipping.   
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Both underwriters and institutional investors want to avoid overpriced issues 
(underwriters’ incentives are related to difficulty of selling the issue and reputational 
effects).   Both Loughran and Ritter (2002) and Lowry and Schwert (2004) empirically 
test and find support for the predicted asymmetry effect of positive versus negative 
information.  However, there exists less consensus on the effects of public versus 
private information. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) employ a series of univariate regressions to 
examine the effects of public versus private information.  First, they note that a 
regression of the percentage change between the first aftermarket closing price and the 
midpoint of the filing range represents an estimate of the firm beta, which they 
estimate to be 2.37 on average.  Second, they argue that if public information is 
completely incorporated into the offer price, then a regression of the percentage 
change between the offer price and the midpoint of the filing range on market returns 
should yield a similar coefficient estimate on market returns.  However, in contrast to 
this prediction, they obtain a coefficient estimate of 0.76, and based on this they 
conclude that only 32% of the public information is incorporated into the offer price, a 
finding that is inconsistent with the Benveniste and Spindt model.   
Lowry and Schwert (2004) argue that a stronger test of the effects of public 
versus private information should include proxies for both in one regression, due to 
the likely positive correlation.  The price update, measured as the percentage 
difference between the midpoint of the filing range and the offer price, should 
incorporate the effects of both public and private information that becomes available 
over the filing period, while market returns should capture just public information.  
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Regressing initial returns on both these factors (as well as a variety of other firm- and 
offer-specific characteristics), the coefficient on market returns should capture the 
effects of public information and the price update coefficient should isolate the effects 
of private information.  Using this framework, Lowry and Schwert conclude that 
nearly all public information is incorporated into prices.  A one standard deviation 
change in market returns (approximately 11%) is associated with an 0.08% standard 
deviation change in initial returns (1.6%).  In contrast, a one standard deviation change 
in the price update is associated with an 0.40 standard deviation change in initial 
returns (8%).53   
In sum, to a large extent the process by which underwriters set the offer price 
is yet unclear to the public and academics alike.  The lack of publicly available 
allocation data raises questions regarding whether some investors have advantages 
over others, for example if certain information is not fully incorporated into price, and 
whether post-IPO price dynamics are predictable as a result.  For example, Cornelli 
and Goldreich find that when there is more disagreement about the offer price, i.e., the 
elasticity of limit quotes is lower, the offer price tends to be lower and post-IPO 
market returns higher.  Should more information be available?  In today’s world of 
increased disclosure requirements and increased attention from regulatory authorities 
on disclosure, these questions provide ample opportunity for future research. 
Information production more broadly  
 As highlighted in the previous subsection, empirical support for information 
production by the lead underwriter during the bookbuilding period is mixed, and 
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 Lowry and Schwert find that the coefficient on market returns is positive and statistically significant, 
but the economic significance is trivial. 
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despite many efforts it is largely circumstantial:  papers based on samples of European 
IPOs find conflicting results regarding both the prevalence of informed bids and the 
extent to which such informed bids are rewarded with higher allocations.  However, 
there is strong evidence that institutions, on average, receive higher allocations than 
retail investors, and institutions earn high profits on these allocations.  One possible 
explanation for this mixed evidence relates to uncertainty regarding the time of 
information production and/or revelation.  There are three periods of time during 
which information is potentially produced and revealed:  prior to the IPO filing, during 
the bookbuilding period, and in the secondary market.  While the above-cited papers 
focus on information production during the second period, both Jenkinson, Morrison 
and Wilhelm (2006) and Hanley and Hoberg (2010) emphasize the potential for 
information production during the first period.   
It is quite clear that in the first period, for example during the due diligence 
process, much information about the issuers is gathered by the underwriters: they talk 
with management, they talk with suppliers, they talk with the relevant VCs and other 
stake holders, in conjunction with the lawyers and auditors they thieve through 
companies documents, they examine inventories and examine the company’s 
accounting and governance. The underwriters combine this information with their 
assessment of industry and market valuations and eventually come up with a value 
range for the company.   Hanley and Hoberg’s (2010) analysis of prospectuses is 
consistent with certain underwriters and managements engaging in meaningful pre-
filing information production.  They find that the uniqueness of the text in the 
prospectus, specifically in the MD&A section, is related to more accurate offer prices, 
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i.e., to smaller absolute value of price updates and to lower initial returns.  The authors 
further find that the uniqueness of information in the prospectuses is positively related 
to underwriter fees, which they interpret as being consistent with information 
production rather than a decision to simply disclose more information.  Moreover, 
information related to inputs into valuation models is found to be most relevant, e.g., 
finance and accounting terms, product market, governance, etc.  Jenkinson et al (2006) 
suggest that the extent of information collection prior to the IPO filing is even more 
extensive in Europe, where regulations governing pre-IPO (and prior to the intent to 
file an IPO) interactions between investors and issuers are less stringent.    
Consistent with this idea that information production can occur prior to the 
IPO, a number of countries have variations in issuing strategies, which offer potential 
benefits at least for certain types of firms.  For example, firms in the United Kingdom 
use a two-stage issuing strategy, where they list without issuing equity and then 
subsequently issue.54  Derrien and Kecskes (2007) conclude that this first-stage trading 
reduces valuation uncertainty, resulting in lower initial returns.  Similarly, Aussenegg, 
Pichler, Stomper (2006) analyze pre-IPO trading that occurs in the German market, 
and they find that this ‘when-issued’ trading reveals substantial information, thereby 
reducing costs of bookbuilding.    However, they also conclude that bookbuilding still 
provides incremental information.  Finally, Chang, Chiang, Qian and Ritter (2016) 
focus on the pre-market in Taiwan, and in a similar vein conclude that pre-market 
prices contain substantial information regarding post-IPO prices  
                                               
54
 Because no primary shares are sold, the only shares available for sale are secondary shares, i.e., 
shares of current shareholders such as owners, managers and employees. 
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 While the theoretical literature focused on the relationship between “the 
underwriter” and investors, Corwin and Schultz (2005) examine the determinants of 
syndicate composition.  Their results highlight the importance of relationships among 
banks:  banks that have worked together in syndicates in the past are likely to also 
work together in subsequent syndicates.  They find that the composition of this 
syndicate is related to the amount of information production.  The causal interpretation 
would be that larger syndicates tend to result in more information production, as 
measured by the likelihood of the offer price being revised.  However, it is difficult to 
differentiate this causal story from one in which firms whose value is more uncertain 
choose to work with larger syndicates.  
Corwin and Schultz also highlight the changes in syndicates over their 1997 – 
2002 sample period, with total syndicate size decreasing but the number of co-
managers increasing.  We collected more data on the syndicate size and find that since 
2002, total syndicate size has continued to decrease, rather substantially: median 
syndicate size is eleven in 2002 compared to only five in 2015.55  Interestingly, the 
number of co-managers has also decreased, from a median of three in 2015 to a 
median of two in 2015.  However, the number of book managers has increased over 
this period, going from a median of one in 2002 to a median of three in 2015.56  While 
29% of IPOs in 2002 had multiple book managers, that number had increased to 
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 These statistics are based on SDC data combined with manual checking of prospectuses.  We confirm 
that SDC data on syndicate size are largely correct for these years, with the exception that actual 
syndicate size equals SDC’s reported syndicate size minus the number of underwriters listed as Global 
Coordinator (because these underwriters are included in either the book manager or joint book manager 
categories).   
56
 Book managers, coded as book manager or joint book manager in SDC, receive the greatest share 
allocations.  We would expect joint leads to also receive relatively large share allocations (i.e., larger 
than co-managers), but in more recent years the differentiation between joint leads and other members 
of the syndicate (e.g., co-managers) in SDC is less clear. 
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nearly 90% by 2015.  The contrasting trends are explained by a strong decline in the 
number of co-managers and other syndicate members.  In fact, across the 125 IPOs in 
2015, none had other syndicate members (as recorded in SDC and manually verified 
by examining  the prospectuses).  Figure 3.9 shows the evolution of the syndicate over 
time.   The determinants of both syndicate size and the number of book managers are 
interesting and seem to be understudied. It would be useful to better understand the 
reasons for the variation both across time and across IPOs. 
Overall, this body of literature emphasizes the advantages that underwriters 
have in ensuring that investors both collect information on the firms going public and 
share the information with underwriters.   In particular, the repeated nature of IPO-
related interactions between underwriters and investors, underwriters’ access to both 
company management and to internal company documents, and underwriters’ 
expertise in valuations are key factors.  However, in spite of these advantages, Lowry, 
Officer and Schwert (2010) show that underwriters have limited ability to accurately 
value IPOs.  While various theories suggest that underwriters have incentives to 
underprice IPOs, it is difficult to conjecture that they would gain by overpricing these 
offerings.  Nevertheless, approximately one-third of IPOs are trading below their offer 
price one month after the IPO.  Moreover, measures of mis-pricing are significantly 
related to the difficulty of valuing the company, for example company-level 
uncertainty and information asymmetry.  They conclude that while underwriters may 
gather a lot of information in the first stage (the due diligence process) and may 
perhaps get valuable feedback about demand (a la Benveniste and Spindt) from 
outside informed investors, at the end of the day, IPO pricing is still very imprecise 
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probably because the process lacks sufficient detail about one critical element:  
market-wide demand for these new issues.  In sum, while underwriters and institutions 
do engage in information production, the aggregation of information through this 
process and the ability to value a heretofore private firm is limited.  One should 
wonder whether an auction type process, where all market participants have a chance 
to bid, would improve the process along these dimension.  
Conflicts of Interest between underwriters and issuing firms 
While papers advocating the advantages of bookbuilding tend to focus on 
underwriters’ role in information production, a balanced discussion must also consider 
the disadvantages of bookbuilding that stem from underwriters’ conflicts of interest.  
Unfortunately, the precise features that contribute towards underwriters’ information 
production, i.e., the repeated game nature of interactions between underwriters and 
potential investors, also contribute to agency-type problems.  A number of papers have 
examined whether underwriter – investor relations, combined with underwriters’ 
conflicts of interest, cause shares to be allocated in ways that are not beneficial to the 
issuing firm.   
Ritter and Zhang (2007), Reuter (2006), and Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett 
(2011) examine whether investors receive more allocations of underpriced IPOs if 
they have more direct relations to the underwriter.  Reuter (2006) finds a positive 
relation between the commissions that a mutual fund family paid to an investment 
bank and the fund’s holdings of IPOs that were underwritten by that same bank.  
Moreover, this relation is concentrated among issues that had nonnegative first day 
returns.  His findings are consistent with banks using IPO allocations as a way to 
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reward investors that provide benefits to the bank.  Ritter and Zhang (2007) focus on 
funds that are directly affiliated with the underwriter, and they find that such funds are 
more likely to be allocated shares of hot IPOs, thus boosting their performance.   
Using Abel-Noser data that contains detailed information regarding commissions 
received by lead underwriters, Goldstein, Irvine, and Puckett (2011) find a similar 
relation between the commissions that investors pay and the allocations of hot IPOs 
that they can expect to receive.  Specifically, they conclude that institutions increase 
commissions through round-trip stock trades, higher average commissions per share, 
and the payment of unusually high commissions on some trades.  This practice is most 
common for non-regular investors; underwriters’ concern for their long-term client 
relationships limits the practice. 
Nimalendran, Ritter, Zhang (2007) devise a clever way to examine the extent 
of the allocations for commissions strategy.  They posit that if institutional investors 
are churning shares as a way to generate commissions and increase allocations of hot 
IPOs, then we should observe a spike in the trading volume of the most liquid stocks.  
Consistent with this conjecture, they find that the trading volume of the 50 most liquid 
stocks in the market is 3 – 4% higher in the six days preceding a hot IPO. 
On the whole these papers present strong prima-facie evidence suggesting that 
allocations are strongly motivated by favoritism, whereby investment banks reward 
good clients by giving them underpriced IPO, and/or by clients that increase banks’ 
revenue through inflated trading commissions in return for receiving underpriced 
IPOs. This may be an optimal decision by investment banks and by their institutional 
investors. It is less clear why issuing firms, in competitive markets, agree to this. 
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Further, it suggests that what many models describe as informed investors, may not 
actually provide information about the IPO firm but rather receive the IPO shares as 
part of a quid-pro-quo.  
Liu and Ritter (2010) focus on side payments to executives through a practice 
known as spinning.  Spinning refers to the investment bank’s practice of allocating 
underpriced shares of IPOs to executives of other companies, where there is an 
implicit understanding that these allocations are in exchange for the executives 
directing future underwriting business to the bank.  This practice is not legal. Liu and 
Ritter (2010) examine a sample of 56 companies in which top executives received 
allocations of other firms’ hot IPOs.  They hypothesize and find support for the 
hypothesis that these executives will bargain less aggressively for the highest possible 
offer price in their own company’s IPO:  when these 56 companies went public, they 
had 23% higher underpricing than other companies.  Moreover, these 56 companies 
were substantially less likely to switch underwriters for follow-on offerings. 
In addition to spinning, laddering represents another practice for which 
underwriters received much criticism (and which violates SEC regulations related to 
market manipulation), in particular during the internet bubble period of the late 1990s 
through 2000.  Laddering refers to the requirement that investors purchase additional 
shares in the aftermarket, as a precondition for receiving allocations in the IPO.  Hao 
(2007) models the effect of laddering, specifically the ways in which the increased 
demand in the aftermarket contribute to higher aftermarket prices, and Griffin, Harris, 
and Topaloglu (2007) find empirical evidence consistent with the practice during their 
1997 – 2002 sample period.   
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Survey evidence in Brau and Fawcett (2006) confirms that issuers perceive 
these agency-type issues to be important.  Forty-two percent of CFO respondents 
believe that underwriters strive to underprice IPOs in order to curry favor with 
institutional investors.  In comparison, Benveniste and Spindt’s model receives only 
minimal support from survey respondents:  only 10.25% of CFO respondents believe 
that underpricing compensates investors for truthfully revealing the price that they are 
willing to pay.  However, respondents overwhelmingly suggest that underpricing 
serves purposes other than just side payments to underwriters:  nearly 60% of 
respondents believe it compensates investors for taking the risk of the IPO, and over 
40% believe it increases the post-issue trading volume of the stock and/or contributes 
to a wide base of owners. 
Importantly, most of the findings suggesting that institutional investors receive 
higher allocation in exchange for information production / collection (which was 
presented in the previous subsection) would also be consistent with the agency-related 
motives described here.  Consider the finding that institutions tend to receive larger 
allocations.  Does this reflect a reward to institutions for sharing value-relevant 
information with underwriters, or does it reflect a quid pro quo arrangement where the 
bank is rewarding its best clients?  In a similar vein, does the partial adjustment 
phenomenon represent the mechanism that enables underwriters to successfully solicit 
information from informed investors, or does it represent the underwriter simply 
allocating more underpriced shares to their favorite costumers by only partially 
adjusting the price to what they learn during the roadshow?   This is an immensely 
important issue, and one that we hope future research will be able to address directly. 
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4.5  Bookbuilding versus auctions 
By definition, underwriters’ ability to manage investors’ information 
acquisition by controlling allocations is unique to bookbuilding.  As highlighted by 
Sherman (2005), under auctions the number of participating investors and their 
information production are uncertain and beyond the control of underwriters.  Rational 
investors will only acquire information and place a bid if they expect to recover their 
information production costs, i.e., if they expect the shares to be sufficiently 
underpriced.  However, if the auction mechanism is set such that the offer price equals 
the point where demand equals supply, then shares will not tend to be underpriced.  
Interestingly, as a way to mitigate such problems, W.R. Hambrecht (the underwriter 
that managed auction IPOs in the US) purposefully stated that the auctions would be ‘
dirty’ auctions, in which the offer price is set below the clearing price.57  Nevertheless, 
Sherman suggests that auctions’ susceptibility to these problems might explain the 
worldwide trend toward bookbuilding. We are still puzzled by this. It seems that 
issuers and regulators should push toward an auction system. It will create a more 
level playing field for investors, it will give investors the right incentives, and it will 
likely increase proceeds to the IPO firms. Since it reduces the role of bankers in the 
process, it might also reduce their fees.  
                                               
57 A recent paper by Schnitzlein, Shao and Sherman (2016) suggests a hybrid auction structure as an 
alternative way to overcome the problems of auctions (e.g., insufficient participation and price 
discovery), but still preserve their advantages.  Specifically, they consider a hybrid auction that includes 
a price-setting tranche open to institutions plus a non price-setting tranche for retail investors 
 
205 
While bookbuilding may offer advantages such as enhancing underwriters’ 
ability to elicit information from investors, the discussion in the previous subsection 
highlights the costs that stem from underwriters’ conflicts of interest.  In light of this 
evidence, several papers have attempted to empirically examine the superiority of 
bookbuilding versus auctions.  Sherman (2000) shows that bookbuilding is replacing 
auctions around the world, a piece of evidence that she interprets as being consistent 
with the superiority of bookbuilding.  However, it is also possible that a small group 
(e.g., underwriters) derives strong benefits from the bookbuilding method, while a 
large disperse group (issuing companies) would benefit more if an auction method 
were prevalent. Consistent with this possibility, there exists a small number of 
underwriters who are both better informed and repeat players, while there exist a large 
number of individual companies each of which has little prior experience with public 
markets only has an IPO one time. 
Derrien and Womack (2003) compare auctions, bookbuilding, and fixed price 
offers in the French market.  They find that auctions are associated with less 
underpricing and less variance of underpricing, suggesting that auctions are on 
average preferable.  However, it is admittedly challenging to ascertain the effects of 
the mechanism itself versus the type of firm choosing the mechanism.  Nevertheless, 
subsequent studies by Lowry, Officer, and Schwert (2010) and Degeorge, Derrien and 
Womack (2010) reach similar conclusions in examinations of the small sample of 
firms that have gone public via auctions in the US market.  Using detailed bid data, 
Degeorge et al are able to conduct an in-depth investigation of the extent to which 
these auctions suffer from either low investor participation or low information 
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production.  Notably, while prior literature suggests that these represent the biggest 
problems of auctions, Degeorge et al find little evidence to support these concerns.  In 
a similar vein, an examination of the demand schedules of 27 Israeli IPOs by Kandel, 
Sarig and Wohl (1999) finds that demand is very elastic, suggesting substantial price 
discovery. 
In examinations of Taiwanese IPOs, Chiang, Hirshleifer, Qian, and Sherman 
(2011) and Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2010) find that individuals’ behavior in 
auctions contrasts dramatically with institutions’ behavior.  Individuals are more 
susceptible to behavioral biases, for example being more likely to bid in an IPO 
auction if they received high returns in past IPO auctions.   Institutions are more likely 
to base their decision to bid on information costs:  institutions enter an auction if the 
expected initial returns are sufficient to cover their costs of collecting information.  
These findings suggest that ensuring institutional participation in auctions is key. 
The documented advantages of auctions increase the importance of the 
question raised at the beginning of this subsection:  why is bookbuilding overtaking 
auctions as the dominant mechanism of bringing companies public.  Kutsuna and 
Smith (2004) show that after Japan’s 1997 introduction of bookbuilding as an 
alternative to hybrid auctions, all issuers in Japan began to choose bookbuilding.  They 
conclude that net benefits of auctions versus bookbuilding vary by firm type.  For the 
average firm, auctions result in smaller issuance costs.  However, the authors also find 
some evidence that small, high uncertainty firms, which are most susceptible to Myers 
and Majluf – type lemons problems and which would thus glean the highest benefits 
from the certification of an underwriter, avoided going public when auctions were the 
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only available mechanism. As noted by the authors, results regarding this disadvantage 
of auctions are suggestive rather than conclusive, as they are unable to rule out the 
influence of hot markets that caused smaller companies to go public in many countries 
around the world during this late-1990s time period (which represents the time period 
of the bookbuilding sample).  Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2007) posit that the 
marketing behind bookbuilding issues explains the fact that this mechanism has grown 
in growing popularity, despite the lower costs and potentially greater pricing accuracy 
of the auction mechanism.  Further, the fact that with only a few exceptions (see the 
Google IPO) most of the largest investment banks refuse to take part in any IPO unless 
it uses book building represents a significant reason for the lack of popularity of the 
auction method. 
How IPOs are allocated to investors is an immensely important aspect of the 
IPO process for more than one reason. Clearly, bookbuilding - the most dominant 
method and arguably de facto the only method - does not treat all investors in an equal 
and fair manner. The adverse selection it creates for uninformed investors may be a 
reason that companies have to leave so much money on the table in the IPO process 
(Rock 1986). It gives an unfair advantage to institutions, especially to those 
institutions that have close contact with investment banks and that generate significant 
trading commissions for the banks. Bookbuilding also gave rise to laddering, which 
may artificially inflate IPO prices and at least in the short term cause a deviation of 
market prices from true prices even after the IPO; these effects are again to the 
detriment of uninformed (mainly individual) investors. In sum, bookbuilding seems to 
distort prices both at the time of the IPO and during the first months of trading.  
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What then can be the justification for bookbuilding? Investment bankers argue 
that it helps them put the shares in the “right hands”, meaning allocating shares to 
those investors who will not flip the shares. But this is clearly not the case as it is 
institutional investors who do most of the flipping. It is also argued that those 
institutions who get preferential treatment are also those who buy the cold IPOs, and 
thus on average make less profits than perceived. The jury is still out on the empirical 
validity of this argument. But even if true, we are not convinced that this cross subsidy 
is desirable or efficient. Finally, Benveniste et al (1989) and several follow up papers 
suggest that this method is optimal because this allocation method encourages 
institutions to gather information and reveal their private information about the 
upcoming IPO, resulting in a more efficient process. Maybe. Clearly, investment 
banks are better off with this allocation mechanism. The fact that auction type 
allocation mechanisms are not more popular is puzzling.  
From an empirical perspective, is it clear that the lack of data on allocations 
(with only a few exceptions) makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions.  In our 
opinion it is in the best interests of the SEC and other regulatory bodies to make such 
data available to researchers so that the public and regulators will have a better 
understanding of how shares are allocated in practice and of the associated costs and 
benefits. The fact that investment banks are so reluctant to reveal IPOs allocations 
may suggest that the current practices are not in the best interests of the investing 
public. This is exactly the point where regulators should step in. Clearly, this is 
another area where more research can be immensely useful.  
Agency costs within the issuing company 
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 While Section 4.4 focused on the effects of conflicts of interest within 
underwriter banks, a separate stream of literature has considered the effects of agency 
costs within the company itself on IPO pricing.  Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and 
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) note that agency-related issues potentially affect the 
ways in which managers of issuing firms influence offer prices.  For example, an 
owner that plans to sell many shares in the IPO has strong incentives to limit 
underpricing, whereas a manager with limited ownership who plans to sell no shares 
in the IPO cares less about maximizing the offer price.  Moreover, as highlighted by 
Habib and Ljunqvist, companies have the ability to limit underpricing by engaging in 
greater promotion, for example by hiring a top-rank advisors (e.g., investment banks, 
lawyers, auditors), by listing on certain exchanges (e.g., a high-tech company may 
choose to list on the US, rather than on its domestic exchange), and by choosing a 
firm-commitment offer rather than the lower-fee best efforts offer (where underwriters 
play much more active roles in firm-commitment offers).  Consistent with general 
economics of agency, cases in which owners benefit more from limiting underpricing, 
e.g., in larger companies and in cases where the owner plans to sell more in the IPO, 
the company engages in greater promotion efforts.  Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) 
provide further evidence on the role of agency, finding for example that changes in 
ownership structure in companies going public in the dot.com era explained a 
substantial portion of the higher underpricing in these years (though Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), using a different measures of ownership, question this conclusion). 
 Lowry and Murphy (2007) similarly test the effects of agency on underpricing, 
but arrive at the opposite conclusion.  They document that in one-third of IPOs, 
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managers are granted options in which the exercise price is set equal to the IPO offer 
price.  All else equal, such options give managers strong incentives to underprice the 
offer, as higher underpricing increases the value of these options.  However, 
controlling for pre-IPO ownership and estimating a wide range of empirical tests, they 
find no evidence of such a relation.  This robust non-finding calls into question the 
effects of agency-related explanations on underpricing, at least in regards to the effects 
of agency costs of the manager-owner.  In a subsequent paper, Chahine and Goergen 
(2011) estimate specifications where initial returns are regressed on CEO’s gains from 
such options plus a number of interaction variables related to the governance structure 
of the firm.  Including a broad set of such interaction terms, the authors find evidence 
that options issued at the IPO price do affect IPO underpricing within subsets of more 
weakly governed firms.  Their findings highlight the importance of IPO governance, a 
topic to which we devote more attention in Section 8.   
Information asymmetry between the issuing firm and the investment bank 
Baron (1982) develops a model in which banks are better informed about the 
value of the firm going public, than the firm itself.  One way to think about this is that 
the bank can better estimate market demand for the issue, which is a critical 
determinant of price.  Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) test this model by comparing 
the underpricing of banks who are managing their own IPOs (e.g., Morgan Stanley 
serving as underwriter on Morgan Stanley’s IPOs) to the underpricing of other IPOs.  
They find that the underpricing of these self-underwritten bank IPOs is no different 
than the underpricing of other IPOs.   While we agree that Baron’s model implies that 
banks should be able to more accurately price their own IPOs, the issue of whether 
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banks have incentives to price their IPOs closer to true value is debatable.  Assuming 
that the bank benefits by underpricing IPOs, for example because they are easier to 
sell, it will be more difficult to credibly argue to future clients that it is optimal to 
underprice their offerings if the bank did not underprice its own offering. 
Prospect theory, investor inattention, and investor type 
 Loughran and Ritter’s (2002) finding (previously discussed in section 4.2) that 
public information is only partially incorporated into the offer price raises questions as 
to why this is an optimal outcome.58  A complete explanation must consider the 
willingness of both underwriters and issuers for such “higher than necessary” 
underpricing.  As discussed in sections 4.4 and 4.6, a number of papers have 
considered the effects of agency, within both the underwriter bank and the issuing 
firm.  Loughran and Ritter (2002) propose a behavioral explanation, prospect theory:  
issuers care about the change in their wealth rather than the level.  Consider a case in 
which the IPO is underpriced.  The entrepreneur’s wealth change around the time of 
the IPO represents the sum of two components:  money lost due to underpricing (from 
shares sold at the offer price rather than the ‘true’ value, and also from the dilution 
effect of selling part of the firm for below market value), plus money gained because 
retained shares are valued at the higher market price.   If the gain from the second 
component exceeds the loss from the first, then prospect theory argues that the issuer 
                                               
58
 While Loughran and Ritter (2002) emphasize that their finding of partial incorporation of public 
information into the offer price is inconsistent with Benveniste and Spindt, we note this finding is not 
necessarily inconsistent with Rock.  However, one might argue that the magnitude of underpricing is 
difficult to explain within the framework of Rock’s model, particularly certain times such as the internet 
bubble period. 
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will be content.  The fact that the entrepreneur could have been even wealthier if the 
IPO had been valued more highly is less relevant.   
Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2004) conclude that despite the high 
underpricing of IPOs, the median IPO was significantly overvalued at the offer price, 
when valuations are computed based on industry peer price multiples. In addition to 
providing high first-day returns, these overvalued IPOs earn significantly lower 
abnormal returns over the long-run.  The authors trace this price trajectory to 
optimistic growth forecasts around the time of the IPO, which are not realized.  They 
conclude that investors pay insufficient attention to profitability around the time of the 
offer. 
Finally, several papers consider the effects of investor clienteles on 
underpricing.  For example, Derrien (2005) and Ljungqvist, Nanda and Singh (2006) 
conjecture that issuing firms and the institutional customers of investment banks 
benefit from the presence of sentiment investors.  Building on this, Cook, Kieschnick, 
and Van Ness (2006) argue that the investment bank underwriter should promote IPOs 
to retail investors.  While endogeneity concerns make it difficult to make definitive 
conclusions, their results suggest that investment banks do in fact benefit from such 
promotion efforts, for example through higher offer price revisions and higher offer 
price valuations relative to comparable firms.  Consistent with these relations being 
driven by participation of retail investors, they find that average trade sizes are smaller 
in cases where promotional efforts were greater.   
Other services provided by underwriters, in bookbuilding IPOs 
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In addition to marketing and pricing the IPO, underwriters also frequently 
provide a number of services after the IPO, for example price support, market making 
activities, and analyst coverage.  Starting with Michaely and Womack (1999) and 
Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001), analyst coverage in particular has attracted 
substantial attention for its potential effects on underwriter selection, IPO pricing, and 
choice of bank for post-IPO transactions such as mergers and SEOs.  Brau and 
Fawcett document that 83% of surveyed CFOs state the “quality and reputation of the 
research department / analyst” to be an important determinant of underwriter selection. 
A number of papers have examined the influence of analyst coverage in the 
IPO context.  In this section, we highlight papers that focus on the relation between 
analyst coverage and pricing, and future sections the literature on analyst coverage as 
it relates to IPOs more broadly. 
Loughran and Ritter (2002) focus on the link between analyst coverage and 
underpricing; they posit the analyst lust hypothesis, under which companies are 
willing to accept large underpricing from prestigious underwriters because of the 
importance of coverage from influential analysts, which tend to be concentrated in 
these high-rank investment banks.  Consistent with this argument, Cliff and Denis 
(2004) find that underpricing is higher among issues brought public by underwriters 
with an all-star analyst covering the issuer’s industry.  They further conclude that the 
relation is causal, rather than solely reflecting a scenario where managers underprice 
their offerings as a way to attract subsequent attention from both analysts and the 
media (a possibility suggested by Aggarwal, Krigman and Womack (2001)).  
Specifically, in addition to conducting 2SLS analyses that control for such 
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endogeneity, Cliff and Dennis also find that companies are significantly more likely to 
switch lead underwriters between the IPO and SEO if the lead underwriter does not 
have a recommendation outstanding one year after the IPO.   This latter finding 
regarding the influence of analyst coverage in underwriter switches is consistent with 
findings in Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001).   In fact, Krigman et al find that 
underpricing is not an important determinant of underwriter switches, suggesting that 
analyst coverage is the more important factor. 
Liu and Ritter (2011) posit and find empirical support for the conjecture that 
VCs are particularly focused on analyst coverage, because they want a high price 
when shares are distributed to limited partners (frequently at the end of the lock-up 
period, 180 days after the IPO).  While Liu and Ritter’s reported results are based on 
OLS regressions and therefore may be sensitive to identification issues that make 
causal interpretations difficult, they find similar results using 2SLS regressions that 
control for endogeneity.  
In addition to analyst coverage, price support is perceived to be an important 
service provided by underwriters.  The objective of price support is to limit the extent 
to which the price falls below the offer price, and price support activities are generally 
concentrated within the first month after the offer.  As explained by Ellis, Michaely, 
and O’Hara (2000) and Aggarwal (2000), underwriters can stabilize the aftermarket 
price of an IPO through the use of pure stabilizing bids, in which the underwriter 
purchases shares in the aftermarket, or through aftermarket short covering, in which 
the underwriter generally repurchases shares that were issued under the overallotment 
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option.59  The authors find that pure stabilizing bids (i.e., not supported by over-
allotted options) are never used, and that aftermarket short covering is the most 
common.   Ellis, Michaely and O’Hara further show that the lead always becomes 
market maker, and that the lead takes on substantial inventory, especially for IPOs 
with negative initial returns.  Importantly, the overallotment option (described in more 
depth in section 3) substantially reduces this risk.  Finally, in addition to price support 
being perceived as valuable by the issuing firm, Ellis et al find no evidence that these 
activities have to be subsidized by the profits from underwriting.  Rather, they find 
that market making activities, of which the potential for price support represents one 
component, is on average profitable for the lead underwriter, accounting for an 
average 23% of total IPO profits.  Given the many changes in the markets over recent 
years, including for example increased participation by high frequency traders and 
lower bid-ask spreads, it is an empirical question whether trading activity continues to 
represent a significant source of profits for underwriters.  
While price support is perceived by the firm as being beneficial, the economics 
of why a temporary manipulation of the price would provide long-run benefits are 
intriguing.  Lewellen (2006) finds that stabilization appears to raise the equilibrium 
stock price, at least in the short run, as there is little evidence of declines in stock 
prices after the stabilization is withdrawn.  However, it remains difficult to determine 
if the long-run price trajectory would have been different in the absence of both the 
overallotment option and price support.  One possibility is that price support limits 
                                               
59 In addition, the underwriter may also employ penalty bids as a deterrence mechanism.  Penalty bids 
refer to cases in which brokers whose clients sold IPO shares shortly after the IPO lose a portion of the 
commission that they made on the sale of the IPO shares. 
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cascade-type effects (see, e.g., Welch, 1992) that potentially cause downward spirals 
in the stock price.  To the extent that retail investors would be more susceptible to 
such phenomena, it is illustrative that Lewellen finds price support to be concentrated 
in issues with more retail participation. 
Effects of the Lockup Period  
Most IPOs have lockup agreements that limit the periods during which insiders 
can sell shares.  This is an agreement between the firm and the underwriter, not 
involving any of the regulatory bodies (see section 3 for more details). In any IPO 
with a lock-up agreement, insiders can sell shares in the IPO (in which case the sales 
must be disclosed in the prospectus) or at the expiration of the lockup period, but the 
lock-up agreement prevents sales in the interim period.  The typical length of the 
lockup agreement is 180 days.  Field and Hanka (2001) find that 80% of IPOs from 
1988 until 1997 had lockup periods of 180 days, and that lock up agreements tended to 
become more standard over their sample period: in the last year of their sample more 
than 90% of companies set the lockup period to 180 days.  At the lockup expiration, 
when insiders first have the opportunity to sell their holdings, Field and Hanka (2001) 
document a -1.5% average return.  They attribute this price drop to insider sales, and 
they find that it is more severe among companies backed by venture capital, which are 
themselves subject to the lockup agreements. 
 Brav and Gompers (2003) explore the potential role of the IPO lockup 
agreements.  They test three hypotheses for the use of lockup agreements.  First, a 
lock-up agreement may represent a signal of company quality:  insiders (who are 
almost surely undiversified) will only agree to limits on selling if they are confident 
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about the long-term value of the company.  Second, the lock-up agreement may 
represent a commitment device to discipline the management, i.e., to commit them to 
continue to expend effort and to restrain from consuming excessive perquisites.  Third, 
the lock-up agreement may represent a source of additional rent for the underwriter:  
the underwriter has the option to release insiders from the lockup ‘early’(i.e., prior to 
the expiration), and in such cases the insiders are only permitted to sell through an 
SEO or via a block trade through the lead underwriter.  In either case, the underwriter 
would earn additional fees.  Cross-sectional comparisons indicate longer lock up 
agreements among companies with higher levels of potential moral hazard, suggesting 
they would be more susceptible to the commitment problems highlighted in 
hypothesis two.  In contrast, the authors find no evidence that insiders of higher 
quality firms ‘signal’ their quality through longer lockup periods, as the signaling 
hypothesis would predict.   Finally, Brav and Gompers also find that insiders are more 
likely to be released early from these lockup agreements among companies with 
higher post-IPO returns, that were backed by VCs, and that were brought public by 
higher ranked underwriters.   
How probability of issue withdrawal affects pricing 
In a samples of IPOs between 1985 and 2000, both Dunbar and Foerster (2008) 
and Edelen and Kadlec (2005) document that approximately 20% of IPOs that are 
initially filed are withdrawn.  Using SDC data we examine the rate of withdrawals for 
a more recent period.  Edelen and Kadlec (2005) and Busaba, Benveniste, and Guo 
(2001) posit that issuers (possibly together with their investment banks) factor the 
likelihood of being forced to withdraw the issue into their pricing of the issue.  Edelen 
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and Kadlec argue that any issuer that files to go public prefers public ownership to 
private ownership, but that this revealed preference must be conditional on the 
valuation under public ownership.  If the issuer’s utility from going public at the 
expected public valuation is large, then the issuer will price the deal conservatively to 
prevent withdrawal.  Alternatively, if the issuer’s utility is small, then the issuer will 
price the deal more aggressively because of a greater indifference between going 
public versus withdrawing and staying private.   
Edelen and Kadlec note that a key implication of their model is that there 
should be no asymmetry in the extent to which positive versus negative market returns 
are incorporated into the offer price:  following an increase in market returns, issuers 
should have a larger surplus from going public and thus price conservatively, i.e., 
incorporate only a portion of the positive information into price and thus accepting a 
lower price than might be possible.  In contrast, following a decrease in market 
returns, issuers should price aggressively by incorporating only a portion of the 
negative information into price and thus pushing for a higher price than would be 
achieved by incorporating 100% of this negative information.  They argue that the 
asymmetry in prior literature is due to a truncation bias, which is driven by the fact 
that issues that would have been priced lower in response to low market returns are 
instead withdrawn.  Empirical results that control for the sample selection resulting 
from withdrawn issues provide support. 
 In a similar vein, Busaba et al (2001) posit that underpricing is lower when 
investors perceive a greater likelihood that an issuer will withdraw the issue.  Issuers 
with access to alternative sources of financing (proxied by debt ratio), with less 
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uncertainty about company value (as proxied by level of revenues), and without 
venture backing have higher probabilities of withdrawal.  Viewing this from the 
perspective of the company, a company that is more likely to withdraw, for example 
because it has access to more alternative forms of financing, is less willing to accept 
high underpricing in order to become publicly listed.   Thus, we observe a negative 
relation between likelihood of withdrawal and underpricing.   
Lawsuit Avoidance 
 Tinic (1988) represents a model that is based on a combination of both 
information asymmetry and various institutional factors.  In particular, companies in 
the United States face a risk of class action, Section 11 lawsuits, and the details of 
damage calculations cause underpricing to provide a form of insurance against this 
risk.  Specifically, if a company is sued for violations related to its securities offering 
(i.e., sued under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933), damages to investors are 
calculated as the difference between the price at which they purchased the issue and 
the lower of the offer price or the price at the end of the first day of trading.  To 
provide an example, suppose an investor purchased a share on the day it went public, 
where the company went public at $10 per share and closed at the end of the first day 
at $13.  One year later, the company is sued for disclosing insufficient information in 
its prospectus, and at this time the stock is trading at $8.  While in a typical lawsuit, 
the damages would be based on the difference between $13 and $8, in the case of 
Section 11 lawsuits related to securities offerings, the damages are based on the 
difference between $10 and $8.  The lower potential damages have two effects:  they 
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decrease the cost in the event of a lawsuit, and they effectively lower the probability 
that a lawsuit is filed.   
Lowry and Shu (2002) find support for Tinic’s model in a sample of US IPOs. 
Using a 2SLS framework to address the endogeneity, they examine both the effects of 
litigation risk on initial returns, and the effects of underpricing on the probability of 
being sued.  Companies with higher litigation risk underprice their offerings more as a 
form of insurance, and higher underpricing serves as a deterrent against lawsuits.   
Hanley and Hoberg (2012) find that companies employ both underpricing and 
disclosure to protect themselves against litigation risk.  They note that legal penalties 
are based on both alleged damages and alleged insufficient disclosure in the 
prospectus, suggesting they can protect themselves by either underpricing, as 
suggested by Tinic, or by increasing their level of disclosure. They argue that 
companies with large revisions in price (between the midpoint of the filing range and 
the offer price) but small changes in the text of the prospectus are particularly likely to 
have a material omission in the prospectus:  some new information caused a change 
from the expected to the actual offer price, but this new information was not reflected 
in the prospectus.  They find that these companies with a higher likelihood of poor 
disclosure tend to underprice their offerings by a greater amount.  Based on these 
findings, they conclude that companies tend to employ either high quality disclosure 
or underpricing as a deterrent against lawsuits.  While intuitively plausible, it is 
important to note that many of the factors contributing to changes in the offer price 
and to underpricing are not incorporated in the prospectus, for example estimates of 
future growth, indications of interest from institutional investors, and underwriters’ 
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revisions to marketwide demand.  Importantly, SEC demands for added disclosure, as 
communicated through SEC comment letters, drive many of the revisions to the 
prospectus.   
Litigation continues to have a substantial effect on companies.  Approximately 
5 to 8% of IPOs are sued under Section 11 (depending on the sample period), and a 
greater number are sued if we include Section 10B-5 lawsuits as well.60  Moreover, 
these lawsuits tend to be concentrated among larger companies, where expected 
damages are higher, suggesting that the probability of being sued will be much higher 
within certain subsamples. These lawsuits are costly both to companies and to 
underwriters, who are frequently named as co-defendants.  
 
Other institutional factors 
The IPO market is affected by many institutional factors, as explained in 
previous section.  One of the factors that has received attention in the literature is 
limits to short selling, as originally proposed by Miller (1977).  Miller notes that the 
heterogeneity of investors’ valuations is particularly high for IPO firms, however short 
sale constraints in early trading limit the extent to which the negative opinions are 
factored into market prices.  These limits to short sales are a function of few shares 
available to loan, for example because many pre-IPO investors are prevented from 
selling until after the expiration of the lock-up.   
                                               
60
 Lowry and Shu find that 8% of IPOs between 1988 and 1995 are sued under Section 11; Hanley and 
Hoberg (2012) find that 5% of IPOs between 1997 and 2005 are sued under Section 11 and 10% under 
any form of class action lawsuit.  In a sample of 2005 – 2013 IPOs examined by the authors of this 
review, 6% are sued under Section 11. 
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Consistent with Miller, Ljungqvist, Nanda, and Singh (2006) develop a model 
in which post-IPO short sales constraints can explain both the positive initial returns 
and long-run underperformance.  Specifically, because issuers know that sentiment 
investors will bid up prices in the after-market and the opinions of pessimistic 
investors will be under-represented, they are able to price the IPO higher than they 
otherwise would.  Institutional investors purchase the over-valued IPO shares because 
they know they can re-sell them to sentiment investors at even higher prices, resulting 
in high initial returns.  Over time, as short-sales constraints relax, the negative 
information gets incorporated into prices and the issues underperform.  As noted by 
the authors, this model is based on an assumption that IPOs underperform over the 
long-run, a premise for which the empirical literature provides mixed evidence and 
which is reviewed in depth in Section 6. 
Ofek and Richardson (2003) focus more narrowly on the internet bubble 
period, but similarly conclude that stock price patterns on IPOs in this sector are 
consistent with Miller.  Specifically, they document: higher short interest and higher 
borrowing costs for this set of stocks (consistent with short sale restrictions), 
heterogeneity in investors that would cause variation over time in the identity of the 
marginal investor (meaning the most optimistic investors change over time thereby 
contributing to continually increasing prices), and lock-up expirations that both 
substantially loosen short-sales constraints that are followed by significantly negative 
abnormal returns. 
In contrast, Edwards and Hanley (2010) obtain actual data on short selling 
transactions, and they show that short selling occurs simultaneously with the opening 
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day of trading in 99.5% of IPOs in their 2005 – 2006 sample.  Moreover, by the fifth 
day of trading, the ratio of short selling to volume is only slightly lower than that for a 
sample of mature firms as documented by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009).   In 
contrast to the predictions of Miller (1977), Edward and Hanley find that short selling 
is positively correlated with underpricing.  This general availability of short selling in 
IPOs is consistent with findings of Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002), who find that 
shorting costs among those IPOs that are available to short are not substantial, 
averaging 44 basis points per year.  However, as highlighted by Edwards and Hanley, 
shorting costs are unlikely to be equal across all firms, potentially being especially 
high among firms with low institutional investment (see, e.g., D’Avolio (2002)). 
Patatoukas, Sloan and Wang (2016) focus on the cross-sectional differences in 
shorting constraints across IPO firms, and find substantial evidence that these 
constraints contribute to both underpricing and long-run returns.  They hypothesize 
that firms with higher information asymmetry, with more divergent investor opinions, 
and with fewer shares available to trade (i.e., fewer shares issued in IPO and thus not 
subject to lock-up agreements) will have higher shorting costs.  Consistent with 
predictions, they find that such firms have higher lending fees, higher initial returns, 
and more negative returns around lockup expirations.   In sum, while most IPO firms 
are available to short after the offering, there are still substantial differences between 
firms, and these differences appear related to pricing patterns. 
Is underpricing a form of advertising? 
 In their 2002 review paper of IPO underpricing, Ritter and Welch (2002) ask:  
“On theoretical grounds, however, it is unclear why underpricing is a more efficient 
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signal than, say, … advertising”.  Chemmanur and Yan (2009) examine this directly. 
They hypothesize that firms will choose a higher level of product market advertising 
when they are planning to issue new equity, and that product market advertising and 
initial returns represent substitutes.  Empirical results, which are based on the subset of 
IPOs with positive advertising expenditures, provide strong support for their 
predictions.  For example, advertising expenditures are significantly higher in the 
years of an equity offering, a finding that holds for both IPOs and SEOs.  Second, in 
both OLS regressions and SUR regressions that control for endogeneity, the 
magnitude of underpricing is significantly lower when a firm expends more on 
advertising.  To the extent that underpricing is a more efficient form of advertising to 
consumers than to businesses, we note that these relations should be stronger among 
business-to-consumer companies than among business-to-business companies.  The 
authors do not examine such differences. 
 In a related vein, Demers and Lewellen (2003) also find that product market 
advertising is related to various dynamics of the IPO.  They provide evidence 
consistent with the marketing benefits of underpricing:  greater underpricing of 
internet firms is associated with a post-IPO increase in website traffic. 
The signaling hypothesis and information cascades 
 Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), and Welch (1989) 
propose signaling models of underpricing, wherein high quality firms strive to 
distinguish themselves from low quality firms by incurring a cost, where the cost is 
underpricing of the IPO.  Low quality firms cannot afford to incur this cost, and hence 
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investors know that an underpriced IPO must represent a high quality firm.  In general, 
this class of models has received little empirical support.  
 Welch (1992) proposes an information cascade model of IPOs, in which the 
order in which investors are approached about purchasing the issue affects the ultimate 
proceeds raised.  The general intuition is that each investor has a private signal about 
firm value, and attempts to infer the private signals of previous investors from their 
decision of whether to purchase the issue.  Thus, the second investor makes a decision 
to purchase based on his private signal and the observed action of the first investor.  
The second investor is more likely to purchase if the first investor purchased.  Each 
subsequent investor can observe the decisions of a greater number of prior investors, 
and thus puts less weight on his own signal.  In this way, if the early investors view 
the offering favorably, the issue is more likely to succeed.  Knowing about this 
cascades model, an issuer has an incentive to underprice the issue to increase the 
probability that early investors view the offering favorably.  Amihud, Hauser and 
Kirsh (2003) find support for Welch’s cascades model using a sample of Israeli data, 
where they are able to observe investors’ subscriptions.  Specifically, they find that 
investors tend to subscribe heavily to new issues, or to largely refrain, consistent with 
herding. 
As this review chapter primarily concentrates on papers published since 2000, 
we refer the reader to other sources such as the excellent review by Ritter and Welch 
(2002) for a more detailed discussion of these important issues.  
Is the underwriting market competitive? 
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The ways in which one thinks about the underwriter’s role is related to 
questions regarding the competitiveness of the underwriting market.  Chen and Ritter 
(2000) document a striking clustering of spreads at 7%.  Based on both the lower 
average spreads in other countries and the lack of a negative  relation between spreads 
and proceeds across a wide range of issue sizes, they conclude that spreads for deals 
about $30 million are above competitive levels.  We extend the sample and examine 
the underwriting spread for a long time period. While spreads today continue to have a 
substantial clustering at 7% (see Figure 7), investment banks claim that underwriting 
IPOs is a loss-leader rather than a highly profitable activity. This seems surprising, 
given average IPO proceeds of approximately $111 million (in constant 2015 dollars, 
see Table 1), implying fees of around $7.8 million (calculated at 7%). Under an 
assumption that an IPO requires 3 months work of three associates, one vice-president 
and ½ of a managing director, being a underwriter would not seem like a loss leader. 
However, the lack of cost data and the ambiguity related to how costs should be 
allocated even if one had detailed data make this a difficult question to answer 
empirically.   
Torstila (2003) and Hansen (2001) question the conclusion that the 7% 
clustering necessarily reflects collusion.  Torstila finds that spreads cluster in many 
IPO markets around the world, and that many countries have greater clustering than 
the US.  However, he notes that the level at which most other countries’ spreads 
cluster is lower than that in the US.  Hansen concludes that 7% represents efficient 
contracting rather than implicit collusion.  He argues that underwriters compete on 
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other dimensions, for example marketing and placement of the issue, and analyst 
coverage.  
In sum, a common theme throughout much of this literature relates to the 
extent to which the underwriting market is competitive.  The concentration of spreads 
and the large underpricing seem at odds with a competitive market, yet the large 
number of underwriters is strongly inconsistent with a monopolistic industry.  Hoberg 
(2007) and Liu and Ritter (2010) suggest reasons for these apparent contradictions. 
Hoberg (2007) finds strong evidence of underwriter persistence, where some 
underwriters tend to persistently underprice IPOs by substantially greater magnitudes 
than other underwriters.  If all underwriters provide a similar service, one would 
expect competitive forces to diminish these differences over time.  However, Hoberg 
concludes that underpricing is actually a proxy for underwriter skill, with the higher 
quality underwriters underpricing offerings by a greater amount.   To the extent that 
underwriters can exchange underpriced shares for other services, such as discussed 
above, the higher underpricing potentially substitutes for higher fees than would 
otherwise be observed.   We note that the conclusions of this paper are all based on 
underpricing being positively related to underwriter rank, however as was discussed in 
depth in section 4.1 this is debatable.  
Consistent with underwriters differing in important ways, Liu and Ritter (2010) 
argue that the underwriting market can best be modeled as a series of local oligopolies.  
While there are a large number of underwriters, they are not all competing directly 
against each other.  A limited number of underwriters are positioned to best provide 
the services demanded by a particular company.  For example, a large company 
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backed by a top tier VC will focus on highly ranked investment banks with an all-star 
analyst in their industry, as potential underwriters for their IPO.  In contrast, smaller, 
regionally-focused companies may be more likely to select among the set of 
investment banks with operations focused within their geographic region. 
Role of other intermediaries:  VC, Banks, Institutions, and Analysts. 
In addition to the underwriter, there are several other financial intermediaries 
involved with the IPO firm, before, during, and in the months following the offering. 
During the pre-IPO period, institutions such as VCs and banks often provide both an 
advisory role and also certification for company value. After the offering, financial 
institutions such as investment banks potentially influence company performance, for 
example through analysts’ recommendations and market making activity. The role of 
these intermediaries does not end at the IPO, with VCs typically continuing to holding 
shares after the IPO and banks frequently providing additional loans. We also review 
here the literature discussing the actions of the VC and other stakeholders at the end of 
the lock-up period, when insiders can start selling their shares freely.  
A typical startup company goes through several rounds of financing before its 
potential IPO. In the initial round of financing a company attracts “seed capital”, 
generally from individual investors.  These investors range from family and friends to 
wealthy individuals commonly referred to as angel investors. Companies that 
successfully develop past the initial stage may subsequently attempt to attract 
financing from a venture capitalist (VC).  VCs provide a screening role, a monitoring 
role, and an advising role.  The screening role refers to the VC’s decision of which 
companies to fund, among the hundreds or even thousands of business plans it 
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receives, whereas the monitoring and advising refer to the active influence of VCs, for 
example in terms of establishing connections to suppliers and customers, setting up 
governance structures, and regularly visiting the company and communicating with 
management.  Sorenson (2007) finds that at least two-thirds of the higher valuation of 
VC-backed companies stems from VCs’ active influence on companies.   
Prior to the IPO, a VC typically advises a company on its business and 
financial strategy, helps it to establish a governance structure (Baker and Gompers 
(2003) and Hochberg (2012)), and assists it in raising additional funds. The VC is 
generally closely involved with the company until the company successfully exits 
(where exit is defined as going public or being acquired) or until the investment is 
written off (a scenario that is commonly referred to as joining the living dead).  
Among companies that successfully go public, the VC holds shares until at least the 
end of the lock-up period but frequently much longer (see, e.g., Gompers and Lerner, 
1998; Field and Hanka, 2001; Field and Sheehan, 2004).  Bernstein, Giroud, and 
Townsend (2016) show that a higher level of VC engagement with the company 
increases both the company’s innovation and its likelihood of successful exit, and 
Brav and Gompers (1997) show that IPOs backed by venture capital earn significantly 
higher returns over the three to five years after the IPO, compared to their non-venture 
backed counterparts.61   
Our analysis reveals that among IPOs between 1972 and 2015, 37% were 
backed by venture capital.  As shown in Table 3.4, venture capital backing is more 
common among younger companies and among companies in technology industries. 
                                               
61 The difference in post-IPO returns between venture- and nonventure-backed IPOs is only significant 
using equally weighted returns. 
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The VC’s role in screening, monitoring, and advising companies should decrease the 
level of information asymmetry surrounding the firm.  Using data from the 1970s and 
1980s Megginson and Weiss (1991) conclude that VC backing decreases first day 
returns, which is consistent with this prediction.  However, in more recent periods VC-
backed IPOs have tended to have higher initial returns, for example as shown in 
Figure 3.6.  Lee and Wahal (2004) compare underpricing in VC-backed IPO versus 
non-VC IPOs matched on size, industry, location, book value, underwriter rank and 
revenue, and find underpricing to be 5-10% higher among the VC-backed sample, 
with the difference being more pronounced during the “bubble period”. This positive 
relation between VC backing and initial returns may be arttributed to endogeneity:  
companies backed by venture capital tend to belong to riskier industries and to be 
more difficult to value, suggesting that the coefficient on VC backing picks up these 
characteristics rather than the causal effects of VC backing on information asymmetry.  
In addition to benefits related to lower underpricing, Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis and 
Singh (2011) suggest that higher ranked VCs contribute to better post-IPO long-run 
performance, an effect that they attribute to greater post-IPO involvement of higher 
ranked VCs.   The true causal effects of VC backing on underpricing remain unclear. 
In addition to the potential certification effects of VC backing, venture 
capitalists may also influence initial returns through a grandstanding effect.  As 
posited by Gompers (1996), grandstanding refers to the incentives of younger VCs to 
take companies public earlier, as a way to demonstrate their ability to the market.  The 
ability to take a company successfully through the IPO process is critical to a VC’s 
reputation, specifically to its ability to raise further capital and to attract high-quality 
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companies.  Thus, the VC is willing to incur the costs of bringing a company public 
earlier than would otherwise be optimal.  From the perspective of the company, which 
is typically younger and thus has higher information asymmetry, one of the costs of 
such grandstanding is higher underpricing. Consistent with grandstanding, Gompers 
finds that IPO firms backed by younger venture capital firms are on average 4.6 years 
old at the time of the IPO, compared to an average age of 6.6 years among companies 
backed by more mature VC firms. In terms of initial returns, IPOs backed by younger 
VC firms have average underpricing of 13.6%, compared to an average 7.3% among 
companies backed by more mature venture capital firms.  Given the changes in the 
types of firms going public, the changes in the VC industry, and also the changes in 
the association between VC-backing and underpricing, it would be valuable and 
interesting to re-examine this effect with more recent data.  
A number of additional papers have further examined differences between 
IPOs backed by highly versus more lower ranked VCs.  For example, companies 
backed by more highly ranked VCs are more likely to exit successfully, tend to have 
higher post-IPO valuations, and have higher average abnormal stock returns after the 
IPO (see, e.g., Sorenson (2007), Nahata (2008), Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh 
(2011)) 
Finally, Iliev and Lowry (2016) find that VCs financial commitment to the 
company often extends long after the IPO.  While common wisdom has been that VCs 
strive to exit soon after the IPO (for example at the expiration of the lock-up period), 
Iliev and Lowry find that that in a nontrivial portion of cases VCs invest additional 
capital after the IPO.  Specifically, in 15% of companies that were backed by venture 
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capital firms prior to the IPO, a VC invests additional capital within the first five years 
after the IPO.62  In approximately half of these cases the VC that funds the firm post-
IPO is the same VC that also provided funding prior to the IPO.   Their findings 
suggest that these post-IPO venture capital fundings occur predominantly in high 
information asymmetry companies with positive NPV projects – companies that 
Myers and Majluf (1984) characterize as frequently being unable to issue public 
equity at a viable price.   
In sum, VCs perform a number of roles, which in aggregate have a positive 
effect.  First, they screen companies prior to providing funding, meaning that the 
companies that receive venture backing are of above-average quality.   Second, after 
providing funding, they play a very active role within these companies, both in terms 
of monitoring management and in advising on matters ranging from employees, to 
operations, to governance.  The extent of VC involvement and the quality of the VC 
positively affect company innovation, the likelihood of exit (via IPO or acquisition), 
and post-IPO long-run performance. 
Interactions with other financial institutions can similarly provide certification 
of company value prior to the IPO.  This issue was first examined by James and Weir 
(1990), who find that firms with bank loans prior to the IPO have significantly lower 
initial returns than their counterparts without pre-IPO loans.  While this could reflect 
either differences in the types of firms obtaining bank loans (e.g., firms with bank 
loans may have more assets in place, lower information asymmetry) or the causal 
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 There exists considerable variation across VCs.  For example, of all IPOs between 1995 and 2010, 
3% of those backed by Kleiner Perkins prior to the IPO also received additional funding from Kleiner 
after the IPO, compared to an analogous rate of 12% for New Enterprise Associates. 
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effects of the bank loan in lowering information asymmetry, they conclude that their 
evidence is suggestive of the latter explanation.  More recently, Schenone (2004) 
examines this issue in more depth, in a manner that is better able to overcome the 
above endogneity issues.  Specifically, she focuses on a sample of IPO firms, all of 
which had syndicated loans prior to the IPO, and she compares firms whose bank 
could have underwritten the IPO with those in which the bank did not have this 
capability.   She hypothesizes that the effects of the bank loan in lowering information 
asymmetry should be greater if the bank providing the loan also served as underwriter.  
Results support this prediction, consistent with the existence of a previous relationship 
between the bank and underwriter lowering information asymmetry.  Her results also 
indicate that companies with a pre-IPO lending relationship with a potential 
underwriter exhibit significantly lower underpricing than those with a pre-IPO 
underwriting history with a potential underwriter, which is consistent with the lending 
relationship producing more information.  (These findings may suggest that in cases 
where the investment bank has a prior banking relationship with the firm, the bank 
should be less concerned with soliciting information from outside investors 
(Benveniste and Spindt).  The extent to which underwriters view these different 
sources of information as substitutes potentially provides a fruitful avenue for future 
research.) 
 Schenone's (2004) findings highlight the greater certification effects of banks 
that have served as lenders prior to the IPO, compared to banks that serve solely as 
underwriter.  Other potential effects of such lenders, for example as a potential 
providers of post-IPO capital in cases that the firm becomes financially constrained, 
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remain an avenue for future research.  To the extent that such benefits exist, they 
would affect many firms.  Gonzalez and James (2007) find that 67% of companies 
have a bank loan prior to the IPO; approximately 25% of IPO firms have a syndicated 
loans prior to going public.63.  
In recent years, “venture debt” has emerged as another source of capital for 
pre-IPO firms.  Venture debt refers to loans provided to startup companies that 
typically have little or no positive cash flow but who have venture-capital-baking. The 
most active and dominant player in this market is the Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). In 
most cases, companies that take venture loans are not eligible for more conventional 
bank loans due to the lack of cash flow and/or fixed assets. Instead, innovation and 
intellectual property are frequently used as collateral. In term of its relevancy to IPO 
activity, venture debt has parallels to types of lending in terms of both its certification 
effects and its effects on pre-IPO capital structure. Another interesting aspect is the 
type of covenant venture lenders impose on companies that in many times have little 
earnings and at times even low or no revenues.  
The recency of the venture debt vehicle suggests that more information and 
more analysis can enhance our understanding of how debt might resolve both 
information asymmetry and agency issues and thereby have an impact on the IPO 
outcome.   
Investment banks can influence IPO companies not only through the 
certification and advising channels prior to the IPO, but also via analysts’ coverage 
after the offering.  Analyst coverage is typically initiated at the end of the quiet period 
                                               
63
 Syndicated loans are made by a group of banks and are generally for substantially larger dollar 
amounts than non-syndicated loans. 
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(see for example Michaely and Womack, 1999), where the quiet period refers to a 
time interval from prior to filing of the initial prospectus until its expiration same days 
after the IPO. Post IPO, the duration of the quiet period is 40 days, with the exception 
of companies that go public under the JOBS Act of 2012 who have a quiet period of 
25 days. Prior to July 9, 2002, the duration of the quiet period was 25 days for all 
companies.64   
The company and its insiders are prohibited from making any forward-looking 
statements during the quiet period, a limitation that forbids underwriter analysts from 
making earnings forecasts or stock recommendations during this time interval.  The 
objective of the quiet period is to insure that potential investors rely on the IPO 
prospectus (which as discussed in Section 3 must be approved by the SEC as 
satisfying all relevant disclosure requirements) for all material information, that all 
investors are exposed to the same information, and that the stock is not hyped during 
this time period.  While analysts from unaffiliated brokerage houses could issue 
recommendations during the quiet period, Michaely and Womack show that the lead 
underwriter typically issues the first recommendation at the end of the quiet period.   
Several papers highlight the changes in analyst coverage of IPO firms over the 
past several decades.  Over the 1990 – 1991 period, Michaely and Womack find that 
51% of firms had analyst recommendations within the first year of the IPO, with 
approximately half of these being buy (or strong buy) recommendations by the 
underwriters and the other half being lower-level recommendations or 
                                               
64
 The extension of the quiet period was part of the measure preceding the Global Settlement for 
managing underwriters. The length of the quiet period was changed by the NASD Rule 2711 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3675. 
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recommendations by non-underwriters.  Bradley, Jordan and Ritter (2003, 2008) find 
that the percent of cases with analyst initiation, the frequency of underwriter 
involvement, and the positiveness of the recommendations all increased over the 1996 
– 2000 period.   Across this period, 76% of IPOs had analyst coverage initiated 
immediately at the expiration of the quiet period (increasing from 58% to 95% over 
this five-year period), and 95% of recommendations were a buy or strong buy.  
Among 1999 – 2000 IPO,  Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008) find that the first 
recommendation comes from the lead or co-lead underwriter in 89% of cases.  
The ways in which the market interprets the positive recommendations of 
affiliated analysts is a matter of some debate in the literature, potentially due to 
changes over time.  The first paper to take an in-depth look at analyst coverage after 
IPOs, Michaely and Womack (1999), shows that managing underwriters tend to 
provide more positive analyst recommendations than other brokerage firms, but that 
these recommendations are more likely to be biased.  Over the long-run, firms with 
buy recommendations from unaffiliated analysts tend to outperform firms with a 
similar recommendation from the lead underwriter.  Michaely and Womack (1999) 
empirically show that conflicts of interest within the bank contribute to such a bias.  
Specifically, analysts might strategically provide more positive recommendations to 
make the bank more attractive as a potential underwriter in future offerings. 
In contrast to Michaely and Womack, Bradley et al (2003) find little difference 
in either the recommendations or the associated abnormal returns of the affiliated 
versus non-affiliated analysts.  The market interprets these initiations of analyst 
coverage as positive news, regardless of the analyst providing the recommendation.  
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Companies that receive the first analyst recommendation immediately upon expiration 
of the quiet period, experience a 4.1% abnormal return, compared to a 0.1% abnormal 
return among their counterparts with no coverage initiations.   
James and Karceski (2006) attempt to shed further light on differences between 
affiliated versus nonaffiliated analysts through an investigation of both 
recommendations and target price estimates, where the latter shows more variation.  
Their results provide further evidence that analysts affiliated with the lead underwriter 
are more optimistic than other analysts.  Similar to Michaely and Womack, they find 
that the differences between affiliated and non-affiliated analysts are concentrated 
within issues that performed poorly after the IPO, for example those with non-positive 
initial returns.  However, while these ‘booster shots’ are presumably intended to 
bolster the price of the newly public firm, the authors find that the market discounts 
these affiliated recommendations. 
The incentives of underwriter banks to provide positive recommendations are 
high.  For example, Krigman, Shaw and Womack (2001) and Cliff and Denis (2004) 
show that companies are more prone to switch underwriters between the IPO and SEO 
if the bank did not provide extensive analyst coverage after the initial offering.  
Moreover, companies perceive these analyst recommendations as an important 
determinant in their selection of an underwriter.  Dunbar (2000) finds that changes in 
investment bank market share year-to-year are positively related to changes in the 
reputation of the bank’s analysts, particularly within the set of highly ranked 
investment banks.         
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In a study that includes both debt and equity offerings and both IPOs and 
SEOs, Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) argue that the effects of analysts are 
limited to whether a bank has an all-star analyst within the issuer’s industry;  banks do 
not win more underwriting business through inflated analyst recommendations.65  
Their findings highlight the importance of long-term relations between the bank and 
the firm, for example whether the bank has underwritten past bond, loan, or equity 
offerings or has an equity investment in the firm, as determinants of bank selection.   
The strategic upward bias in analyst recommendations harms market 
efficiency, and it predominantly affects the small investors who rely more on the 
information provided.  The former New York State Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, 
investigated the analyst activity of the largest investment banks.  The investigation 
found that most banks directed their analysts to issue only bullish recommendations. 
The Global Analyst Research Settlement (Global Settlement) of April 28, 2003 is an 
enforcement agreement that was reached as an outcome of this investigation.  Ten 
investment banks (Bear Stearns, Credit Suisse First Boston, Deutsche Bank, Goldman 
Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, 
Salomon Smith Barney, UBS Warburg) cumulatively paid $1.4 billion in fines under 
the Global Settlement.  Also, banks were required to isolate their banking and analyst 
departments with so-called “Chinese Walls”.  For instance, analysts were no longer 
allowed to participate in the IPO roadshows.  As noted earlier, the Global Settlement 
also increased the length of the quiet period from 25 to 40 days and enforced the 
                                               
65 Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2009), using a similar sample of IPOs, SEOs, and debt offerings, 
conclude that the selection of co-managers is positively related to analyst optimism. 
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disclosure of historic analyst rankings, allowing investors a better relative perspective 
on how bullish the analyst really is. 
Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach (2009) explore the changes in analyst 
behavior after the Global Settlement.  They find that sanctioned banks switched from a 
five category ranking to a ranking with only three categories: optimistic, neutral and 
pessimistic.  Moreover, the frequency of optimistic recommendations significantly 
decreased after the Global Settlement.  Their results suggest that following the Global 
Settlement there is no longer a significant difference in the recommendations of 
affiliated versus unaffiliated analysts.  Consistent with the notion that 
recommendations were biased prior to the GS, they find that following the 
implementation of the new ranking system, market reactions to optimistic 
recommendation became stronger while reactions to negative and neutral 
recommendations became more negative.  In sum, their results indicate that the Global 
Settlement had some success in alleviating of conflicts of interests within underwriter 
banks. 
More recently, the JOBS Act has again allowed for changes in the role of 
analysts.  The JOBS Act aimed to increase the net benefits of going public for IPO 
issuers with less than $1 billion in pre-IPO annual revenue, and one portion of the Act 
was to increase the involvement of research analysts. Specifically, analysts affiliated 
with the underwriter are allowed to attend pitch meetings, to attend due diligence 
sessions, and to interact with potential investors prior to the IPO.  Importantly, the 
JOBS Act did not relax the restrictions on analyst compensation, which were put in 
place as part of the Global Settlement.  Dambra, Field, Gustafson, and Pisciotta (2016) 
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examine whether this involvement of affiliated analysts contributes to: (1) more 
accurate earnings forecasts, which would potentially benefit the company through the 
lower information asymmetry, or (2) more optimistically biased earnings, which 
would potentially help the bank through increased banking or trading revenues.  
Analyses of firm abnormal returns and of trading volume support the importance of 
the latter factor.  In sum, the pre-IPO involvement of the research analysts appears to 
benefit the bank rather than the firm. 
Going back to Rock (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989) IPO 
underpricing theories have posited that institutional investors have an informational 
advantage and that as a result of this advantage they obtain greater allocations of 
underpriced shares.  As discussed in Section 4, several papers have examined 
allocations to the IPO, as a way to better understand the ways in which the 
bookbuilding mechanism rewards institutional investors.  In addition to these 
previously discussed studies, another stream of literature has examined institutions’ 
behavior in the aftermarket, with a focus on the extent to which institutions play a 
supportive role for cold IPOs, the extent to which institutions’ information advantage 
continues after the IPO, and the extent to which institutions profit from their 
allocations. 
Underwriters who are trying to support the price of IPOs that received a cold 
shoulder by the market, (for example cases in which the underwriter engaged in price 
support to avoid a precipitous price drop after the IPO; see section 3 for a discussion), 
have an obvious preference that institutions hold on to their shares rather than quickly 
flip their shares.  From the perspective of institutions, incentives are more nuanced.  
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Looking at the P&L for any given IPO, institutions would prefer to quickly sell their 
shares if they believe its price is going to go down, in an effort to limit losses.  
However, since underwriters potentially link allocations of subsequent IPOs to such 
flipping behavior, institutions may optimally elect to hold ‘cold’ shares longer.  Both 
Aggarwal (2003) and Chemmanur, Hu and Huang (2010) find evidence to support the 
latter scenario.  Using a sample of proprietary data on 193 IPOs managed by nine 
large investment banks over the May 1997 – June 1998 period, Aggarwal finds that 
approximately 15% of shares offered are flipped within the first two days, with 
flipping being higher among institutional investors and in hot IPOs.  Using a 
combination of 13F data and proprietary transaction-level trading data from 
Abel/Noser Corporation to examine the trading of 419 large institutions across 909 
IPOs between 1999 and 2004, Chemmanur, Huang and Hu (2010) find that 
underwriters reward those institutions that hold cold IPOs longer with higher 
allocations in subsequent underpriced IPOs.   In addition to shedding insight on 
flipping behavior, an important conclusion from these findings is that flipping makes 
quarterly 13F holdings a very imperfect proxy for IPO allocations, a point that future 
researchers should bear in mind.    
Field and Lowry (2009) investigate the relation between institutional holdings 
and post-IPO returns over longer intervals.  Focusing on holdings at least six weeks 
after the offering (after the effects of price-support and flipping restrictions have 
wound down), they find that institutional ownership is significantly positively related 
to post-IPO performance.  Institutions are significantly less likely to hold shares in 
those companies with especially poor post-IPO long-run performance.  They conclude 
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that institutions’ superior performance, compared to that of individuals, stems from a 
superior ability to analyze the publicly available data.  Institutions disproportionately 
invest in the types of firms that earn significantly higher abnormal returns, for 
example firms that are venture backed, were backed by higher-ranked underwriters, 
etc.   
 Chemmanur, Hu, and Huang (2010) similarly conclude that institutions have 
an informational advantage during the months after the IPO, but unlike Field and 
Lowry they conclude that private information contributes to this advantage.  They 
further find that only the trades of institutions that participated directly in the IPO (i.e., 
who were allocated shares) are predictive of subsequent returns, and they conclude 
that institutions’ information advantage arises from participation in the IPO.  
However, the fact that participation in any IPO represents a choice makes it difficult to 
differentiate this interpretation from one driven by sample selection, where those 
institutions that choose to participate are those with incremental insight into firm 
value. 
IPO cycles 
As first documented by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ibbotson, Sindelar and 
Ritter (1988, 1994) and as highlighted in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the IPO market is 
characterized by dramatic fluctuations over time.  Both the number of companies 
going public and average initial returns vary substantially, with the periods of highest 
initial returns being followed several months later by peaks in the number of IPOs.  In 
addition, the figure also highlights the secular decrease in the number of IPOs starting 
in 2000 (which we discussed in previous sections).  Cycles in the post-2000 period are 
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more muted, with ‘hot markets’ being ‘less hot’, compared to the hot markets of the 
late-1990s or mid-1980s.  Finally, there is some evidence of cycles in post-IPO 
outcomes as well.  For example, looking at Figure 3.14 we see that the percent of 
firms delisting for poor performance was substantially higher among those issued 
during the hot markets of the mid-1980s and late 1990s.  Fama and French (2004) 
document that whereas 17% of firms going public in 1973 delisted for poor 
performance within ten years, this increased to 44% of firms going public between 
1980 and 1991.   Figure 3.14 indicates that this percentage has been lower in more 
recent years. 
What is the reason for these cycles and for the empirical regularities associated 
with them? Similar to examinations of other patterns in IPO markets, the literature has 
debated whether these fluctuations are driven by irrationalities (e.g., investor 
optimism) or whether they are consistent with efficient markets.  Posited explanations 
in the literature include: 
• Fluctuations in investor sentiment, which cause investors to overvalue 
equity and to overpay for newly public companies during some periods 
• Fluctuations in demands for capital, for example as driven by variation 
in marcroeconomic conditions 
• Fluctuations in market-wide information asymmetry, which affect the 
costs of issuing equity  
• Variation in the real option of staying private 
• Product-market effects 
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In an attempt to understand why so many companies go public during some 
periods, combined with so few during others, Lowry (2003) focuses on the first three 
of these potential explanations:  demands for capital, investor sentiment, and 
information asymmetry.  In a series of regressions of IPO volume on proxies for each 
of these factors, combined with analyses of post-IPO returns of companies going 
public during different periods, she finds strong support for the first two factors, 
combined with minimal support for the third. Consistent with more companies going 
public when economy-wide conditions are favorable and thus firms’ demands for 
capital higher, the number of IPOs is significantly positively related to the future sales 
growth of all publicly traded firms and to the change in the number of new  companies 
incorporating, a measure of new business creation.66  Investor sentiment also plays an 
important role, as evidenced by the finding that IPO trading volume is negatively 
related to both the closed-end fund discount and to future market returns.  In economic 
terms, she concludes that variation in investor sentiment has an effect two times larger 
than demand for capital. 
 Pastor and Veronesi (2005) come to a different conclusion regarding the 
effects of mispricing.  They present a real options model of the decision to go public, 
where mispricing plays no role.  Rather, the decision is a function of expected market 
returns, expected aggregate profitability, and prior uncertainty.   Variation in these 
factors causes variation in managers’ decisions to exercise their options to go public.  
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 It is intriguing that the number of IPOs is positively related to future sales growth of publicly traded 
companies and future GDP growth, as shown by both Lowry (2003) and Gao, Ritter, and Zhao (2013), 
but negatively related to future market returns (as discussed in more detail below).  This combination of 
findings is consistent with Pastor and Veronesi’s model, which suggests that more companies tend to go 
public when growth opportunities have been priced into stocks; the realization of these growth 
opportunities is observed through subsequent sales and GDP growth. 
245 
The result is cycles in IPO volume that are generated without any mispricing.   In a 
similar vein, Benninga, Helmantel and Sarig (2005) also consider the decision to go 
public as a trade-off:  managers lose private benefits of control, but gain capital to 
grow the firm as well as the ability to diversify.  When expected future cash flows are 
higher, for example as a result of a positive economic shock, the net benefits of going 
public are more likely to be positive.  Because firms’ cash flows are cross-sectionally 
correlated, we observe cycles in IPO volume.67 These models however, are unable to 
explain the significantly higher failure rate among firms who go public during hot 
markets.  
Beyond the cycles in the number of companies going public, perhaps even 
more puzzling is the strong autocorrelation in initial returns, combined with the fact 
that the periods of highest initial returns are followed several months later by the 
periods of highest number of IPOs.  This simple statistical pattern appears to raise an 
interesting issue:  why would companies choose to go public when underpricing is 
particularly high?  Several explanations have been posed, though many share certain 
common features.  Lowry and Schwert (2002) conclude that the serial correlation in 
initial returns is entirely driven by two factors: changes in the types of firms that go 
public over time (with certain types of firms tending to be more underpriced than 
others, see, e.g., Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986)), and by information that 
becomes available during the registration period but is only partially incorporated into 
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 Chemmanur and He (2011) argue that product market effects can cause cycles in IPO markets to arise 
in the absence of either productivity shocks or investor sentiment. If the proceeds raised through an IPO 
enable a company to compete more aggressively, then a company may decide to go public as a means to 
gain market share.  However, the fact that a competitor plans to go public potentially causes other firms 
in the industry to also go public, as a means to avoid losing market share.   
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the offer price (with positive information learned during the filing period being 
associated with higher price updates and higher initial returns, see, e.g., Benveniste 
and Spindt)).  In sum, the answer that this paper provides to the apparent puzzle posed 
at the beginning of this paragraph “why would companies choose to go public when 
underpricing is particularly high” is that high recent underpricing does not mean that a 
company will be more underpriced; rather, it indicates that high information 
asymmetry companies have been going public and it suggests that the company will be 
able to raise more money than previously expected.  As discussed below, subsequent 
studies that have investigated whether these hot markets represent periods when the 
market fundamentally overvalues these IPO firms (for example through examinations 
of post-IPO returns) reach different conclusions.   
Another possible explanation for this relation is related to Purnanandam and 
Swaminathan’s (2004) findings. They show that while IPOs are priced relative to their 
trading peers (e.g., industry comparables), they are priced in comparison to the left tale 
of the trading peers’ distribution. Thus when the market is over-valued, we see a 
phenomena of high first day returns, as we documented above. Also when the market 
is over-valued more firms go public because they receive high valuations. Thus the 
positive association between IPO volume and large first day returns is not causal but 
rather due to the omitted over-valuation of all firms in the economy or industry, which 
causes more firm to go public.  
The conclusion that economic shocks in conjunction with information 
spillovers generate many of the observed cycles in IPOs, including both the numbers 
of IPOs and average initial returns, has also been shown empirically by Benveniste, 
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Ljungqvist, Wilhelm and Yu (2003) and theoretically by Alti (2005), who discuss the 
ways in which information learned by one company affects the decisions of 
subsequent companies to go public.  Across this literature, there is a common 
consensus that at least a portion of cycles represent the effects of learning:  if the first 
company learns that the market values it more highly than expected, then subsequent 
companies are more likely to go public.  This conclusion is consistent with practitioner 
accounts of one company ‘testing the waters’, and other companies waiting to observe 
how that offering will be received by the market.  
Finally, several papers have focused on the role of the underwriter in 
generating the observed cycles.  On the one hand, if more information is produced 
when many companies go public, then underwriters have incentives to encourage 
clustering in the volume of companies going public (see, e.g., Benveniste, Ljungqvist, 
Wilhelm and Yu (2003); He (2007)).  Alternatively, if the underwriter has certain 
constraints in labor supply, then it may be less able to accurately value companies 
when the number of IPOs is extremely high (see, e.g., Khanna, Noe and Sonti (2007)).  
Finally, if underwriters have greater market power during periods when more 
companies are going public (for example if companies are all competing for coverage 
from the highest profile analysts), this would similarly contribute toward a positive 
relation between underpricing and the number of companies going public (see, e.g., 
Liu and Ritter (2011)).   Boeh and Dunbar (2016) find evidence in support of this last 
theory.68 
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 Specifically, Boeh and Dunbar use the number of companies that register to go public after the IPO of 
focus, to avoid endogeneity issues.  They find that this pipeline measure is positively related to 
underpricing. 
248 
A common idea behind many of the above conclusions is that the type of firm 
going public varies over time.  The ‘efficient markets’ explanation is that a 
technological innovation or economic shock causes certain firms to demand more 
capital to fund positive NPV projects, for example firms in certain industries or riskier 
firms whose prospects had previously been less certain.  Alternatively, the ‘investor 
sentiment’ explanation is that lower quality firms will go public during hot markets, 
when the firms are able to raise equity at a price exceeding true value.   Within the 
empirical literature, there is a lack of consensus on both the extent to which firm type 
varies over cycles and whether efficient markets versus investor sentiment 
explanations can better explain observed patterns. Our view is that both factors play 
significant roles.  Macro-economic conditions that influence demand for capital almost 
certainly are important.  However, beyond this, many patterns in the data suggest the 
influence of over-valuation:  during hot markets, riskier firms are able to raise capital 
and first day returns are significantly higher, suggesting that investors view those 
firms’ cost of capital lower than their underwriters and participating institutions.  
Finally, there is evidence that firms going public during hot market under-perform in 
absolute terms.  
An alternative to examining firm characteristics directly is to focus on post-
IPO performance.  Yung, Colak and Wang (2008) find that companies going public in 
hot markets have both a higher standard deviation of post-IPO long-run abnormal 
returns (measured for example over the three to twelve months after the IPO) and are 
significantly more likely to have the extremely bad outcome of delisting for poor 
performance, as we also show in Figure 14.  This evidence is consistent with greater 
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dispersion in the types of companies going public in hot markets, including more 
lower quality firms.  However, it doesn’t directly address the question of whether hot 
market IPOs are on average more overpriced, as the authors do not compare average 
abnormal returns.69 
Lowry, Officer and Schwert (2010) examine variation in firm type through a 
very different avenue.  They note that Beatty and Ritter’s (1986) extension of Rock’s 
(1986) model predicts that higher information asymmetry companies will tend to have 
both a higher level of initial returns and a lower precision of pricing.  In other words, 
to the extent that certain periods are characterized by higher information asymmetry 
companies, we would expect both the average level and the volatility of underpricing 
(measured as average initial returns, and as the cross-sectional standard deviation of 
initial returns, respectively, across all IPOs in a month) to be higher.  Consistent with 
this conjecture, they find a strong positive correlation between these series, leading to 
the conclusion that a substantial portion of the cycles in initial returns is driven by 
variation in the information asymmetry of the firms going public, combined with 
underwriters’ challenges in accurately valuing these types of firms.  
The evidence in Lowry et al (2010) is important but does not address the extent 
to which changing investor sentiment (and firms’ associated abilities to capture over-
valuation) contributes to cycles in IPO volume.  That is do firms going public in hot 
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 Helwege and Liang (2004) examine variation in firm characteristics directly, over hot versus cold 
markets.  They fail to find consistent evidence of hot market IPO firms being riskier, or more 
characteristic of young start-ups.  For example, while hot market IPOs have lower operating income, 
they are similar to cold market IPOs in terms of firm age and industry-adjusted market-to-book ratios.  
It would be interesting to revisit this issue using more recent data, and perhaps data from around the 
globe.  
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markets perform worse.    While clearly important, we discuss this issue last because 
there is not a clear answer in the literature.  Early papers such as Ritter (1991) and 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) conclude that hot market IPOs perform significantly worse 
in the long-term.  In a cross-sectional regression of post-IPO three year raw returns on 
market returns over the same period, IPO volume and various controls, Ritter (1991) 
finds a significantly negative coefficient on IPO volume.  Using Fama-MacBeth 
regressions of monthly stock returns on firm size, book-to-market, and an issue 
dummy equal to one if the firm had an IPO or SEO over the past five years (1970 – 
1990 period), Loughran and Ritter (1995) conclude that firms going public in hot 
markets underperformed by 60 basis points per month, compared to only 17 points per 
month for firms going public in cold markets.70   
Lowry (2003) finds that this conclusion regarding the greater 
underperformance of hot market IPOs is sensitive to test specification.  Looking at 
abnormal returns of IPO firms relative to matched size and book-to-market portfolio 
benchmarks (1973 – 1996 period), she confirms that firms going public in the lowest 
IPO volume quartile periods tend to perform the best, but finds little evidence that 
abnormal returns are monotonic across the other quartiles or that the highest IPO 
volume quartile periods tend to perform the worst.  Further, the negative relation 
between IPO volume and post-IPO performance is strongest when using raw returns, 
and weakest (and insignificant) when using size and book-to-market abnormal returns.  
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 Specifically, for each of the 240 calendar months within the sample period, Loughran and Ritter 
estimate a cross-sectional regression of monthly returns across all stocks on firm size, market-to-book, 
and an issue dummy equal to one if the firm had an IPO or SEO within the past five years. 
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She concludes that firms are more likely to go public when they and also other similar 
firms are valued more highly by the market.  
However, it is important to note that ALL researchers agree that firms that go 
public during hot cycles do not perform well and investing in those IPOs results in a 
negative return on investment. The debate is whether this under-performance is unique 
to IPOs or also common to other non-IPOs with similar characteristics. 
Corporate Governance of IPO Firms 
As noted by both Baker and Gompers (2003) and Field and Karpoff (2002), 
pre-IPO shareholders have strong incentives to implement a corporate governance 
structure that maximizes firm value.  While the governance of mature firms generally 
represents the cumulative effects of many past decisions that may no longer be optimal 
for the firm, IPO firms start from a relatively blank slate; firms generally make many 
choices relative to governance shortly before going public.  However, this is not to say 
that IPO firms are immune from agency issues. For example, powerful CEOs might 
strive to protect the control they wielded prior to the IPO, to ensure continued control 
after the firm goes public; or controlling shareholders may implement a structure that 
is not in the best interests of minority shareholders.  The novelty of the corporate 
governance decisions of IPO firms combined their dynamics as firms mature makes 
IPO firms a particularly attractive setting in which to examine corporate governance. 
As highlighted by Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2007), one-size-fits all formats 
for corporate governance are unlikely to be optimal.  However, to the extent that the 
majority of research focuses on the same set of S&P1500 firms, our body of 
knowledge and associated regulatory changes are likely made based on one fairly 
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homogenous set of firms, a concern voiced by Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).  In a 
related vein, there is growing evidence that proxy advisory firms both have broad 
influence and base their recommendations on one-size-fits-all policies (see, e.g., Iliev 
and Lowry, 2015).  Such practices have potential to harm newly public firms if they 
push these firms to implement policies that do not maximize firm value.  In light of 
such issues, we focus our discussion on papers that highlight differences between IPO 
firms and their more mature counterparts, including the economic reasons for the 
differences and they ways in which these differences are likely to affect governance 
structures.  
Motivated by firms’ strong incentives to establish optimal structures when 
raising equity for the first time, Baker and Gompers (2003) was one of the early 
papers to focus on the governance structure of IPO firms.   Their results highlight the 
positive influence of a concentrated shareholder such as a venture capitalist.  Venture 
capitalists actively influence Board structure, as evidenced by the fact that the Boards 
of VC-backed firms tend to have more outsider directors.  More reputable VCs are 
particularly influential, for example being more likely to fire the CEO prior to the IPO.   
However, the paper also demonstrates that agency issues can play a role even at this 
early point in a firm’s life cycle.  More powerful CEOs successfully limit the influence 
of VCs, for example by limiting the number of Board seats they hold.  Hellmann and 
Puri (2002) provide further evidence on the ways in which venture capitalists 
influence start-up firms, for example in influencing human resource policies and 
encouraging the adoption of stock option plans. 
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Field and Karpoff (2002) highlight the ways in which agency issues play a 
role, at the time the firm is setting up its governance in preparation to go public.  
Within their sample of over 1,000 IPOs between 1988 and 1992, over 50% have at 
least one takeover defense at the time of the IPO.  Their body of evidence is consistent 
with managers implementing these defenses as a means to maintain their private 
benefits of control. 
The interplay of pre-IPO investors’ demands for optimal governance structures 
combined with managers’ incentives to maintain private benefits of control raises 
questions regarding the ways in which governance varies cross-sectionally and 
evolves over time, for example across firms whose businesses yield different demands 
for governance and whose ownership structures imply different private benefits of 
control.  In this vein, Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007) find that demands for 
monitoring, agency issues, and the power of the CEO all influence Board structure.  
More complex firms demand larger Boards and more independent directors to perform 
the greater amount of monitoring.  Firms in which there are more private benefits 
available to insiders also tend to have larger Boards to perform the necessary 
monitoring, but this relation is weaker in cases where the cost of monitoring is high, 
for example among firms with high return variance or high R&D.  Finally, consistent 
with Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), CEO influence also plays an important role:  
CEO’s with higher ownership and longer tenure have fewer independent directors on 
the Board, particularly in cases where there are fewer constraints on the CEO, for 
example when ownership of outside directors is low and there is no VC.  As firms 
evolve over the years following the IPO, with firms generally becoming more complex 
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and ownership of pre-IPO shareholders decreasing, the structure of the Board evolves 
as well. 
This evidence on the evolution of the Board suggests that the governance of 
IPO firms should differ from that of more mature firms, an issue that Field, Lowry, 
and Mkrtchyan (2013) examine directly.  Broadly speaking, the Board is tasked with 
monitoring and advising management.  Field et al argue that newly public firms differ 
both in their demands for monitoring and in their demands for advising (compared to 
their more mature counterparts):  the inexperience of management in running a public 
firm contributes to a high demand for advising, whereas the high ownership of pre-
IPO owners leads to lower agency costs and thus a relatively low demand for 
monitoring.  As such, these firms should seek to hire directors that have an expertise in 
advising, focusing less on their monitoring capabilities.  In particular, IPO firms 
should benefit from busy directors, defined as directors that serve on three or more 
Boards, because such directors likely have substantial experience and connections that 
increase their value as advisors.  The fact that they also likely have less time to 
diligently monitor the firm should be less of a concern, because of the relatively low 
agency costs in these firms.  Empirical tests focusing around the time of the IPO 
provide strong support for these conjectures.  As firms mature, the type of director 
also changes in ways that are consistent with demands for monitoring increasing and 
demands for advising decreasing – specifically, firms choose far fewer busy directors 
as they mature.  
Chahine and Goergen (2013, 2014) emphasize in several papers that IPO firms 
also likely differ in their access to high quality directors.  Management is likely to 
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have a smaller network, compared to their counterparts in more mature, larger firms.  
While not highlighted in these papers, we would argue that these effects are likely 
concentrated in firms that are not backed by a venture-capitalist. 
Johnson, Karpoff and Yi (2015) provide further evidence on the ways in which 
IPO firms’ have unique demands for governance.  To the extent that IPO firms are 
more likely to be taken over after going public, for example because the owners have 
less control, a firm’s business partners have reasons to be concerned.  Specifically, if 
the IPO firm is taken over, the pre-existing relationships become more uncertain.  The 
IPO firm can protect the value of these relationships through the use of take-over 
defenses.  Consistent with these arguments, Johnson et al find that among firms with 
such relationships, the use of takeover defenses is positively related to the longevity of 
these relationships and to post-IPO operating performance. 
Johnson et al’s findings are consistent with the more general argument that 
anti-takeover provisions can potentially provide a benefit, in addition to a cost.  The 
benefit is that it allows the firm to pursue a longer-term growth strategy.  A firm with 
lower risk of being subject to a takeover is less concerned with short-term results.  
This is beneficial if it gives managers the flexibility to pursue long-term positive NPV 
projects, but costly if it allows managers to enjoy the quiet life or otherwise 
overconsume perquisites.   
Perhaps reflecting differences in these cost-benefit trade-offs, Field and Lowry 
(2017) show striking differences between IPO firms and more mature firms in the 
choice to have a classified board.  The percent of IPO firms with classified boards has 
increased from 40% in 1990 to nearly 80% as of 2014.  In stark contrast, the percent of 
256 
mature firms with classified boards has decreased from 60% to 40% over the same 
period.  Coincident with these trends, the percent of IPOs firms incorporating in 
Delaware has also dramatically increased, from 57% to 88%, a decision that arguably 
decreases litigation-related uncertainty for firms (see, e.g., Romano, 1985).  Field and 
Lowry conjecture that these trends in IPO firms’ governance choices are related to an 
increase in activism, in particular by proxy advisory firms such as ISS.  If entities such 
as ISS fail to appreciate the unique governance demands of IPOs, for example the 
directors who are best qualified to advise the newly public firms, then the firm might 
be at greater risk of suboptimal outcomes in shareholder votes.  Firms can potentially 
protect themselves from such risks by only putting directors up for vote every three 
years, i.e., by having a classified board.   An analysis of voting data provides support 
for these conjectures. 
Field and Lowry also find cross-sectional differences in these time trends, with 
the trend toward classified board being particularly high among R&D intensive firms.  
This is consistent with Manso’s (2011) hypothesis that that a long-term focus, as 
would be facilitated by a classified board, encourages innovation.  In a similar vein, 
Baranchuk, Kieschnick, and Moussawi (2014) find that IPO firms focused on 
innovation tend to employ incentive compensation and long vesting periods. 
The governance structure that provides the strongest protection to management 
is arguably a dual-class structure.  Conditional on the B-shares having sufficient 
voting power, it is impossible to oust management.  Consistent with this, Smart and 
Zutter (2003) find that firms that go public with a dual class structure experience far 
fewer control events.  Moreover, consistent with agency costs being higher in such 
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firms, Smart and Zutter also find that the stock of dual-class firms trades at lower 
values, and top management receives higher compensation.  Similarly, Arugaslan, 
Cook, and Kieschnick (2010) conclude that dual class structures are driven by private 
benefits of control, rather than an effort to focus managers on the long-term rather than 
short-term stock fluctuations.  As with much of the earlier research in corporate 
governance, a potential concern relates to the possibility that dual class structures are 
concentrated within certain types of firms, and these firm typ 
Aes tend to have offer higher compensation irrespective of whether they have 
dual-class stock.  Future research that can better address these issues is important, 
particularly in light of the fact that while dual class structures are becoming less 
common in mature firms, Field and Lowry document no evidence of such a decline in 
IPO firms. In fact, many of the high-flying IPOs, such as Google, Facebook Twitter 
and more went public with dual-class share structure.  
Consistent with theory, Kim and Michaely (2017) find that the benefits of dual 
class shares vary with firm age, where dual class structure is more beneficial on net for 
young firms. They find no evidence of a dual-class valuation discount for young firms, 
while there is a significant discount for old firms. In addition, young dual-class firms 
show marginally higher ROA and operating margins than young single-class firms, 
while old dual-class firms exhibit statistically indistinguishable performance from old 
single-class firms. In contrast to these findings on operating profitability, they find 
evidence that old dual-class firms use “assets-in-place” (capital and labor stocks) less 
efficiently than older single-class firms, but again, this is not the case for young firms. 
In particular, old dual-class firms have significantly lower asset turnover and labor 
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productivity, and their capital expenditures and employment changes are significantly 
less responsive to changes in Tobin’s q, a proxy for investment opportunities, all 
relative to old single-class firms. These results suggest that old dual-class firms may 
face higher costs of capital due to higher capital and labor adjustment costs. Consistent 
with this explanation, they find that old dual-class firms’ equities have significantly 
higher loadings on the Fama-French value factor and higher expected returns.   
In a similar vein, Johnson, Karpoff and Yi (2016) find that the value of 
takeover defenses declines as firms age, where they examine the six provisions in the 
E-index:  classified boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority 
requirements to change firm bylaws, to change the firm charter, and to approve 
mergers.  They argue that while companies would optimally remove such defenses as 
they progress through the life cycle, takeover defenses are sticky.  As a result, older 
firms in many cases continue to have defenses that no longer contribute positively to 
firm value. 
The underlying assumption of a strong corporate governance structure is that 
this positively affects the quality of management, for example because directors incur 
the greater costs of searching for higher quality management to hire and because they 
are more likely to fire underperforming managers.  Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005) 
evaluate directly the effects of management quality in IPO firms.71  In addition, to 
providing informative descriptives across this wide set of factors, the documented 
                                               
71
 The authors characterize management quality as higher if: the firm has a greater number of officers of 
rank vice-president or higher adjusted for firm size;  a greater percentage of firm management has an 
MBA degree; a higher percentage of the management team has past work experience as a vice-president 
or higher or past experience as a partner in a law or accounting firm;  average tenure of the management 
team is higher, suggesting greater cohesion of the team; a greater number of non-profit Boards on which 
the management team sits.  In addition, the authors also consider CEO dominance, measured as the 
percent of total management compensation earned by the CEO.   
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relations between these metrics and firm outcomes confirms the importance of a high 
quality management team.  Specifically, all else equal, firms with higher quality 
management teams successfully hire more reputable underwriters, raise more equity in 
the IPO, and attract more institutional investors.  In the long-run, there is some 
evidence of a positive relation between the quality of the management team and 
performance.  The authors focus on non-VC backed firms in this paper, to ensure that 
they capture the effects of management per se, rather than the VC.  In a more recent 
paper, Chemmanur, Simonyan and Tehranian (2014) find that the VC has a direct 
effect on management quality, and that within VC-backed firms both the venture 
capitalist and the quality of the management influence post-IPO outcomes of the firms. 
In addition to choosing management, the Board of Directors also controls the 
compensation of top management.  While there has not been a lot of research on 
compensation within IPO firms, Pukthuanthong, Roll, and Walker (2007) document 
that the average firm has a substantial number of options at the time of the IPO with 
options equal to 50% of shares offered in the IPO.  They find that a balanced 
combination of equity ownership and options is positively related to post-IPO 
operating performance, which they argue is consistent with the options providing 
higher incentives but potentially encouraging excessive risk taking, where the latter 
influence can be mitigated through equity ownership.   
 Finally, one of the important aspects of studying the corporate governance of 
IPOs is that it can potentially inform us on issues beyond IPOs. For example, it can 
inform us on the importance of fitting the firm’s governance to the firm’s life cycle 
stage. Young firms may not have the same optimal governance structure as more 
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mature firms. For example, concentrated ownership (or equivalently dual class share 
structure) may be beneficial early on in the life of the firm. It may have a different 
effect on value for more mature firms. Examining these dynamics around the IPO is 
informative. Consistent with these ideas, the evidence on the evolution of the Board 
suggests that the governance of IPO firms should differ from that of more mature 
firms. Similar effects likely apply for takeover provisions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
Public markets are an essential element of well-functioning capital markets. 
Public markets can potentially lower firms’ cost of capital, enable the general public 
as well as entrepreneurs to hold diversified portfolios, allow for liquidity at relatively 
low costs, and facilitate effective monitoring of firms. By implication, it is essential 
that private, typically young firms move from the private to the public market by 
offering their shares to the public. This process, the IPO process, is what we have 
attempted to describe and explain in this chapter.  
This chapter both provides an overview of the many parties involved in 
bringing a firm public and highlights the ways in which the incentives of each 
influence the entire process.  The IPO company’s management, who in many cases 
represent the firm’s founders, are generally motivated by a combination of 
maximizing shareholder value and retaining some private benefits of control that they 
may have enjoyed while the firm was private.  However, this management also in 
many cases has limited experience with the IPO process, which potentially makes 
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them more dependent on intermediaries.  Intermediaries are generally more 
experienced, but there exist the potential for agency costs within each:  the venture 
capitalists and banks that provide funding to the firm in its more nascent stages, the 
underwriters that manage the firm’s first public equity offering, and the institutions 
and analysts that potentially influence the stock price once the firm is public.  Finally, 
layered on top of all of these various incentives, evidence suggests that behavioral 
biases within the public markets also influence the price at which companies’ can raise 
capital. 
In aggregate, all of these factors influence the costs and benefits of going 
public.  It is important to remember that if going public was all good, i.e., that there 
were only benefits to going public, many more firms, would have gone public. There 
are costs involved in both the process and the outcome (being public); and these costs 
vary among firms.  In the wake of the recent downturn in the number or companies 
going public, several recent papers have attempted to shed light on the costs versus 
benefits of being a publicly traded firm versus a private firm.   
In a frictionless, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1961) world, private and public 
firms should behave similarly:  capital structure should be irrelevant, cost of capital 
should not vary across firms, and firms should take all positive NPV projects.  
However, once frictions are introduced, theory suggests various differences.   
Consistent with theory, empirical evidence has found significant differences.  
For example, consistent with public listing lowering information asymmetry and 
increasing liquidity, Brav’s (2009) examination of private and public firms in the 
United Kingdom leads him to conclude that private firms have a higher cost of capital. 
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Empirical literature regarding the effects of public listing on investment 
behavior are more nuanced.   Together, findings from Gilje and Taillard (2016) and 
Asker, Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2015) demonstrate that public listing can have 
both a positive and a negative effect.  On the one hand, public firms’ increased access 
to capital makes them better able to undertake positive NPV projects, an advantage 
that is particularly significant among capital-intensive positive projects.  However, 
public firms also suffer from heightened agency-related issues such as managerial 
myopia, which causes more short-term managers to avoid some positive NPV projects.  
Bernstein (2015) and Gao, Harford and Li (2013) provide added evidence suggesting 
that agency costs influence the investment behavior of public firms relative to their 
private counterparts, causing them both to engage in less innovation and to hold 
substantially more cash.   
In sum, a growing body of literature employs samples of private and public 
firms, combined with clever empirical specifications, to highlight both the benefits as 
well as the costs of public listing.  While public listing confers benefits such as a lower 
cost of capital, it comes with the nontrivial cost of higher agency-related issues that 
can distort investment decisions.  Further research along these dimensions is 
important, particularly in light of the decreasing numbers of companies going public. 
As we highlighted throughout this chapter, there are other issues related to the 
IPO process where we feel further research is warranted. There are many potential 
reasons why firms may want to go public, but it is not clear we have a good 
understanding which are the dominant drivers behind the decision. This is of first 
order importance. The answer to this question is not only important in its own right 
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but can also help understand other phenomena such as why firms are underpriced at 
the time of the IPO and when firms choose to go public.  
Another unresolved issue is the optimal going public mechanism. On the face 
of it, a mechanism that results in an average of 16.4% first day return and which has 
an opaque allocation mechanism that is subject to possible abuses is unlikely to be the 
optimal mechanism. We need a better understanding why bookbuilding is still the 
most common and dominant going public venue. And this issue may also be related to 
the high fees extracted by underwriters through the process.  
Finally, how to structure the optimal corporate governance for young firms is 
another open question. For example, we are seeing a large number of IPOs coming out 
to the market with a anti-takeover devices such as a classified board and a dual share 
structure; which are generally viewed as suboptimal among mature firms. It is possible 
and quite likely that considering the dynamics of corporate governance and how it is 
related to firms’ maturity will yield new and interesting insights
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